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T H E T R A G E D Y O F T H E R IV E R S : B U IL D IN G A U T H O R IT Y O V E R
T H E B R IT IS H W A T E R E N V IR O N M E N T

Kevin B. Vichcales, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2003

“The Tragedy of the Rivers: Building Authority over the British Water Environment”
examines the problem of rivers as common public resources in modern Britain. Viewed
historically, the enduring problem of environmental pollution control in Britain has been the
establishment of regulating authority over aspects of nature that are regarded simultaneously
as economic resources, public utilities, and public amenities. Legislators, subject to pressure
from industrial polluters, political parties, and advocates for environmental quality, sought at
different times to locate authority at local, regional, national and extra-national levels. Each
effort failed to resolve the issue of authority over the environment, because administrative
solutions merely shifted the pollution elsewhere. The administrative solution of nationally
directed, regionally administered multipurpose agencies ultimately failed as they were
undermined by internal conflicts of interest fueled by competing popular conceptions of river
water as a natural economic resource, a common commodity, or as an amenity for recreation
and leisure.
Three themes are evident from the study. The first was the struggle to define the
appropriate level at which authority over the environment was vested. The second concerned
the structural composition of institutions that were both regulator and polluter. The British
experience suggests that the multi-purpose structural arrangement of the regional water
authorities, who were both regulator and polluter, could not effectively function to protect the
river common. The third was howto use scientific and technical knowledge. Advocates for
one position or another have used scientific and technical knowledge as a neutral “authority”
to demonstrate the correctness of their position. However, there has been a gradual
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recognition that such knowledge is tentative, dependent upon conditions and subject to
change, which in one sense redefines the “authority” of this resource. Lastly, natural
ecosystems, such as river basins or watersheds, provided a geographical and natural
framework for regulatory control especially with regard to integrated resource management
and pollution control. The British experience in the 1970s suggests that while the proper
decision in regards to geographic size was ultimately made, the authorities created lacked
the necessary legislative powers to match their river systems. This remained a challenge for
the future.
The work is based upon primary materials gathered from the British Library, Public
Record Office, Thames Water PLC, the Port of London Authority, and the archives of the City
of London and the GLC. Contemporary materials include newspaper accounts, letters and
conference proceedings on related subjects and interviews with government officials, related
water and sanitary engineers, and pollution control officers. Relevant secondary literature
was also utilized.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“The Tragedy of the River: Building Authority over the British Water Environment”
examines the problem of rivers as common public resources in modern Britain. Viewed
historically, the enduring problem of environmental pollution control in Britain has been the
establishment of regulating authority over aspects of nature that are regarded simultaneously
as economic resources, public utilities, and public amenities. Legislators, subject to pressure
from industrial polluters, political parties, and advocates for environmental quality, sought at
different times to locate authority at local, regional, national and extra-national levels. Each
level represented an attempt to reconcile economic and political interests with the need for
strong, clear regulation of the common water environment. Along the way, legislators
discovered that the riverine watershed was the most natural and most effective area for
regulation; that multi-purpose agencies combining water supply with pollution control were
always undermined by conflicts of interest; and that pro-actively controlling pollution at its
specific sources is more effective than passively adjusting pollution discharge regulations to
constantly shifting levels of environmental water quality.
Coinciding with the "final" administrative decision to create regional water authorities,
Britain’s entrance into the European Community (EC) [today the European Union or EU] in
1973 also impacted British pollution control as the nation became subject to EU
environmental directives and policies. The EU has become the most effective level of
environmental authority so far. Even though it has not “solved” the problem of pollution, it
represents the most successful arena for resolving the many inevitable conflicts inherent in

environmental policy. Although Britain’s adherence to EU directives has often been reluctant
and dilatory, it has led to improved water quality in many areas of British life, including the
revival of the Thames River from lifeless sludge to a vital waterway.

1
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The Thames Valley offers a representative yet complex example of environmental
control. While there are other British rivers with more serious pollution problems, the Thames
has historically been managed by a complex group of national, regional, and local
governmental agencies making it unique in terms of defining authority over the environment
via institution building. One player in the region, The City Corporation of London, historically
gained exemptions from national pollution control legislation due to its archaic system of
political rights deriving from its position as the national political capital and financial center of
the nation. This illustrates just one example of why the Thames river basin offers an
opportunity to examine the British search for water pollution control on several levels of
authority simultaneously.
Three themes are evident in the study of the Thames. The first is the historical
struggle to define the appropriate level at which authority over the environment was vested.
The second concerns the structural composition of institutions that were both regulator and
polluter. The third is how scientific and technical knowledge was used. The British
experience suggests that the multi-purpose structural arrangement of the regional water
authorities, which were both regulator and polluter, could not effectively function to protect the
river common. Advocates for one position or another used scientific and technical knowledge
as a supposedly neutral “authority” to demonstrate the correctness of their position.
However, there has been a gradual recognition that such knowledge is tentative, dependent
upon conditions and subject to change, which in one sense redefines the “authority” of this
resource. Lastly, natural ecosystems, such as river basins or watersheds, provided a
geographical and natural framework for regulatory control especially with regard to integrated
resource management and pollution control. The British experience in the 1970s suggests
that while the proper decision in regards to geographic size was ultimately made, the
authorities created lacked the necessary legislative powers to match their river systems. This
remained a challenge for the future.
Two interrelated yet separate ideas underlie this study. The first is the idea of the
common as expressed by ecologist Garrett Hardin. His now classic essay “The Tragedy of
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the Commons,” published in the December 1968 issue of Science1 focused on the
interconnectedness of economic activity and environmental quality, and lamented the failure
of society to develop institutions or mechanisms for managing human ecology. As Hardin
made clear, the “tragedy of the commons” derived from the absence of any set of institutions
or social mechanisms to control the use of natural resources. The consequence of
unrestricted entry was overuse, and ultimately, the destruction of the common. Using the
example of grazing cattle on common lands, he showed it was to each person’s advantage to
increase the number of cattle they grazed, even though it was to the disadvantage of the
common as a natural resource. As a result, there was always an incentive to ruin the
common by overuse, and not always an incentive for the community as a whole to prevent it
through regulation.
The term “common” is applicable to any natural resource, such as water, air or land.
Hardin viewed the pollution problem in relation to the systemic growth of world population,
which he believed would outstrip the carrying capacity of the planet. In this model, Earth is
the ultimate common, and the tragedy derives from the freedom to breed and pollute.
Hardin's proposed solution was the development of “mutual coercion” mechanisms agreed
upon by the community. However, this left three practical yet difficult questions unanswered.
Could current political systems obtain the public support and cooperation needed to establish
effective systems of mutual coercion? Given the influences that could be brought to bear
against the establishment of such systems by the parties who would be most affected, a
positive answer to the question wa? very much in doubt >and remains so today. Secondly, if
such systems could be established, what forms should the coercion take? If absence of
regulatory mechanisms produced destruction of the common, what types of institutions or
regulation could effectively avert the tragedy?
The British experience with water pollution demonstrates the validity of Hardin’s
argument. Rivers historically served a variety of purposes, chief among them as the major
source of the population’s drinking water and the most expedient place for dumping of
wastes. The “tragedy of the river” in this study is its overuse by society, particularly as a
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place to put wastes, resulting in the destruction of its natural carrying capacities and its
usefulness for other industrial and amenity purposes. River pollution negatively affects a
river’s natural ecological balance, subsequently hampering its usefulness as a common
resource. Attempts to regulate river pollution led British society to explore the larger question
of whether it was possible to find means of mutual coercion to protect the natural resource
upon which they all depended. The historical record shows that while British political
institutions could legislate for the specific problem of river pollution, the institutions they built
lacked the powers necessary to effectively act on behalf of the common. This led British
government in a continuous search to build an effective institutional and regulatory
framework. This study surveys that search with a concentration on the 1970’s, when the
traditional institutional approach in Britain was radically altered in favor of a national
approach, which in turn was challenged by the concurrent development of a common
European Community environmental policy.
The second idea underlying this study is how societies wrestle with the problems of
pollution control. A useful model exploring these practical considerations is Joel Tarr's The
Search for the Ultimate Sink.2 examining cities as unique ecosystems. An often-cited essay
in the historical literature on pollution, it analyzes a number of shortsighted “solutions” to
waste-disposal problems. To remove human wastes from cities, sewer systems were built,
but these only removed the problem from one geographic area to another, shifting epidemic
diseases downstream from one population to another. To reduce concentrations of air
pollution, higher smokestacks were built, which produced acid rain in far-off places. To
comply with river pollution regulations, industries dumped hazardous wastes on land, which
soon polluted underground aquifers. Tarr concludes that the most common means of
disposing of wastes merely transfers the problem from one place to another and often from
one medium to another.
Tarr argues that the repeated shortsightedness of decision-makers in both
government and industry was due to a variety of economic, political, scientific, and cultural
factors that worked against a holistic approach to pollution control. Common examples
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included business leaders who almost always chose the least expensive “sink” for wastes,
and government officials who generally were spurred to action only by crisis, and sought
quick fixes even when experts warned of later problems. Science often proved inadequate,
but the widely shared faith in the efficacy of technological solutions encouraged shortsighted
problem solving. Government and industry often applied technological solutions based on
faulty data, merely shifting the problems someplace else.
The history of British river pollution lends itself to an application of Tarr’s thesis, and
this study is an extension of its principles to the arena of policy formation. Direct discharges
of pollutants from industry and cities led to the destruction of river ecosystems, thereby
threatening the common resource. The technological solution of sewer systems led to the
discharge of massive amounts of untreated sewage into British rivers. The need to remove
wastes from the urban environment led local officials to seek the cheapest and most
convenient method of waste disposal, often the local stream or river. In Britain, as
elsewhere, this merely transferred the problem from the urban (e.g. land) to the river (e.g.
aquatic) environment with subsequent effects downstream. As these consequences became
clear, policy-makers sought other solutions, subsequently placing them on a search for the
ultimate regulatory authority.
Authority can be defined in a number of ways. It may be moral, such as a minister
has over a congregation; legal, as defined by legislation with powers to sanction those who
break the norm; or expert, often based on scientific principles and rational thinking. For this
study “authority” may be characterized as (a) an agency delegated powers to set standards
of behavior, regulate, discipline, and advice; (b) recognized by its constituents (e.g.
government ministers, water users, and the public) as legitimate and effective, and therefore
(c) deemed worth influencing by interested parties (e.g. industry, politicians, activists). It is
generally held that a clearly defined authority makes politics “work” better. In Britain, the
tradition of “responsible” (e.g. local) government meant that authority should not only be
clearly defined, but also responsive to its constituencies. This contrasts sharply with other
societies where authority is based on military or religious sanctions. The story of British river
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pollution is largely the story of the search for the proper authority to solve the problem of
excessive water pollution. Over time a number of “solutions” were attempted through the
creation of various “authorities,” operating at different levels, who were charged with
responsibility for managing river pollution.
“The Tragedy of the River” is about water, its contamination by human activities, and
the search to find the appropriate institutional authority for pollution control. Its focus is
Britain but its features apply to many other countries. W ater and its cleanliness are universal
concerns, and the search for the proper authority for pollution control is common to most
nations. W ater has always been a controversial issue. Its multiple uses consistently put
different groups at odds with each other. Water's utility (e.g. for drinking, washing, flushing
wastes, agricultural irrigation and industrial purposes) created conflicts within both the private
and public spheres, resulting in pollution at such levels that it became necessary to create
public authorities to control water and its uses.
W ater pollution was a problem in England long before the advent of the Industrial
Revolution and the rise of modern urbanization. Even though medieval towns and cities
lacked the population of modem urban centers, the command over modern chemistry to
subtly pollute water with unseen substances, and the technical knowledge and means to
produce large-scale industrial wastes, they were nonetheless able to pollute their
environment through careless disposal methods.
Since the nineteenth century pollution of waterways has significantly increased, due
to a variety of factors including overall population growth, the development of large urban
centers that dumped wastes into rivers, and the creation of large-scale industries that used
and contaminated water through a variety of processes. Pollution reached such levels that
public demand for change spurred local and national governments to respond. While initial
responses were laudable, they were also largely ineffective in solving the problem. The
question of how pollution could and should be controlled remains a matter of public debate to
this day.
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During the decades after the Second World W ar several interrelated factors came
together to move environmental issues towards the center of the political agenda in Britain.
The 1960's witnessed the transformation and eventual splintering of the conservation
movement as its utilitarian foundations became challenged by newer, more aggressive
environmental groups.3 By 1970 there was increasingly vocal insistence from some of these
groups that large structural changes were required if the world was to survive into the next
millennium. The concerns of experts and environmental groups engendered a mass
movement that swept the industrialized world. Nature and natural resources were no longer
the sole focus of debate; the new movement reached beyond these issues to address the
structural problems of humanity, ranging from overpopulation and pollution to the costs of
technology and economic growth, challenging the very nature of the capitalist system.
Many of the established conservation and wildlife protection organizations operating
within the slower, more conservative models of the 1950s were bypassed by new
organizations and were left to respond as best they could.4 The new movement was more
dynamic, broad-based, and responsive to its popular constituencies, winning much wider
support. While some of the older organizations welcomed the new militancy and moved with
the times, a whole new community of environmental organizations formed,5 including Friends
of the Earth, Greenpeace, and more recently Earth First and the Ecology Party. These
groups were fundamentally different from their precursors in terms of their ideological
underpinnings and activities.
Philip Lowe and Jane Goyder, in Environmental Groups in Politics6 argued that
traditional organizations were formed during three periods; the 1880s to the turn of the
century; the inter-war years; and from the late 1950s to the early 1960s. These groups are
considered “traditional” in that they followed the pattern of Victorian era reform whereby they
examined “problems” and attempted to work with government to effect solutions. The first
period saw the formation of groups such as the Selbome Society, the Royal Society for the
Protection of Birds, the Coal Smoke Abatement Society (now the National Society for Clean
Air), the National Trust, the Metropolitian and Public Gardens Association, the Garden Cities
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Association (now the Town and Country Planning Association), the Camping Club, and the
Society for the Preservation of Wild Fauna of the Empire (now the Fauna and Flora
Preservation Society). The inter-war period produced the Ancient Monuments Society, the
Rambler’s Association, the Council for the Preservation of Rural England, the National Trust
for Scotland, the Pure Rivers Society and the Central Council for River Protection. The late
1950s and early 1960s saw the formation of the Civic Trust, the Council for Nature, the
Victorian Society, the Noise Abatement Society, and the British Trust for Conservation
Volunteers.
Lowe and Goyder suggest that two sets of factors underlie the episodic development
of these organizations—one internal and one external.7 The internal factor relates to the
aging of voluntary organizations and their associations with different generations. For
example, groups formed during the Victorian period typically had elitist structures that vested
control in a few individuals who were leading figures in social, political, or literary life. Their
founders and supporters were mainly upper class and their strength lay in the personal
influence and patronage of their members. During the inter-war years, the growth of new
groups reflected the growth of suburban life and a widening of the social base. Many groups
formed in this period featured decentralized structures and attempted to harness interest in
the countryside as a way to influence the growing regulatory powers of local government.
The era of the late 1950s and the early 1960s saw a further widening of the social base of
these groups, with control of both national and local organizations in the hands of the
professional and managerial classes, though often with broader lower middle class support.
Internal structural changes in the operation of state power also influenced how these
organizations functioned. Historically, the expansion of government controls shifted the
target for pressure. For example, Victorian groups were generally concerned with influencing
or constraining the behavior of individuals or private organizations. They primarily employed
persuasion, legal restraints in the courts where necessary, and appeals to parliament when
existing law failed to cover a particular abuse. With the growth of state power, the focus of
action shifted to government. Groups formed in the inter-war period promoted employment of
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state regulatory powers, particularly in regard to land-use planning, pollution control and the
loss of natural or historical features. In turn, the expansion of such powers, administered
locally, stimulated the formation of groups to monitor and influence their use.
A particular configuration of groups tends to prevail until such time as a new
generation perceives new problems or old problems from new perspectives and creates its
own institutional structures projecting their style and identity. This is furthered by a natural
aging process wherein groups lose their initial zeal and settle into roles as guardians of
environmental reforms already secured.
The external set of factors advanced by Goyder and Lowe suggest that episodic
growth of environmental groups is linked to phases in the world business cycle, especially
towards the end of periods of economic expansion. They argue that environmental groups
arose as more people began to assess the costs of economic growth and accepted non
material values. They point out the irony that environmental values are most often espoused
by those individuals for whom economic prosperity has furnished the means to both choose
and more fully appreciate their surroundings. Older groups often blurred the line between
definitions of preservation and conservation and viewed them concurrently. Their tactics
relied on private negotiations with public officials and the use of persuasion. This was due
both to their traditional development and to their funding structure, which often relied on direct
government support. While some attempted to adapt to the development of the new,
broader, more aggressive environmental movement (such as the Council for the Protection of
Rural England’s (CPRE) adoption of the use of mass media tactics to shape debate) many
activities of new organizations, such as direct lobbying, political activism, and the mobilization
of public opinion, threatened their charitable status, and thus their very existence. As a
result, while many traditional organizations became more active, they did so largely within the
confines of their structure and membership. For many of their members in the 1970s, this
was insufficient and they chose to leave and form new environmental organizations that were
fundamentally different from those of the past.
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One of the most important differences between these sets of groups was
philosophical orientation. Traditional conservation organizations were primarily utilitarian,
focused on the rational management of natural resources. Preservationists were largely
moral crusaders focused on the non-human environment. The new environmentalists
focused on humanity and the natural environment it inhabited. Issues that concerned these
three types of groups were related but different. For conservationists, the issue was
responsible use of nature; for preservationists, it was wildlife and the protection of habitats;
for the new environmentalists, it was human survival itself.
The new environmentalists were more active and politically oriented than previous
groups. Borrowing tactics from previous mass social movements, such as public
demonstrations and rallies, they attempted to directly impact public opinion to produce
change. From an alarmist viewpoint, they argued that modern industrial society would
ultimately implode, destroying modem civilization, and fundamental changes in societal
values and institutions were necessary if catastrophic events were to be avoided.8 In
contrast, preservationists largely pursued charitable aims, such as buying land to place in
reserves, while conservationists used economic arguments to advance their aims. The new
environmentalists are rightly viewed as part of the wider social movement that transformed
most industrial societies during the 1960s. They were anti-establishment and reactive,
responding more to events than to the scientific evidence that motivated preservationists and
conservationists. The necessary condition for action was not scientific certainty but merely
evidence of environmental mismanagement. New environmentalists were more radical than
their predecessors and ultimately more influential politically because they were willing to
engage in confrontational methods and tactics, which at times goaded governments into
action.
The new movement, like its predecessors, was not homogeneous. It has been
described as an accumulation of individuals and organizations with similar tendencies and
goals but different methods. Unlike their predecessors, who often attempted to influence
policy with scientific evidence, the new environmentalists were anarchistic, less oriented
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towards systems analysis, and more humanist.9 John McCormick describes the movement
as containing elements of evangelism, social reform, political reform and ecological science.10
The new movement's structure, style, and tactics pushed environmental issues to the
forefront of the British political agenda as it did elsewhere in the industrialized world.
Contributing to the dynamic of this movement was a series of environmental incidents
that crystallized the public’s environmental fears.11 For example, in 1952 between December
5th and 10th winter smog in London killed 445 people outright and over 4,000 more from long
term respiratory problems, and was directly responsible for the passage of the 1965 Clean Air
Act.12 A fire at the Windscale nuclear plant in northern England in October 1957, caused by
an overheated reactor, released a small amount of radioactivity. While contamination was
limited, danger of a similar occurrence with more hazardous results was clearly
demonstrated.13 Popular reaction to these events was muted at the time, as a clear
understanding of linkages between pollution and public health was not readily apparent to the
general population. Within a decade that situation changed.
A series of similar accidents in the mid-1960s, sensationalized in the press, had a
greater political impact due to heightened public sensitivity to the environment. One of the
first was the Aberfan disaster in October 1966, when a mining waste heap above the village
in South Wales collapsed, killing 144 people, 116 of them children.14 Stanley Johnson argued
that Aberfan represented a turning point because it demonstrated the implications of pollution
and changed how people (particularly politicians and governmental officials) thought about
the issue.15 Another accident was the wreck of the tanker Torrev Canyon, which ran aground
off the coast of Cornwall in March 1967, spilling approximately 875,000 barrels of crude oil
into the sea and polluting hundreds of miles of coastline. The government attempted to use
untested detergents to break up the oil but this effort failed and caused further ecosystem
damage. The accident illustrated both the costs of pollution and the fragility of the marine
ecosystem. More importantly, the disaster demonstrated that government was unprepared to
deal with such accidents, and that gaps existed in the organization of scientific research and
advice to government.

16

The weak governmental response ultimately led to formation of the
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Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) in 1969.17 The accident also
contributed to signing of the 1969 Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties and the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage.
Another factor contributing to the new environmental movement was the 1972 United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm, Sweden June 5-16. The
conference was attended by representatives of 113 countries, 19 intergovernmental
agencies, and 400 other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. Notable for
their absence were the Eastern European countries (save Romania) who boycotted the
conference over the voting status of East Germany. However, all of them had participated in
the preparatory discussions. The conference was a landmark event in the growth of
international environmentalism. John McCormick describes it as “the first occasion on which
the political, social, and economic problems of the global environment were discussed at an
international forum with a view to actually taking corrective action.”18 The conference
heightened world interest in the condition of the physical environment and led directly to
establishment of the United Nations Environment Program. Britain, as a participant and
signator of the Conference Report, committed itself to taking action on environmental issues.
The government’s willingness to work on behalf of international environmental issues also
committed it, by association, to action at home. Environmental groups never let subsequent
governments, or the public, forget the commitments made in 1972. The Conference Report
contained a series of recommendations toward which governments might strive, as well as a
goal against which their effectiveness was judged.
Britain’s entry into the European Community (EC) in 1973 also contributed to the
changing socio-political climate and ultimately provided the platform for final transference of
authority from national government to the supranational structure of the EC. Britain's decision
to join the EC made it liable for all existing legislative and executive decisions concerning the
environment. Britain and the EC would clash over several structural and administrative
issues relating to pollution control. These clashes were largely due to differences between
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Britain's traditional pollution control structure and practices, which were largely based on
consultation and voluntary compliance, and the more coercive and legalistic structures and
practices followed to varying degrees by the remainder of the community.
British politicians and administrators were largely unprepared for the development of
modern environmental consciousness and the new environmental movement of the 1970s.
They were more comfortable within the loose, permissive, administrative structure of pollution
control that sought to quietly negotiate improvements with those interests who would have to
bear the costs of implementation. British practicality led the government to reason that more
could be accomplished by working closely with business to improve conditions than by
demands that would poison those relationships. The new environmental groups challenged
this traditional administrative arrangement and demanded fundamental reforms, including an
end to secrecy regarding the production of pollution that shielded many polluters in the past.
While successive governments defended themselves by pointing to several pieces of
environmental legislation, they were unable to answer the environmentalists' central charge
that these legislative instruments not only did not go far enough in controlling pollution, but
were also administered and controlled by the polluters themselves. In the view of
environmentalists, British government was not serious about pollution control. They pointed
to the polluted condition of rivers and streams and lack of regulatory rigor as evidence.
The development of British pollution control institutions has its own history and
themes separate from that of environmental groups. If one word could describe the evolution
of British water pollution control it would be “centralization”. This concept was applied
repeatedly to determine the level of authority at which the environment was regulated. The
transfer of regulatory authority from local to regional to national to extra-national levels
created ever-greater centralization of the policy process and offered greater opportunities for
improved water pollution control. However, the transfers only heightened and highlighted
internal contradictions present within the British system.
Centralization, and its countercurrents, are themes that run throughout modem
British environmental history.19 Chapter II examines 19th century pollution in the Thames
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Valley and the first national response through legislation in 1876. It provides an overview of
the development of local control over the environment, and examines the role and problems
of science and technology in defining water quality. It shows how local authority
traditionalism defeated initial centralization efforts and how this result hampered pollution
management efforts through location of authority over the environment at the local level.
Authorities charged with protecting the river, such as the Thames Conservancy, the Port of
London Authority (PLA), the London County Council (LCC) and the Greater London Council
(GLC) all failed due to lack of central government support and their limited size and
resources. Central government resolved that pollution control was best left in the hands of
local agencies capable of responding to local needs. However, the regulatory agencies’
jurisdictions were not large enough to match the ecological framework of the river system. As
a result, pollution control efforts focused solving immediate problems, such as spills, instead
of systematic problems such as the dumping of sewage or industrial wastes into rivers.
A structural problem within the authorities, that undermined their pollution control
priorities, was their dual role as polluter and regulator. They found it difficult to improve
conditions when they lacked the financial powers to make capital investments in pollution
treatment essential to bringing about such improvements. Decisions were often made in
terms of the best financial interests of the local community, which tended to work against the
whole system (i.e. depletion of the common and the transference of pollution downstream).
Cold financial calculation led communities to invest in water treatment facilities or construct
elaborate projects to bring untainted water to the community instead of constructing waste
treatment facilities that would capture the majority of pollutants from entering the river or
stream to begin with.
Chapter III examines 20th century Thames pollution and the evolving structure of
water pollution control authorities up to the 1970s. The movement towards centralization in
size is clearly evident from legislative history, which shows a progression of pollution control
from the local (1876 Rivers Pollution Prevention Act) to the regional level (1948 River Boards
Act: 1951 Rivers [Prevention of Pollution] Act; and 1963 Water Resources Act). Tthe shift to
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national control would come later, beginning during the 1970s (1973 Water Act; 1989 Water
Act; and 1991 W ater Resources Act). Centralization of water authorities’ size and
complexity, which mimicked similar developments across society, ultimately led to questions
regarding the structure of local government. Reorganization of local government set
precedents that enabled eventual creation of a centralized system of water pollution control in
the 1970s.
Chapter IV addresses governmental re-organization in the 1960s and early 1970s
that made centralization of water pollution control functions possible. The new administrative
system shifted pollution control management to central government, while retaining regional
authority administration. The new comprehensive regulatory agencies were charged with
management of the entire hydrological cycle of water within their particular river basin. For
the first time regulatory agencies were large enough to effectively manage water pollution.
The centralized system of government made Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) appear
promising as new pollution control authorities.
Chapter V discusses the W ater Act of 1973. Legislative history shows that roots of
the new integrated system derived both from the need to centralize functional control over
water and government reorganization at the local and national level. Parliamentary debates
shifted focus away from questions of administrative machinery to those of political
philosophy, and away from the idea of using ecological frameworks (i.e. river systems) as a
basis for authority. However, ecologists and water specialists called on the government to
recognize that pollution controls should be vested at a level that conformed to ecological
principles. Their view ultimately prevailed. The Regional Water Authorities (RWAs), created
in 1973, were based on such principles. They operated over the geographic area of an entire
watershed, controlling the entire hydrological cycle. The RWAs represented the first time the
“environment” (river systems) was autonomously recognized as having some role in
determining the proper unit of “authority.” By placing the river system as the unit of authority,
the environment was granted autonomous authority of its own, by virtue of ecological “laws”
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which humans had to respect instead of demanding nature conform to hlimafi social
organization.
Chapter VI looks at the Control of Pollution Act 1974, which contained specific
measures that effectively transferred pollution control to the central government. Whereas
the 1973 W ater Act established the administrative structure of pollution control, the 1974
COPA determined where administrative power to set pollution levels was placed.
In regard to water pollution the COPA based control over regional watershed authorities
under the aegis of the Department of the Environment, with local implementation of pollution
control allowing for flexible response. It failed for a number of reasons, but largely because
the economic crisis in Britain in the mid-1970s left it under-funded. The Regional Water
Authorities were unable to invest in pollution treatment and so remained the largest and most
public polluters in their regions, undermining public confidence in their ability to regulate
others in the community. The structural contradiction of regulator as polluter posed an
obvious question. If the regulator polluted, why should anyone else follow a different set of
standards? Coupled to this was the role of scientific and technical procedures and
information in determining water quality standards. “Scientific” standards were becoming
recognized as evolutionary and related to costs, not as objective authorities to which each
side might appeal as they had done in the 19th century.20
Chapter VII examines the impact of the European Community (EC) on British water
pollution control. Britain’s successful effort to join the EC had unforeseen consequences for
the British water environment. The development of an independent EC environmental policy
in 1973 had immediate consequences for Britain as some aspects of water pollution control
were shifted from the national to the supranational level. The extra-national character of the
organization meant that a common policy for the environment would be formulated at the
supranational level with each nation responsible for implementation within its own structures.
No sooner had British central government gained authority over pollution control than it was
lost to the supranational bodies of the EC. Whether this was the appropriate place to vest
pollution control authority remains an open question and continues to be subject of debate
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between Britain and the EC (primarily surrounding how to set and achieve water quality
standards). Differences between the EC’s and Britain's administrative systems regarding
water pollution standards led to confusion in reporting and hampered the implementation of
some water quality directives. Thus, Britain’s membership in the EC shifted, but did not
resolve, the question of authority over the environment, particularly the tension between
central and local authorities and the tension between regulators and users.
Until recently, the history of pollution was treated in political, social, or economic
terms, but rarely dealt with environmentally. Literature on British environmental history is
sparce but growing. Many of the works are fragmented across academic disciplines. One
economic history is B.W. Clapp's An Environmental History of Britain Since the Industrial
Revolution.21 Clapp's work provides an overview of environmental conditions in Britain and
discusses initial attempts at remediation. In contrast, Lawrence Breeze's The British
Experience with River Pollution. 1865-1S7622 examines water pollution and the conditions
which led to appointment of two Royal Commissions (1865 & 1868) to study the problem and
make recommendations that would not hamper trade or the public health. It offers a review of
the scientific and political context of river pollution in the nineteenth century, providing insight
into the contents of the Royal Commission reports and affording a cursory look at how the
press and Parliament addressed the issue of river pollution. David Kinnersley’s Coming
Clean23 examines British water systems in the 1980s and 1990s with an emphasis on river
pollution and the legislative privatization of water services. As a former member of the British
bureaucracy, Kinnersley presents a unique insider’s view of the complexities facing
government at the end of the twentieth century.
Stanley Johnson's The Politics of Environment: The British Experience24 offers a
parochial examination of the way in which Britain perceived the “environmental problem” and
the way in which it dealt with the problem through the legislative processes of the 1960s and
early 1970s. It takes as its standpoint that the record of the sixties was not irrelevant to the
requirements of the future and that the planning machinery that evolved in this period served
Britain well as the “environmental question" evolved in British political life. Johnson concludes
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that by 1972, Britain had produced a magnificent planning machine but the machine by itself
was not, and never could be, equal to the task of planning for the environment. Put simply,
environmental planning in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s would require a massive investment
in public transport; ruthless curtailment of the exponential growth of car and truck use; and a
massive injection of resources into social capital such as housing, new sewage systems,
water pollution control systems, family planning and birth control systems. While Johnson
published no further works on the subject, other researchers who examined later decades
suggest that the machinery built, while adequate in some areas, was inadequate in others.
My own work suggests that the machinery of water pollution control was inadequate to the
task.
Philip Lowe and Jane Goyder, Environmental Groups in Politics25 provides a
contemporary account of British national environmental groups, their organization and
operation within the political sphere. The latter section of the work provides case studies of
the organization and operation of five groups; the Henley Society, Friends of the Earth, the
National Trust, the Royal Society for Nature Conservation and the European Environmental
Bureau. Whereas Johnson features the bureaucracy, and Lowe and Goyder the pressure
groups, Mike Robinson's The Greening of British Party Politics.26 focuses on the major
political parties, including the party of government during the 1970s and 1980s. His work
seeks to move beyond party rhetoric, offering explanations for how and why they responded
to the challenge of the environment. Based on interviews with Members of Parliament,
ministerial advisors, opposition spokesmen, party strategists, policy makers, trade union
leaders, pressure group leaders and prospective parliamentary candidates, the work provides
an inside view of the attitudes of leading party politicians towards this policy sector. It largely
shows how both major parties sought to co-opt the environmental movement for their own
partisan political purposes. In doing so, the major parties undercut new parties, like the
Greens, who were attempting to establish themselves within the British political system.
However, neither party was willing to entirely embrace the radical economic philosophy of the
Greens, but simply employed environmental rhetoric for their own ends.
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Johnson concludes that while the major parties co-opted the rhetoric they did not
become “green.” New issues and new ideas were chosen to fit established structures of
party thought and action, and the reasons why party politicians respond to the challenge of
the environmental movement have as much to do with the intricacies of politicking and the
desire for political power, as with genuine environmental concern. Any concern for the
environment is inevitably colored by sets of motivations specific to individuals and party
ideologies. As such, the “greenness” of the Conservative is different from that advocated by
the Labour Party and vice versa.
The idea of ecological interdependence, central to “green” thinking, is largely missing
from the major parties. While it is recognized that environmental matters impinge upon all
policy sectors and all stages of policy making - a point demonstrated by creation of the
Department of Environment, the major parties still treat the environment as one issue among
many others, and any attempt at holistic thinking is immediately chocked by a systems of
departments and shadow departments where competition always seems to have the edge
over co-ordination.
Behind the idea of interdependence is the notion of equity. The major political parties
are still chained to the idea that natural ecosystems exist primarily as a resource for human
exploitation. Although, as a review of environmental policy demonstrates, the parties have
begun to address issues of resource planning, future energy policy, recycling and the concept
of sustainability. The sacred cow of economic growth has not been sacrificed, nor is it likely to
be sacrificed in the future. How else are nations to pay for the promises of a cleaner future
except with a growing economy?
Through examination of the Conservative and Labour platforms and major political
tracks on the environment it becomes clearly evident that each party wants to appear
“greener” than the other to the electorate, and when necessary they make common cause to
pass legislation to give the appearance of working on this critical issue. However, neither
party is willing to forgo the capitalist economic principles underlying tenants of economic
growth on which the major elections of the last fifty years were fought. Which party will bring
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more prosperity to which segments of the electorate remains the overriding concern of both
parties while environmental issues take a secondary position in regard to policy decisions.
While both parties are “greener” in their rhetoric, and have increased the amount of time
spent on this issue, it has not permeated their political thinking. Debates surrounding
governmental reorganization in the 1960s and the passage of the 1973 W ater Act and the
1974 Control of Pollution Act, and their subsequent implementation support this conclusion.
Most of the literature on the Thames River is heavily weighted towards anecdotes,
boats and riverside rambles. However, there is a growing body of literature that examines
environmental problems during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Two early works are
Jeffery Harrison and Peter Grant's The Thames Transformed27 and Alwyne Wheeler's The
Tidal Thames: The History of a River and its Fishes.28 Both works concentrate on the effects
of environmental pollution which threatened Thames ecosystems. Harrison and Grant look at
wildfowl conservation efforts in the 1950's and early 1960's, and Wheeler documents the
decline in numerous fish species during the same period. Both examine conservation efforts
to raise public awareness of the pollution problem and their efforts to pressure government to
find solutions. However, neither work examines groups outside of the conservation circle that
identified problems with Thames pollution, nor the agencies involved in the negotiation and
subsequent action that produced legislation.
Bill Luckin's Pollution and Control: A Social History of the Thames in the Nineteenth
Century29 examines pollution as a means of linking social and political history, historical
demography and the social history of disease. As such it offers an instructive initial use of a
sociological perspective. One work that goes further is Christopher Hamlin's A Science of
Impurity: W ater Analysis in Nineteenth Century Britain.30 Hamlin's work focuses on water
quality, how it was analyzed, and the analysts themselves. Much of 19th century controversy
centered around the definition of clean water. Many groups were involved in the process of
definition, but the two most important were chemists and biologists, who had different
methods of ascertaining water quality. Hamlin's work is valuable because it points out that
science and technology provided convenient vocabularies and discourses for both sides in
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the water quality debate in the 1840s, but these alone could not solve the problem. Solutions
couched in scientific and technical terms were in fact socio-political decisions, not scientific
ones. The scientists were unable to say exactly what pure water was or how to demonstrate
purity in a way that satisfied both sides. To some extent this is still the case today. Hamlin's
work points out that technical issues dissolve into socio-political ones, and that study of the
groups involved in the process is a better approach to policy analysis than study of the
technical or scientific arguments.
Dale H. Porter’s The Thames Embankment: Environment. Technology, and Society
in Victorian London31extends of the work of Tarr, Luckin, and Hamlin through examination of
the historical function of technology as an interface between a community and its natural and
built environments.
“The Tragedy of the River* shows that the key issue in British water pollution control
was and is, establishment of regulating authority over aspects of nature that have
simultaneous uses for consumers. Balancing these uses led to the search for the ultimate
authority over water pollution. First established in the 19th century at the local level, authority
over pollution control structures evolved to regional, national and supranational levels.
Efforts to “solve” the pollution question shifted but did not resolve the issue of authority over
the environment. Part of the problem stems from waters’ multiple uses and subsequent
popular conceptions. Part of the problem is systemic: society sought to gain control over a
natural resource, namely rivers, which operate under their own principles. Both “environment”
and “authority” are problematic, even more so when linked together. Popular conceptions of
the “environment” influenced the level and meaning of “authority” as society attempted to
save the common resource of the river for continued multiple uses, a problem that continues
in many societies today.
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CHAPTER II

ASPECTS OF BRITISH POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURIES

Industrial and urban development in the 19th century transformed Britain, her
landscape and people. During the century Britain would become an industrial nation and
would concentrate her population into new cities and develop an urban character. Industrial
expansion and urbanization created ever-increasing amounts of wastes. The wastes were
believed to be the source of public health problems, specifically epidemic diseases such as
cholera. Water pollution was a continuing source of public concern, which eventually led to
adoption of the first national legislation in 1876. This chapter discusses the historical
developments that led to the legislation, the historical significance of its provisions and the
related issue of water quality that underwent concurrent development. The century
witnessed enlargement of the franchise three times and the further development of local
government and local controls over the environment. The 1876 Act confirmed local
governments’ position as the provider of pollution controls. However, neither the Act nor
other local controls produced any large reductions in pollution.
Water Pollution in the Thames Valiev
The Thames Valley drains a hydrological area of approximately 5,150 square miles.1
Rising near Cirencester in Gloucestershire, on the southern slopes of the Cotswolds, it flows
some two hundred miles to the North Sea. The Thames receives the waters of several
tributaries and drains much of south central England. The region is unevenly industrialized,
with concentrations in the middle and lower reaches of the region. The Thames has
historically served as a major artery into the heart of England from the Continent and North
Sea. London, with its port and tideway, is the largest transport/exchange area in Britain. Its
major concentrations of financial, commercial, and governmental power dominate the nation
and have historically served as a beacon leading to ever-greater concentrations of people.
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London is situated on the lower half of the river, which from Teddington W eir to the North Sea
(approximately 151.5 kilometers2) is a tidal estuary.3
Twice daily the tidal action on the lower Thames carries saltwater upriver from the
North Sea. Incoming tides slow the river’s current and prevent polluting matter from being
directly flushed out to sea. At ebb tide the reverse is true: the river’s current increases,
moving pollutants downstream and out to sea. If the tidal action flushed the river from
Teddington Weir to the sea, the river would be cleansed twice daily. But the movement is
incremental, taking several cycles to complete; each day what is put into the river moves
downstream, but then returns part way on the tide.
W ater pollution has the longest and most extensive history of any pollution problem in
Britain. London’s sheer size, location in the lower Thames valley, and its role as the
administrative hub of the nation consistently made it the center of water controversies
throughout British history. Visible contamination of drinking water supplies along the Thames
valley at Oxford, Kingston, and London appeared as early as the mid-nineteenth century.
Pollution only increased throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and
industrialization and urbanization further concentrated people and pollutants. By the middle
of the nineteenth century many portions of the Thames were unusable as a source of drinking
water, fishing, or swimming. As early as 1852 water companies were forbidden from taking
drinking water supplies from the lower Thames and were required to move their intakes
above Teddington W eir so the tidal action of the river would not affect supplies.4 In this
instance the problem of contaminated drinking water supplies led to the simple and cheap
technical solution of moving intakes to a “safer” location instead of addressing the source of
the contamination.
Three major societal processes- industrialization, urbanization, and natural resource
exploitation- are responsible for the pollution problem. While activities such as mining
caused destruction of other rivers, most notably the Severn, urbanization and industrialization
were primary offenders in the Thames valley. By the middle of the nineteenth century,
municipal and industrial effluents ruined numerous drinking water sources, destroyed fish

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30

population and habitats, and raised costs for many water-using industries who required clean
water, such as paper manufacturers. Sanitarians in the public health movement, scientists,
and engineers became increasingly convinced that water pollution was related to epidemic
diseases such as cholera and typhoid. In the mid-nineteenth century they launched public
campaigns to improve water supplies and construct municipal sewerage systems as a means
to protect public health.
Beginning in the 1840s and continuing throughout the remainder of the century, the
public health movement, composed of a diverse and sometimes competing group of
governmental reformers, doctors, engineers and chemists, helped to build sewerage systems
throughout Britain. This process began in London, as the problems of urban pollution there
were the first to attract national attention and response. London in many cases served as a
model replicated elsewhere in the nation and throughout the world.5 Rivers historically served
as the most convenient and affordable means of disposal, and many believed water’s selfpurifying capacity justified their use. While rivers do purify themselves to a limited degree,
due to dilution and absorption of oxygen, as cities began to dispose of millions of tons of
untreated sewage in rivers and streams their natural abilities were simply overwhelmed. As
those downstream began to suffer the effects of pollution, as their drinking water supplies
became contaminated, the health impact of disposal practices were apparent. The wastes of
one community became a direct health hazard to another. Ironically, the use of sewerage
system technology designed to improve local health conditions and eliminate public
nuisances, had devastating effects on both the environment and human health.6
Recognizing, after careful scientific study, the relationship between clean water and
public health, and from the advent of bacteriology in the late nineteenth century, which
changed human understanding of disease, many cities passed regulations to address these
problems. Their solutions were illustrative. The adoption of water filtration and chlorination
helped to reduce most threats. However, the focus on filtration to ensure the safety of
drinking water did not address the fundamental problem that rivers were being used as large
sewers to remove wastes from the local environment. Lawrence E. Breeze and Bill Luckin7
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examined early legislative efforts to remedy river pollution. In the process of constructing
sewerage systems and examining their impacts, major technological and policy choices,
large-scale institutional developments, and societal changes occurred.
W ater was adopted as the preferred transport system for waste removal by the public
health movement during the Victorian period.8 Its dual focus on clean water supplies and
adequate sewage disposal meant a transfer of wastes from land disposal to river disposal as
cities adopted sewerage systems into their infrastructures. This is what occurred in London,
and is an example of Tarr’s thesis that the adoption of new technologies to solve one
pollution problem merely transfers the problem to others and to other environmental medium.
While this explanation is valid, as seen in London, it does little to improve our understanding
of the causes of the breakdown of the previous land based system, or the costs of that
breakdown to society.
Deplorable conditions in London and Manchester led utilitarian reformers such as
Edwin Chadwick to examine the state of towns and health in Britain. The impact of
industrialization and heavy urbanization made living conditions very harsh, featuring
overcrowding and inadequate or non-existent sanitation facilities such as running water,
sewers, paving, and street cleaning. Edwin Chadwick's Report on the Sanitary Condition of
the Labouring Population of Great Britain (1842) revealed these failings to the British public,
spurring demands for reform.9
The introduction of running water into cities resulted in large increases in water
consumption, as more people had greater access. However, this was not accompanied by a
system designed to remove the wastes produced, it was initially expected that the previous
system of waste disposal, largely cesspools and privy-vaults, would continue to function
adequately. This lack of foresight, to provide for the increase in the daily load of wastewater,
led to overflows that contaminated the ground and water in the vicinity. The problem of
wastewater was only compounded with introduction of another sanitary invention, the water
closet. This was not a new idea, one simply waiting for the constant supply that piped water
provided to make its adoption efficient.
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The installation of water closets in the absence of sewerage systems resulted in
adaptation of elements of the old waste removal system to the new technology. Wastes from
water closets were not initially deposited into modern sewers that transferred them away.
Few such comprehensive systems existed. As a result, wastes were instead deposited into
the old cesspools and privy vaults. While London had a system of storm sewers in some
locations, it was forbidden to use them as a receptacle for human wastes. Many however
made surreptitious connections as a means of adopting the new technology. The increased
flow of wastes into cesspools and privy vaults soon overwhelmed their capacity and
contaminated surrounding soils and groundwater. The spills or leaching of contaminants into
homes was a major public health threat. This is much of what Chadwick described in his
1842 report.
Following the Sanitary Report (1842) and a recommendation by a Health of Towns
Commission (1845), London created a waterborne sewerage system replacing the earlier
cesspit system. The Thames became an open sewer as a result of the raw sewage and
wastewater it received. As water suppliers continued to draw water from contaminated river
water threats to public health increased. The need for additional facilities led municipal
leaders to act.
Spurred by prevalence of epidemic disease, primarily cholera, developments in
sanitary engineering coupled to a growing interest in public health led to the extension of
basic amenities in London and the provincial towns. Never evenly applied to all parts of a
town, results were never uniformly beneficial. Piped water was viewed more as an item of
commercial value than as a necessity of urban life. Operating in the hope of profit,
commercial or private water companies had minimal interest in piping their product to
dwellings of the poor. Sewage systems also were built in wealthier sections of towns first and
taxpayers from these classes were often reluctant to extend these systems to poorer areas.
Water companies were also concerned that an expensive item such as a flush toilet could not
be entrusted to poor populations as they could so easily be damaged or destroyed. For the
upper and middle classes, piped water and sewerage systems certainly made improvements
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in the sight and smell of their surroundings. This typically meant better health for them, but
not in all cases. Piped water helped to maintain a high incidence of waterborne disease
(such as typhoid, cholera, and gastro-enteritis) among those (rich or poor) who drew their
water from increasingly polluted sources.10 The expanded use of sanitary technology,
primarily in the form of piped running water and flush toilets, led to the transference of the
pollution problem from one medium to another.
To be fair, Victorian sanitary reformers such as Chadwick had not intended it that
way. They envisioned an egalitarian system where sanitary ideal of cleanliness could be
achieved through the universal application of clean piped water with sewerage systems
designed to remove wastes from the vicinity of the population. Based near the seat of power
in London during the late 1830s and 1840s, a number of these men, often working through
their connections with the Poor Law Commission and the Health of Towns Association, were
well known for their inquiries into conditions affecting public health.11 Chadwick helped make
sanitary reform a reality. He was an opinionated, unyielding, intolerant, and enthusiastic
man. He supplied early leadership to the public health movement, providing it direction and
organization from a legislative standpoint.12 But in cleaning up one area with his "sanitary
idea," Chadwick certainly did not intend to pollute and endanger another, although this was
the result.13 Chadwick acknowledged that discharging sewage into rivers caused pollution.
He attempted to ameliorate this problem by diluting the sewage with water, carrying it in
covered sewers to farmland some distance from the population centers, and distributing it as
liquid manure for irrigation.14 This was a proven system adopted in Paris as a means of
removing some of its wastes. Chadwick was only willing to use the Thames as a sewer
temporarily until an integrated system was available. He considered liquid manure a valuable
commodity for farmers who in turn would make this a productive and profitable use of these
wastes. He even initiated his own commercial firm to help put his ideas into effect. In
hindsight, his plan was a brilliant but ultimately unworkable move towards a sustainable
system. He thought that through these means "the loss and injury by the pollution of natural
streams may be avoided."15
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Chadwick’s report led to passage of the 1848 Public Health Act.16 This Act
established, for the first time, provisions for improving sanitary conditions in England and
Wales under the control of a single centralized management body, a National Board of
Health. Edwin Chadwick served as secretary to this body. The National Board of Health
represented a primitive move towards centralization of pollution control. However, it placed
primary responsibility for provision and maintenance of sewers and sewerage works on Local
Boards of Health, allowing them to dispose of their sewage as they saw fit. The Act also
made provisions for water supply, and more importantly, its protection. As cities and towns
implemented the act, they were confronted with what to do with their sewage. Since there
were no clear provisions directing them, most chose the convenient, cost-effective means of
disposal, into the nearest stream or river. On the Thames this meant sewage was simply
passed along to neighbors downstream. While it was recognized these actions would lead to
water contamination, it was not clear whether the levels of contamination were dangerous.
London, situated on the lower Thames, did not fully consider the adverse impact of its
wastes, as there were no other large towns situated below it on the river. London’s sewers,
located along the banks of the Thames within the city’s boundaries, daily poured millions of
gallons of wastes into the river. By the late 1840s and early 1850s river’s odor was notorious.
1848 would forever be known as the Year of the Great Stink as consequences of the
Victorians actions became clear. Parliament had to suspend operations as the putrid river
stifled debate. By 1857 the lower Thames received an estimated 250 tons of fecal matter
each day from London.17 Chadwick’s hope of using the river only temporarily would never be
resolved. Even today, the river serves as a major artery of waste transport.
Local Govemment/Democracv/and Pollution Control
The nature of local government and the popular attitude toward how it operated in the
early Victorian period stood as obstacles to resolution of problems created by urban living
and an industrial economy. These included the problem of river pollution by sewage and
industrial waste. When Victorians spoke of local self-government they placed emphasis on
“self’ and considered this self-reliance as the key to the nation's strength and vitality. They
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recognized that local administration operated under some general oversight from central
authority. They looked to Parliament to provide acts essential to effect what local
government hoped to accomplish. However, they also took the expansive view that those
operations that could be accomplished by local authorities should be within their control.
Naturally public expenditures should be administered by those asked to bearing the expense.
Centralization of power and collectivist action, even in the name of public health, was
considered alien and unwelcome. As a result pollution controls were vested in local
authorities, typically administered by the municipality.
By its nature, the myriad tangle of entities that collectively formed local government
could not possibly meet the sanitation, water supply, pollution control, and other needs of a
modem society. Instead of a precisely defined and orderly system, British urban government
of the 1830's to 1850’s contained a mixed bag of parish vestries, corporations, improvement
commissions, and boards, the latter sometimes further weakened by their ad-hoc existence.
Each pursued their individual objectives with little coordination. This led to overlapping of
authority, blurring of jurisdictional lines, intrusion of jealous interests that often led to inertia.

18

The important Municipal Corporations Act of 183519 eliminated the previous system
of closed corporations and allowed "towns" (many that were already major industrial cities
without any form of self-government) to incorporate and elect a council (the City Corporation
of London was an exception). The councils were established with the hope that they would
eliminate corruption believed inherent in old corporations not to anticipate the needs of the
present and future. Thus, they were initially denied authority over services that were later
regarded as unequivocally municipal, such as water supply, sanitation, sewerage, gas, and
later electricity. One unfortunate effect was that when a movement toward "centralization and
uniformity in public health" emerged, a new layer of vested interests with parliamentary
influence stood in the way.20 Moreover, the new councils were in the hands of an emerging
middle class who were fiercely protective of their newly gained powers. Consequently they
resented and resisted efforts at centralization, which they perceived as an intrusion of central
government on their hard won freedom and rights.21
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Importantly for the lower Thames valley, the City Corporation of London22 was
exempted from the 1835 Act through their political power in Parliament. The City Corporation
was unwilling to have its interests controlled by a new metropolitan authority, and was able to
retain its independent position.

23

Powers granted by Parliament to municipal councils were expressed in permissive
terms, in line with the majority view. "Permissive not compulsory" were important words in
the legislative vocabulary of local authorities and interest groups, whether they sought a bill
or had it thrust upon them. They might, as in Birmingham and half a dozen other towns in
1864, recognize a need for and seek a general public health bill to prevent "pollution of rivers
and other streams." Even so a meeting of delegations, held prior to a meeting with Sir
George Grey at the Home Office, indicated a desire for a permissive and not a compulsory
bill.24
These men were not unique in wanting to retain control of the term “permissiveness.”
Local authorities everywhere wanted retain determination over whether or not they would
assume certain powers and functions. If action came from above, they wished freedom to
pick and choose, to restrain or even reject that which seemed threatening to their positions,
interests, and perhaps to the trade of the community. Ever present were fears that control
would be lost, the balance of community economic interests would be threatened and that
other nations, even other British communities, would gain an economic advantage that result
in higher rates (taxes). After all, economy was a more meaningful measure of success of a
governing authority than any initiative in the prevention of ill health.
A step towards centralized and coordinated activities was taken through the 1848
Public Health Act. The Act created a centralized General Board of Health with limited
powers. The Act's history demonstrates difficulties associated with municipal governance at
mid-century. The Act created a Board with no permanence. It only authorized the General
Board to function from 1848 to 1854, via a standard six-year renewable commission, after
which its actions would be reviewed and the Board might possibly be renewed. The Act
placed its central administration under the Crown Commissioners of Works, Woods, and
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Forests.25 It authorized formation of local boards of health that would coordinate efforts with
the central Board. However, the act left initiative in the hands of local authorities. Opposition
to the bill from water companies, manufacturers, corporations, and the City Corporation of
London led to numerous amendments that greatly limited the General Board's ability to
compel formation of local boards and approve their sanitary plans.

26

Almost immediately after its formation, before it could take any effective actions, the
Board faced the threat of a cholera epidemic. It quickly found that it was powerless to force
local Guardians to take preventive measures.27 As Board members (Lord Morpeth, Lord
Ashley, and Edwin Chadwick) tried to enforce policies, they soon became embroiled in
controversy. The Board collided with established interests that ultimately regarded it as a
meddlesome bureaucracy. It alienated both the medical and engineering professions by
backing ideas not accepted by the community at large.28 Worst of all, it provoked a battle
with the City Corporation of London deriving from its exclusion from the Public Health Act.29
From a dominant position in the recently formed Metropolitan Commission of Sewers
(1847),30 Chadwick pushed his program for a comprehensive system of water supply and
main drainage.31 For many reasons the program stalled, and when London was confronted
with cholera, Chadwick influenced a decision ruinous to the Thames and disastrous to people
who used its water. In the urgency of the moment, it seemed imperative wastes be removed
as thoroughly and as rapidly as possible. Although conceding it to be an evil to send refuse
in the Thames, Chadwick argued at a meeting of the MCS that it was "utterly inconsiderable,"
i.e. inconsequential, when compared to the evils of keeping "accumulations of noxious matter
in densely inhabited localities" where it decomposed and gave off "pestilential emanations."32
The sewers of London were flushed during the spring and summer of 1848. This deliberate
polluting of the Thames as the lesser of two evils earned Chadwick The Times enmity whose
editorials thundered at him for "poisoning water” and described his flushing policy as a "piece
of deviltry" and "elaborate depravity."33 Unfortunately, Chadwick became the target of
various interests opposed to central control. He was an ideal candidate for such targeting as
he had a high profile and was contentious in supporting his ideas, often at the expense of the
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solutions he was attempting to implement. Of his opponents, the City Corporation of London
was the most vigorous. While it was successful in stopping it’s inclusion into the 1847 and
1848 Acts, it could clearly see the trend developing and was committed to stopping it at all
costs. The City promoted its own bill, enlarging the powers of its Sewers Commission, and
embedded in it a clause allowing for appointment of a Medical Officer of Health. By June
1849, when cholera first appeared in the City of London, the City’s Sewer Commission
appointed a part-time Medical Officer of Health, Dr. (later Sir) John Simon (1816-1904), who
became the leading figure in the Second generation of sanitary reformers. He built a local
medico-sanitary administration that helped discredit Chadwick’s system and provided other
municipalities with means to resist central control.34
In popular imagination in aftermath of the 1849 epidemic, Chadwick, the Board of
Health and the Metropolitan Commission of Sewers were responsible for London’s inability to
ward off the cholera epidemic. Chadwick and his ideas were discredited and the notion of
central coordination would have to await the second half of the twentieth century. When the
Board came up for renewal in 1854, its policies were viewed as a failure. Its enemies gained
the upper hand, Chadwick was dismissed, and a reconstituted board, with a more limited
role, signaled retreat from centralization. Most important for the future course of public health
was appointment in 1855 of Dr. John Simon as medical officer to the second Board of Health.
With Simon’s appointment, ascendancy of his local model of sanitation was confirmed.35
The Public Health Act of 1858 signaled Lord Derby’s Tory government’s
abandonment of central control over public health.36 The Act empowered localities to
establish their own sanitary authorities. The National Board of Health was terminated and its
functions scattered among various offices. Its medical duties went to the public health branch
of the Privy Council, where John Simon’s quiet efficiency served as an example for a future
role for central government. Responsibilities relating to local government went to the Home
Office. London area sewerage37 was vested to the Metropolitan Board of Works (MBW)
under the Metropolis Improvements Act.38
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As local authorities attempted to meet sanitary requirements of their towns, many of them
began to take pride in their efforts, extolling the virtues of local control. But in order to meet
these needs they often found it necessary to turn elsewhere for advice from experts. One
place where help was found was Dr. John Simon's office, where professional men
with medical, scientific, and technological knowledge were ready to help local officials. Part
of Simon's success lay in his personality. While Chadwick gave the impression of bullying
the nation into good health practices, Simon's influence was subtle, slow, and steady. As
medical officer to the Privy Council, Simon's duties included compilation of annual reports
presented to Parliament. With the nation's ever-increasing respect for technical and scientific
authority, Simon's influence and reports took on great importance.

39

Simon in turn

acknowledged significant works of others, such as William Farr and the Registrar-General's
Office. Beginning with his appointment as compiler of abstracts in 1839, Farr accumulated
statistical facts on life and death. In Simon’s judgment, publication of mortality rates and
causes of death provided a great service to sanitary science by providing exact numerical
standards in place of guesswork.40 While central control over public health issues failed,
local governments increasingly turned to central government for advice and expertise thereby
keeping the issue alive for future generations.
As civic reformers and sanitarians implemented a variety of plans that brought clean
water into cities and built sewer systems to transport away wastes, rivers were polluted. The
contamination caused a variety of problems, including the spreading of disease and
destruction of fisheries and shellfish populations. Contamination rendered river water
unsuitable for agricultural purposes such as irrigation and watering of livestock and destroyed
its “amenity” value for those who lived nearby. The conflicting needs of individual and
“corporate" users became evident.
Ostensibly, common law afforded some measure of protection against river pollution.
A person owning land on a stream had equal rights with his neighbors to the natural flow of
water past his land. He could use this water as long as he subsequently allowed it to flow
down to his neighbor unimpaired in quality. Riparian owners and others seeking to protect
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and preserve their proprietary rights against pollution could ask the civil courts to intervene by
way of injunction or damages. Common law decreed that a man should not dispose of his
refuse in a manner that caused nuisance to his neighbor. An individual, for example, who
owned property on a river, could bring action against a manufacturer for polluting a stream.
Pollution in this case could be defined as the "addition of anything to water which affects it
natural qualities and thereby results in the riparian owner not receiving the natural waters of
the stream."41
However, few people pursued this course due to the cost and difficulty of bringing suit
against a manufacturer. Occasionally a wealthy landowner, his riparian rights violated by
sewage from a municipal corporation or industrial effluent, would go to the expense and
bother of seeking relief through common law 42 However, for most victims of pollution, civil
action was not a practical remedy, and the pervasive nature of pollution was simply too vast
for common law to have any appreciable effect.43
It became increasingly evident that parliamentary action was necessary to address
water pollution. In his report to the Privy Council in 1862, John Simon recommended, "all
industrial establishments which directly or indirectly endanger health, ought to be subject to
official superintendence and regulation."44 Elsewhere there was discussion of legislation that
prescribed safeguards and brought offending polluters before criminal courts.
With one of its own departments devoted to public health, the National Association
for the Promotion of Social Science (founded 1857) provided an important forum for
discussions that sometimes included river pollution. As was common for organizations of this
period, its early leaders were a blend of parliamentary figures, civil servants, and intellectuals,
including such men as Lord Brougham (its president), Lord John Russell, Lord Stanley, John
Simon, William Farr, and John Ruskin. John Stuart Mill and Edwin Chadwick served on its
governing council. Dr. Lyon Playfair, a scientist with a long-standing concern for water
pollution, was active in its work. The association gained the respect of the middle class,
especially in provincial cities where many meetings were held; and its departments met bi
weekly in London during parliamentary sessions.45 Importantly, for the cause of pollution
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control, the Association’s activities illustrated the problems of pollution to national and local
governmental audiences. The use of social science to collect evidence and demonstrate
potential solutions was an important element of informing the public of the extent of the
problem and potential solutions.
Papers on river pollution were solicited and presented at some meetings. Various
professionals, including scientists, engineers, medical doctors, and others gave papers
discussing problems and sources of river pollution. They reveal a diversity of opinion with
some sharp differences.46 While favoring use of practical means to prevent industrial
pollution, a few appeared prepared to abandon some rivers to industrialists. Others insisted
measures could prevent industrial pollution without injuring community trade. As to sewage,
some were so appalled by what sanitary “improvements” had done to rivers, they were ready
to rid themselves of flush toilets, go back to previous technologies, and make it illegal to
discharge sewage into sewers. Others cited Registrar-General returns demonstrating that
health had improved with the progress of sanitary science. They argued for an extension of
sanitary improvements in combination with a system of sewage irrigation redirecting wastes
from rivers to land.47 Redirecting wastes to agricultural purposes thus turned “bad” wastes to
“good” purposes. While all these opinions were important to a healthy debate they
demonstrated that central government had a role to play in coordinating these activities if
consistent advances were to be achieved.
In 1861 a Sewage Commission reported that nearly 100 rivers were totally polluted
and constituted a threat to public health. A similar Fisheries Commission reported on other
rivers that were equally polluted.48 In 1864 pressure mounted for the Whig-Liberal Ministry of
Lord Palmerston to take action against pollution, in particular that associated with sewage. In
March, representatives of the Sanitary Association of Great Britain and of the Fisheries
Preservation Association sent a letter to Palmerston arguing that pollution of rivers was a
national problem, endangering health, destroying fish, and hampering the natural advantages
derived from rivers and streams.49 In April, Lord Robert Montagu, Conservative member from
Huntingdon, moved for a select committee of inquiry into disposal of sewage in large towns.
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The select committee confirmed the report of 1861 and recommended measures for sewage
utilization. In December, forty men, peers and commoners, many of them large landowners,
submitted a resolution against the evil of sewage and in favor of its utilization, as far as
possible, on their own estates.50 In addition, in December 1864, fifteen towns asked
Parliament for authority to handle their sewage problems.51 As pollution of rivers continued
unabated during the 1860s Parliament made its first tentative steps toward national control by
providing the Sewage Utilization Act of 1865,52 giving local authorities powers to dispose of
sewage as fertilizer for agricultural purposes, thereby closing the gap left open in 1848.53
However, this did not remedy the pollution problem. While sewage irrigation worked, the vast
amount of land required to property consume the wastes of cities made the process inefficient
and uneconomical. The Act was permissive, following the period’s dominant tendency. Local
authorities determined how they would handle their sewage. In most cases, especially
London, this meant sewage wastes continued to be conveniently disposed of in local rivers
and streams.
The Move Towards National Legislation
Lawrence E. Breeze’s The British Experience with River Pollution 1865-1876
examined the actions and non-actions of British government during the mid-Victorian period.
He showed how a few individuals and groups tried to rescue rivers from polluters. Their
efforts led to the appointment of two Royal Commissions on Preventing the Pollution of
Rivers, one established in 1865, the other in 1868. Breeze’s work relied heavily upon, and
followed the structures of the commissioners’ reports. The Commissioners were charged
with examining certain designated rivers and streams polluted largely from industrial wastes,
sewage, or both. They were asked to determine what might be done to improve river
conditions without endangering public health or jeopardizing trade. In 1876, ten years after
issuance of the first report, Parliament passed the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act.54 This act
would remain the basic law on river pollution until the mid-twentieth century.
Strikingly, arguments to accept the need for continued pollution are similar in debates
today. For example, it was believed that pollution control costs would make British industry
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noncompetitive with other nations, not to mention unprofitable, if they were required to render
harmless their own polluting matter. Industrialists appealed to their riparian rights as
landowners to continue to pollute. Some, concerned with policy, argued that if pollution
control costs made industry noncompetitive, this would indirectly threaten Britain’s general
free trade policies. In addition, costs to local authorities (charged with pollution control) would
be borne by ratepayers. Politicians, always concerned with upsetting their constituencies,
believed the popular maxim that there were no votes in sewage. This acted as an effective
bar to action, even when it was acknowledged that river pollution was a problem for public
health and an increasing number of industries requiring clean water for their processes.
A second theme of Breeze’s work showed the jealous partiality for local control over
central authority. Deeply ingrained as a prerequisite for liberty, this worked against those
who sought to prevent river pollution. For example, some of the worst offenders, then as
later, were town authorities who used rivers to dispose of their sewage. Additionally,
industrial polluters invariably influenced local government. They resisted the notion that
some central office inspector would come and harass them. Similarly, they resisted the
Royal Commission recommendation for creating a larger administrative unit placing a river
basin under control of a single conservancy board. This recommendation would have to wait
almost a century to become law. Those who fought for pollution control thought it was a
mistake of the Disraeli government, in 1876, to leave initiative for pollution control action in
local authority hands. Events proved them correct.
Victorian society did believe in the value of recycling its wastes. For many cities and
towns this took the form of sewage irrigation on farms. This was nothing more than
application of sewage as fertilizer to land owned by the municipality. In other cases,
municipalities contracted with private agricultural interests to secure disposal of wastes. On
municipal sewage farms, crops were grown for the local market and costs were recovered
from the community through the sale of produce. While this showed some merit, and was a
proven technology in France, British towns did not adopt it on a large scale due to
concentration of population and the amount of sewage produced was too great for the land to
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absorb.55 Too often the convenience of dumping wastes into a nearby river overcame the
potential costs of creating such irrigation farms, not to mention the commercial aspect of
going into direct competition with local farmers for market share within their municipalities.
Similarly, a small number of industrialists, primarily those in cloth manufacturing and mining,
developed practices to salvage materials that otherwise found their way into local rivers and
streams. A conference on river pollution sponsored by the Royal Society of Arts showed
these industrialists recovered their costs and in some cases made a profit.56 As manufacturer
John Thom reported, “I get a good percentage on all the money spent, and that after having
paid all working expenses."57 Thus, profit continued to be the defining motivation for their
actions.
While some industrialists cared about river pollution-especially those, like paper
manufacturers, who relied on clean water for industrial processes they were often silenced by
other concerns or their peers when it came time to support legislation. Individuals who fought
against pollution control measures could look to manufacturing societies and local chambers
of commerce for support. In addition, some members of Parliament with close commercial
ties to trade and industry remained alert to divert perceived threats to their interests.
Those in favor of preventative measures to control pollution represented a diverse
group that included landed elements, both gentry and nobility; engineers, such as Robert
Rawlinson, the dominant figure of the first Royal Commission on Preventing the Pollution of
Rivers; chemists, like Dr. Edward Frankland, the key member of the second Royal
Commission on Preventing the Pollution of Rivers; sanitarians, such as Dr. John Simon;
clergymen; academics, especially from Oxford; and medical doctors, especially those from
the British Medical Association. The Fisheries Preservation Association was also in the
vanguard of protest against river pollution.58 Through such organizations as the National
Association for the Promotion of Social Science and the Royal Society of Arts, these men
exchanged views and information. The nature and work of these societies gave critics an
opening to deride results as mere theory and not to be taken seriously by men of practical
affairs. Overshadowing the broad anti-pollution concerns of certain landed aristocrats, the
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passion for angling by members of that class allowed critics to argue that profits and jobs
should not be sacrificed for the sport of the privileged.
Breeze also demonstrated, in a limited way, how mid-Victorian science lacked
answers to questions of water purification, the nature of pollution, and the effect of pollution
upon health. Expert opinions differed on these and related matters, such as the self
purification of rivers. Science’s inability to give definitive answers to these questions made it
easier for government, beholden to the philosophy and policy of laissez-faire, to await further
investigation before taking action, a trend that continues today.
Britain’s first river pollution legislation, the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act, 1876,

59

contained twenty-two clauses in six parts. Although the preamble noted it would be
expedient to make further provisions for the prevention of river pollution, it stressed the
particular object of preventing the "establishment of new sources of pollution." The Act
prohibited dumping of solid matters, such as animal corpses, solid and liquid sewage (new
sources), and mining wastes (untreated water from within and wastewater runoff from
without). Administration was vested in sanitary authority of a district through which a stream
passed (ironically usually the largest polluter). Offenses were determined by inspectors
appoint by the local sanitary authority.
The legislation had several problems. Polluters were able to evade the law either by
claiming their previous rights to pollute or by showing the use of best practicable means to
reduce their wastes. “Best practicable means” relates to processes and methods used to
dispose of wastes. Use of "standard" technology and accepted practices as used in the
wider community were considered acceptable criteria for comparison. In addition to these
advantages the legislation placed restrictions on disciplinary proceedings. Action against
alleged offenders was only possible with consent of the Local Government Board. In giving
or withholding consent the Board was to give due regard "to the industrial interests involved
in the case and to the circumstances and requirements of the locality." Given the prevalence
of industrial interests on local boards it was unlikely they would give such consent to their
own prosecution. Additionally, no proceedings in the seat of a manufacturing industry were
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to be approved unless the board, "after due inquiry" into all "circumstances of the case,"
concluded that "reasonably practicable and available" means could be undertaken, and that
"no material injury" would be inflicted by such proceedings on the interests of such
industry."60
Inspectors of "proper qualification" (no definition was offered) were appointed by the
local board. An inspector determined whether the means used to render polluting matter
harmless were the "best or only practicable and available means under the circumstances of
the particular case." If so, his certificate was to be accepted by all courts as "conclusive
evidence of the fact." Certificates could remain in force for up to two years and were
renewable for a like period. A person aggrieved by an inspector's action, either in granting or
withholding a certificate, could appeal to the Local Government Board.61
Notably missing were standards to guide those entitled to bring proceedings and
those who applied the law. The general terms "poisonous," "noxious," and "polluting"
appeared several times in the language of the statute. But aside from saying, under
"definitions" in clause twenty, that "polluting" should not include "innocuous discolouration"
and that "solid matter'1should not include "particles in matter in suspension in water," no
definitions of what actually constituted pollution were offered. Admittedly, precise distinctions
defining when "pure" became "polluted," or when the latter could become the former, were
difficult to determine. Differences of opinion existed among medical and scientific experts of
the day. Physical and chemical properties, as well as biological effects, were all matters for
consideration, and with growing acceptance of the germ theory some were beginning to add
bacteriology to the equation.
The act conspicuously ignored standards recommended by the Rivers Pollution
Commission. Developed from examination of the Mersey and Ribble rivers, these standards
were used by commissioners in all subsequent examinations to determine the presence and
extent of pollution. While inadequate for the bacteriologist of today, they were adequate to
the needs of the water chemist of that day. However, the Conservatives learned from the
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experience of others. An earlier bill containing chemical tests aroused such furor from
industrialists that Conservatives avoided their inclusion in 1876.63
Likewise, the phrase "best practicable and available means" was deliberately left
vague. Once again the Commission’s work was set aside. Even if their own laboratory
experiments were dismissed as the work of impractical men, their report reflected the
experiences of certain manufacturers and mine operators. Their anti-pollution and recovery
methods appeared practical, affordable, and sometimes profitable. But the act offered no
help with interpreting the means test, other than casting the very long shadow of the primacy
of industrial interests over it.64
The same language applied to sewage. The commissioners reported that their
experiments with filtration methods and sewage farms were successful and practical (similar
to the conclusion of Chadwick in the 1840s). But most localities did not use them. Instead
they used what was known as the A.B.C process (a mixture of aluminic sulfate, blood, and
clay and charcoal) of sewage treatment. Thus a popular process, investigated and deemed
inefficient by commissioners, was adopted to meet the needs of the moment.65
Given the act’s language, the importance of inspectors was crucial. Yet while they
were to possess "proper qualifications," these were not delineated and were left to the Local
Government Board to define. Except for the indication that chemical knowledge would be an
asset, it was not required. The Board appointed engineer Robert Rawlinson C.E. and Dr.
Robert Angus Smith as inspectors, which signaled the variety of knowledge acceptable in an
inspector.66
It is important to recognize, however, that in the case of manufacturing and mining
operations, the Local Government Board and its inspectors lacked power to initiate
application of the law. This was the act’s Achilles' heel. Once again permissiveness won out.
Once more local control held. Only a sanitary authority could put the law into motion, not an
aggrieved individual nor the central government. As sanitary authorities were usually the
largest polluters of a river (with sewage) this was unfortunate. Local authorities could not act
without consent of the Local Government Board, but unlike earlier proposals, there was little
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central government could do should local authorities fail to act. While the law gave local
authorities considerable powers, it imposed upon them no obligation to do so. They
remained free to choose whether or not to enforce the act. The influence of manufacturing
interests either within or upon a sanitary authority in many places made it unwise to leave
such discretionary powers at the local level, as it prevented true reform.
The Rivers Pollution Prevention Act of 1876, although offering some help, failed to
rescue the rivers of Britain. More precisely, persons in positions to effect rescue did not exert
themselves in enforcing the act. Local authorities themselves were guilty of some of the
largest violations. Despite existence of plans and projects to deal with sewage, it remained a
nuisance and hazard to health. The absence of a higher authority (central government),
argued a speaker before the Society of Medical Officers of Health (1887), left too great a
temptation for sanitary authorities to continue the old policy of "pass it on."67 As polluters
themselves, these officials seldom imposed the law upon manufacturers and mine operators.
Often they were also intimately associated with local industrial interests. Neither towns nor
industries used the year of grace provided by the law to improve conditions.
At the end of the century river pollution remained an enormous problem with no
politically acceptable solution. Population increased, industry expanded, and waste
multiplied well beyond the plans and capacity of even relatively new sewage systems.
London long since exceeded population estimates for a system designed at mid-century.
Sewage outfalls of the main drainage system at Barking and Crossness were sources of
continuing irritation and protest in the 1870s and 1880s. Just before it gave way to the new
London County Council (LCC) in 1889, the old Metropolitan Board of Works (MBW) began
constructing new works to precipitate solid matter from sewage and carry the sludge out to
sea for disposal.68 The new precipitation works were completed and performed their task of
removing solids from sewage remarkably well considering that population and industrial
growth continually outstripped the system’s ability to handle the increases.
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The Problem of W ater Quality
During the nineteenth century one of the central problems surrounding effective
action on pollution control was definition of clean water. This problem moved on a constantly
sliding scale. Scientific disagreement, which was thought neutral and objective, contributed
to this problem.
Christopher Hamlin's seminal work, A Science of Impurity: Water Analysis in
69

Nineteenth Century Britain , examined this question in great detail. His work tells the story
of professional scientists during the nineteenth century, and the role they played in defining
water quality. It points out that they were not neutral, but instead had a vested interest in the
outcome of the debate as they tried to legitimize their profession through its use by
government in public health.
The nineteenth century saw the massive growth of science, its clear emergence as a
profession and its use by the government in decision making. Scientists defined long-term
possibilities, rationalized running the state on scientific principles, grappled with the technical
complexities of their solutions and were used by all sides to justify their positions on issues of
public policy. The public health movement can be considered the scientific answer to urban
problems of their day. Much of the transformation of public health administration from Edwin
Chadwick to the present was guided by science. Drinking water, little better than diluted
sewage at the beginning of the century, was transformed by bacteriological analysis which
detected the microorganisms responsible for disease, making prevention possible by end of
the century. While this made informed public policy possible, much occurred during the
century that can be considered ill-informed.
As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, water policy belonged to the Parliamentary
select-committee system, to the courts, and to local authorities rather than to the civil service.
This did not change until well into the twentieth century. These institutions were old,
designed for problems of the eighteenth century and adapted to those of the nineteenth,
particularly municipal improvements, which included the use of water. Scientists were a key
component of this structure. As Hamlin stated, "Science was a rich and expressive idiom of
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that conflict, one characterized by the ideal that there was a best answer, a natural truth, for
any question, and yet possessing vast flexibility, being capable indeed of giving expression to
very nearly any argument one wished to advance."70
The problem of water purity was such a case. Analyses were not conducted by
neutral governmental departments, as none existed at the time. Instead, they were
conducted by a new class of educated professionals who claimed they alone knew what
represented true science, and had the proper methods for obtaining information needed for
effective action. Unfortunately they were compensated by those with economic interests in
the results. While they agreed chemistry would provide answers, they disagreed over
methods of analysis, educational levels required to certify such analysis, and how results
were interpreted. While such questions were usually seen as part of the scientific process
itself, they did not lead to concrete resolution because science could only provide the
arguments for the context of the moment. Scientists were doing no more than providing
legitimate arguments for the self-interested proposals of their employers. Their testimony
was believed and effective because "they were able to show that contemporary
understanding of nature made possible, plausible, or necessary certain consequences which
those who hired them wished to demonstrate "that water running in a river would invariably
become pure, for example."71
While the question of water quality seems sim ple- is it clean? - There are really two
questions, one of the water's composition and the other of its assessment. The second is far
more important. While it seems the first question naturally leads to the second, some of the
most prominent analysts of the nineteenth century, including Edward Frankland, who served
on the Second Royal Commission on River Pollution and whose work was incorporated into
the 1876 Rivers Prevention of Pollution Act, focused on the second question and let it lead
them to the first. Analysis of water's composition might confirm a scientist’s diagnosis, but its
main function, according to Hamlin, was to symbolize to the public the validity of the
assessment.72
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Hamlin pointed out that the majority of conflicts that arose within this debate were
based on analysts’ assumptions. He showed that three issues arose in examining water
composition. First, how does one know the analytical method one is using can detect all of
the entities that might exist in water? Second, how does one know the method is neutral? If
the method affects the nature of the material, in this case water, and if one were to assume
such, how does one determine what these changes were? Third, how do you know you have
chosen the correct method and are using it at the right level? For example, during the
century water analysis methods were applied to inorganic salts, then to organic matter, and
then to species of bacteria.73
Hamlin also pointed out that in examining the second issue (assessment) many key
questions revolved around whether scientists could identify the active medicinal or pathologic
entities present, and if so, could they reliably be predicted? Hamlin showed that mineral
water chemists, who dominated the early part of the century, claimed such knowledge and
techniques. The potable water analysts who followed them in the middle of the century were
less sure and made no claims about the cause of disease and had doubts about whether
their methods, or any other, could be used to reliably predict such causation. The biological
scientists who succeeded the chemists during the latter part of the nineteenth century (and
who still control the process today) were more sure about identification, but still unsure about
the causal relationship between the presence of such entities and the transference of
disease.74
Much of the problem that surrounded the question of disease transference was due
to incomplete knowledge. The miasmatic theory of disease transference was dominant
during the majority of the nineteenth century. It was only replaced by the germ theory in the
1880s and 1890s. It was not recognized that major diseases of the nineteenth century,
cholera, typhoid, and dysentery could be water-borne until the middle of the century. The
empirical studies of John Snow and Edward Frankland linked disease to contaminated water,
which in turn led to the germ theory, which used bacteriological techniques to identify the
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pathogens which caused disease, and made water analysis a more important matter to public
health.
The debate surrounding London's water supply provided much of the pioneering work
in public health, and consequently to debates among scientists and their employers about the
composition and assessment of water. The debate began in 1828 during meetings of the
Royal Commission on W ater Supply, which investigated London's water supply and its safety.
A key figure in this debate was Dr. William Lambe, fellow and censor of the Royal College of
Physicians, graduate and fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, who believed that
London's water supply from the Thames was dangerous due to the decomposition of
inorganic matter.75 Lambe was a transitional figure because he recognized the importance of
pure water supplies for the public, but used the mineral water analysis techniques of an
earlier period. The 1828 Royal Commission was the first significant discussion of water
quality standards and hammered out many of the issues and arguments that would prevail
through six subsequent investigations of London's water.
Hamlin pointed out that the hearings raised important issues of social philosophy for
the first time. Key issues concerned the right of people to good water, control of water
supplies, how safe water had to be, and how inter-regional disputes were discussed and
settled. All of these areas were subject to debate throughout the century. When scientists
took different position on water's contents and significance, they were also taking positions on
subsequent social issues as well.76
The issues deliberated by the Royal Commission of 1828 occupied Parliament,
government ministries, local authorities and other interested parties for the next seventy-five
years. A pattern of outrage, inquiry, and inconsequential public response persisted
throughout the hearings of 1850-52,1866-69,1880-84,1892-93, and 1898-99. Chemists,
medical personnel, engineers, geologists, meteorologists, economists, accountants and
public administrators repeated the same arguments, only changing details as their sciences
progressed. Throughout the century, the main players also remained constant. Private water
companies that supplied London, advocates of various and sometimes conflicting forms of
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public control, and groups of engineers and investors sought to replace the existing supply,
drawn mainly from the Thames and Lea, with their own alternatives. Scientists appeared in
these forums as paid representatives of these interests, and such engagements did much to
weaken the reputation of science overall, as it exposed the inconsistencies within disciplines
and dramatically showed their limitations.
Developments in the fields of epidemiology and applied statistics changed the nature
of the debate and suggested there was an undeniable cogency to Frankland's critique of the
efficacy of water analysis. Investigations by John Simon and his colleagues at the Medical
Office of the Privy Council between 1858 and 1870 showned that important and decimating
infections, particularly typhoid, diarrhea, dysentery, and cholera, were either partly or wholly
linked to contaminated water.77 Simon himself was not committed to the exclusive water
theory, but this was less relevant than his detailed observations of topography, social
conditions and the course of given infections in a wide range of localities. These indicated
water was often the major cause of serious outbreaks of disease. It was precisely in such
circumstances that the erratic nature of chemical analysis was most comprehensively
revealed. In other words, social statistics and epidemiology were strengthening the position
of those who argued that existing techniques of water analysis were incapable of warning
when a disease might strike and when an outbreak end, or of shedding light on the likely
mode of transmission. John Simon articulated this "sociomedical" assault on chemists when
he told the Royal Commission of 1868 that "water might be...capable of spreading cholera but
chemists would be unable to identify the particular contamination which precedes that
effect."78
This was exactly the problem besetting chemists all through the 1870s and 1880s.
Unable to find the water "poison" which they sought, they started to borrow from other
sciences, particularly biology. They adopted use of microscopes to their efforts and in the
case of Frankland continued to decry the contamination of the Thames with human sewage.
As medical science progressed and the germ theory replaced the miasmatic, water analysis
moved from the chemical to the bacteriological domain. By the 1890s, Frankland himself was
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using bacteriological knowledge and the language of bacteriology to redefine his major
preoccupation in relation to public supply systems—the practical steps which could and must
be taken to pre-empt the possibility of random outbreaks of water-transmitted disease.

He

told the Royal Commission of 1893-94 "You cannot detect the germs by chemical
means...they are too minute in quantity and weight to affect the results of chemical
analysis."79 He argued that more rigorous research must be undertaken to find other
solutions.
During the 1890s the bacteriological researches of Edward Klein and Alexander
Houston on the processes whereby water could be clear yet contain infectious diseases were
explained in more rigorous terms.80 As water analysis moved to the domain of biology, the old
focus on sewage again emerged. New purification technologies relieved much anxiety about
water quality. Cheap and effective biological sewage treatment processes were available by
1895, and chlorination after 1912. Some of the most difficult political issues, such as the
ownership of London's water supply, were also finally resolved as water companies were
taken under municipal control in 1904.
The history of water analysis in the nineteenth century showed no great scientific
breakthroughs. Instead it applied developments in other fields in a series of small steps that
stumbled unevenly forward. Regarded as of little importance in 1800, water contaminated
with fecal matter was recognized by 1900 as one of the principal sources of human disease.
The causal agents of diseases, barely defined at the beginning of the century, were at its end
easily recognized and detected.
The politics of water policy in Britain during the nineteenth century left much to be
desired. It might seem logical that scientific answers would lead directly to changes to
safeguard the people’s health. However, this was not the case: "Parliament, the Local
Government Board, the courts, and official arbitrators actively encouraged the proliferation of
conflicting knowledge claims by allowing the adversary process to become central in the
making of water policy."81

While a balance was eventually achieved with elimination of

certain constituencies, such as water companies, and incorporation of science into the
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mechanisms of government, in the meantime it left determination of public safety in the hands
of interested parties who defined water quality.
As the century ended, pollution control stood little further than in 1800. Some
progress was made with passage of the 1876 Rivers Prevention of Pollution Act, the nation's
first water pollution legislation. Solid wastes could no longer be legally dumped into rivers,
and new polluters were subject to regulation and inspection, but the legislation did little to
stop existing sources of pollution, especially sewage, which continued to grow as population
expanded. While national legislation was passed it was negated by local control,
permissiveness and “best practical means.” Rivers at the end of the century, including the
Thames, were more polluted than at the beginning of the century. Real efforts at pollution
containment would await centralized control, effluent standards, new abatement
technologies, and a new public movement that demanded action in the twentieth century.
Death of a River: The Thames to 1950
The health of British rivers, particularly the Thames, are linked to the location and
concentration of populations near them. As Britain moved into the twentieth century
metropolitan populations continued to grow and their demand for water and sewage services
increased proportionally. This placed financial and political strains on municipalities (and
private companies) who sought to provide these services. Resource use increased as more
water was abstracted from and increasing amounts of wastes were placed into rivers. This
was particularly true in the lower Thames valley where London impacted the river. Conditions
in the Thames were the worst in and below London, reaching near anaerobic conditions.
Under such conditions the river could not sustain aquatic life and became a putrid nuisance
to those who lived near, worked on, or came into its contact.
To understand London’s problems it is necessary to review the administrative and
chemical features of pollution control. Polluting materials fall into two broad categories,
biodegradable and non-biodegradable. Biodegradable materials are those that break down
into natural elements over time. Non-biodegradable materials are those that cannot be
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broken down by natural processes. By their nature non-biodegradable materials are the
greatest threat to any water ecosystem because they alter the natural balance.
Non-biodegradable pollutants do not form part of the natural biological cycle of rivers.
They include heavy metals or other toxic inorganic substances, and organic chemicals that
may be toxic to the biota, have chemical structures not readily biodegradable, or both. In the
82

latter class, pesticides and polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)

compounds cause the most

serious problems due to their chemical properties which make them nearly impossible to
break down and therefore persistent in the environment. Such substances may be controlled
by either ensuring prevention of their entrance to the water environment, or by allowing them
in strictly regulated quantities to prevent the buildup of concentrations that may affect the
river's biota adversely.
Most biodegradable materials are organic in nature and the products into which they
can be broken down, form substrates for the biota of the stream. Bacteria are the primary
organisms. They can be broadly classified into autotrophs, which require only simple
substances for their metabolism, using carbon dioxide or its compounds to synthesize
carbohydrates and protein; and heterotrophs, which cannot use carbon dioxide in this way,
and must obtain carbon from organic compounds. Autotrophs can be chemosynthetic,
deriving energy from oxidation of inorganic substances such as ammonia, or photosynthetic,
when they derive their energy from light. Those bacteria which require free oxygen for
growth are designated aerobic. Others (anaerobic bacteria) cannot survive in the presence
of air and derive oxygen from salts such as sulphates and phosphates.83
In a river ecosystem there exists an intermediate stage between aerobic and
anaerobic conditions. Aerobic decomposition of biodegradable organic material proceeds by
using the dissolved oxygen in water until its level falls to about five percent saturation.
Thereafter, nitrate and nitrite are used as sources of oxygen, through the process of
denitrification, preserving the critical five percent saturation level until they are all used. At
this point anaerobic conditions develop and sulphate is converted to sulphide in an attempt to
raise the oxygen level.
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Under denitrification, elementary nitrogen is produced which escapes into the
atmosphere as an innocuous gas. When anaerobic conditions prevail, sulphide is formed,
which is extremely lethal to river biota, and can give rise to hydrogen sulphide in the riverside
atmosphere. Hydrogen sulphide carries a very unpleasant smell like that of rotten eggs and
is a nuisance to the community into which it released. By 1950, the lower Thames had
deteriorated to this level, making it uninhabitable to the natural biota of a tidal river, and
unpleasant for the human population that bordered its length. Leslie Wood concluded that
the primary factor in the deterioration of the lower Thames was the steady decline in the
levels of dissolved oxygen within the river.84 Wood's work indicated there were three phases
in the deterioration of the lower Thames:85 a rapid deterioration after 1910; near-anaerobic
conditions by 1935; and complete anaerobic conditions in 1950.
Between 1900-50 the quantity of polluting matter of all types being discharged to the
lower Thames increased. The major contributors were "point" sources, such as sewage
works outfalls, sewers from industry, storm water overflows from surface water sewers, and
storm sewage overflow from sewers of the "combined" system.
By the time the lower Thames reached its worst condition, in 1950-53, effluents were
being discharged from eight sewage works in the Greater London area and thirteen more
from rural Essex and Kent counties.86 This pollution load was more harmful to the river than
others because of its relative concentration at that point in the river. As the river moves
seaward its volume increases almost exponentially, and the dilution afforded any discharge
increases in a similar manner. Thus, the effect of effluents from rural Essex and Kent were
small in comparison to those from the Greater London area. Pollution levels were also
compounded due to widespread use of synthetic detergents, making the sewage treatment
process more difficult. Their effect was to retain in suspension substances that would
normally be precipitated during sedimentation. For example, at Beckton, non-biodegradable
surface-active agents such as detergents cut the plants operating efficiency by approximately
30 percent, resulting in lower quality effluents and corresponding higher pollution loads
discharged to the lower Thames.87

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59

The pollution problem around London was significantly more pronounced than in
other areas of the Thames Valley. The Thames in the Greater London area received the
discharges of 182 sewage works. One hundred eight of these sewage plants discharged
directly (or indirectly by way of tributaries) into the lower Thames. Another 74 plants
discharged to tributaries of the upper lower Thames within 20 km of Teddington Weir. Since
any contamination of the Thames upriver had an effect on the self-purifying capacity and
process, the discharging of pollution loads into the upper part of the lower Thames had a
significant effect on the ability of the river to handle additional loads down-river.88
Storm sewage overflows were another factor contributing to the deterioration of the
lower Thames. Constructing treatment systems that could handle the extremely large
amounts of liquid received during storms from the combined system was cost prohibitive.
Storm sewage discharges always constituted a problem, as they introduced a heavy pollution
load for a short period, which had a major effect on the biota of the river by creating a dead
zone. While these flows were small in comparison to flows from the sewage outfalls, they did
exacerbate the already bad conditions in the river between 1900 and 1950.89
Industrial effluents discharged to the lower Thames never were as polluting nor
caused such intractable problems as those made to rivers in the north of England. By 1950
they only accounted for nine percent of the total Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) load
being discharged into the lower Thames.90 In contrast, the combined sewage discharges
from Beckton and Crossness constituted 76.9 percent of the total BOD load 91 Clearly, the
problem of river pollution within the lower Thames was linked to human sewage.
Effluents from power stations also contributed to the pollution load on the lower
Thames. These effluents derived from two main sources, stack washing and thermal
pollution. Stack washing produced additional liquid wastes that were discharged to the river,
transferring one form of pollution into another. Thermal pollution, produced mainly as power
stations used river water for cooling purposes, effectively raised the temperature of the river
across a given area. Raised temperatures not only made it unsuitable for sensitive

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

60

organisms such as migrating fish, but they also decreased the concentration of dissolved
oxygen that water could maintain, reducing the self-purifying capacity of these areas.

92

The deterioration of the lower Thames reached its worst point in the early 1950s
when long stretches of the river were devoid of oxygen. In these anaerobic regions no
aquatic life was possible. Public amenities such as fishing and swimming were not available
and the offensive order of a dead river made it inhospitable.93
Responsibility for the Thames was divided among several agencies located at
different government levels responsible at different times for various parts of the river.94 All
of these agencies’ foundations were in the commercial uses and activities on the river and so
focused on the maintenance and improvement of navigation, not pollution control per se. Bill
Luckin pointed out in his work, Pollution & Control: A Social History of the Thames in the
nineteenth century that there was a critical difference in perceptions between the northern
industrial areas of Britain and London over pollution control. In the North the rapid growth and
social impact of industrialization conditioned reformers to concentrate their efforts on the
impact of industrial effluents. In contrast, in London, the tremendous growth of population
from late seventeenth century onward dictated that water pollution was perceived
predominantly in terms of human waste.95
Following the environmental crisis of 1858, and the decision to construct a main
drainage system for the capital, there was no single body given statutory powers to reduce
pollution on the Thames. Instead these responsibilities were split between several bodies
including the Crown Board of Works, the Chief Crown Commissioner of Works, the Thames
Commissioners, the Thames Conservancy and the Metropolitan Sewage Commissioners.
Involvement of the Board of Works and the Chief Commissioner of Works was short-lived and
primarily directed at establishing the Metropolitan Board of Works (MBW) and providing it
financial powers to borrow funds to finance construction of London’s main drainage scheme.
Once this was completed the MBW became the responsible sewage authority.
Up to the establishment of the MBW, The Thames Commissioners, established in
1751, had nominal pollution control functions on the Thames. However, in 1857 the Thames
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Conservancy was created and given jurisdiction over the Thames between Staines and the
mouth of the river with the Thames Commissioners’ jurisdiction limited to the upper river
above Staines.

96

Luckin informs us that the Thames Conservancy, like the MBW, was a child of
compromise. In 1840 the Thames Commissioners became involved in a long fight with the
Crown over ownership of the foreshore of the river, an argument deriving from the
government’s decision at that time to begin construction on the Victoria Embankment. In the
eighteenth century the Commissioners drew their membership exclusively from those holding
a property interest in the upper river above Staines, but after 1770 the City of London gained
a large representation on the Commission leading to a de facto arrangement whereby a
committee of extra-metropolitan Commissioners supervised the river above Staines, and the
City of London Commissioners assumed responsibility between Staines and the sea. Thus,
the dispute between the Commissioners and the Crown was in actuality a dispute between
the City of London and the Crown.
In 1856 a settlement was reached which separated the divergent interests. The
Crown waived all property rights relating to the Thames; the Thames Commissioners retained
their jurisdiction over the river above Staines, and the new Conservancy, representing the
City of London and the national executive, was given control of the lower river from Staines to
the sea. This arrangement would not last long as the Conservancy soon embroiled itself in a
dispute with the MBW regarding its disposal of sewage in the lower river, which the
Conservancy rightly charged deteriorated the condition of the lower Thames. This dispute
ebbed and flowed over several years until the London County Council (LCC) replaced the
MBW in 1889. At that point in time, the Thames Commissioners controlled the river above
Staines and the Thames Conservancy controlled the river from Staines to the sea. However,
the London County Council still acted as the sewage authority for the metropolitan London
area and the City of London controlled the river within the heart of the metropolitan area.97
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As might have been expected this situation produced further conflict as the London County
Council continually agitated for a place on the Conservancy that previously eluded the MBW.
The Conservancy continued to maintain its position that it was a competent body that would
not allow itself to become captured by the London County Council. It should be pointed out
that the Conservancy did not attempt to “represent” the metropolitan area of London, indeed
none of its 23 members directly represented the 4.5 million people living in the county of
London at the time. In 1894 a new Thames Conservancy Act was passed which granted the
London County Council four seats on the Conservancy, but this did not end the conflict.
Instead, the Conservancy continued to exclude the London County members from access to
technical information relating to the collection and analysis of water samples.
After the turn of the century the London County Council turned its attention to another
“problem” within its jurisdiction, the London docks. Long a source of pollution on the lower
river, the Council determined that it could no longer be separated from management of the
river. The battle over municipalisation was a savage fight that had unintended consequences
for the County. Established in 1908, the newly created Port of London Authority (PLA) wound
up protecting the interests of dock-owners over those of the County Council and
dockworkers. However, a minor clause inserted into the Act made the PLA, and not the
Conservancy, responsible for all measures regarding the reduction of pollution on the lower
Thames from Teddington Lock to the sea. Suddenly, powers of the Conservancy were
restricted to the part of the river that was once the province of the Thames Commissioners.98
The PLA continues to manage the lower river today. It takes pollution control
seriously, such as the pumping of bilges, the dumping of solid matter, and, since 1960, any
discharges into the river within its jurisdiction. The PLA shared its responsibilities on the
lower Thames with the City Corporation of London, the London County Council (LCC) and
later the LCC’s successor, the Greater London Council (GLC). The PLA is responsible for the
tideway itself and the tidal portion of all the tributaries that feed into the lower Thames.
Metropolitan governments are responsible for the non-tidal portion of the tributaries that feed
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into the Thames within their jurisdiction, as well as operation of the London main drainage,
including treatment plants and outfalls at Beckton and Crossness. The City Corporation
maintains the Thames within the City’s jurisdiction and is responsible for the “lost rivers"99
within the Corporation’s limits. It also has limited navigation functions within its jurisdiction.100
In 1948 the Rivers Board Act created the Thames River Board that superceded the
Thames Conservancy as management body for the upper Thames valley.

101

The lower

Thames valley was exempted from the legislation (due to the influence of the City
Corporation) and its management remained split between the PLA and the City of London.
The diversity of interests on the lower Thames, and the concentration of population, made
preservation of the river a continuing problem.102
Restoration Efforts
Measures were taken around the mid 20th century to restore the polluted lower
Thames. They resulted from a unique combination of enthusiasm from the responsible
bodies and continuous scientific investigation. The PLA was one of the most important
bodies, leading the scientific investigation and application of knowledge derived from the
studies. In 1948, a new administrative structure for managing and protecting rivers across
Britain was created. “River Boards” were established and provided with legislative powers to
issue discharge consents by the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Acts of 1951 and 1961,
nominally giving them control over the wastes placed into rivers.103 The Thames was under
the nominal protection of the Thames River Board, but its authority only applied to the upper
Thames. The power to issue consents, given to the River Boards, was not given to the Port
of London Authority; and so no enforcement body existed to cover the lower Thames. In
respect to the major polluting discharges from Beckton and Crossness, the PLA had few, if
any powers, as they were under the control of the London County Council. The 1855
Metropolis Government Act was still extant, which required only that sewage effluents from
these outfalls did not return to London. Despite these difficulties, the PLA's officers worked
constantly, mainly through persuasion, toward improving the quality of sewage effluents to
improve the condition of the lower Thames.
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The other main body that acted in the lower Thames valley was the London County
Council (LCC) [1888-1965] and its successor, the Greater London Council (GLC) [19651986], These councils could have carried out merely what was required by statute, but no
matter which political party was in power, the tradition of providing the best lifestyle for
Londoners was the driving force of the councils. Their aim was first to provide Londoners
with a river free from nuisance, and second, to provide a river affording amenities. The
councils cooperated with the PLA to help improve the condition of the lower Thames,
especially through their support of the PLA’s studies.
A river cannot be cleaned, even with the best of goodwill, solely by local government
and regulatory bodies, and the Thames rehabilitation owed much to a study, probably the
most comprehensive made on any British river, by scientists of the W ater Pollution Research
Laboratory at Stevenage (now the Water Research Center, an agency of the central
government Department of Scientific and Industrial Research).
In 1947, the Chairman of the PLA, Lord Waverley, requested the W ater Pollution
Research Laboratory104 assist in an investigation of causes of silting in the lower Thames,
especially around the Barking area, to ascertain in particular whether deposition of mud was
linked to the discharge of polluting matter (this mirrored demands by the Thames
Conservancy from the 1860s through 1870s). As a result the Thames Survey Committee
was established. Its members included scientists and engineers from the PLA, LCC and
central government, as well as consultants in the field of public health engineering. The
laboratory's investigation began in May 1949. While the silting study was undertaken by the
Hydraulics Research Station, using large, purpose-built physical tidal models, the Thames
Survey Committee turned its attention to the polluted state of the river and to problems of
sulphide production, especially during dry months, that caused large numbers of public
complaints.
The Water Pollution Research Laboratory extended its work beyond silting and
conducted a decade long study (1949-1964), examining the causes of, and remedies for, the
pollution of the lower Thames. Their 1964 report, “The Effects of Polluting Discharges on the
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Thames Estuary”105 detailed the rates of degradation of polluting matter, the concentrations of
dissolved oxygen under various types of biodegradation reactions, and the mechanism of
introducing and replenishing dissolved oxygen. The effects of factors such as temperature,
the upland flow of fresh water, seawater penetration into the river and mixing characteristics
were also taken into account. While it was understood the study would be very labor
intensive and centered on laboratory research, the Survey Committee recognized it would
benefit other estuaries and were willing to make the pioneering effort. The work produced a
mathematical model (still used today with little alteration) that allowed scientific pollution
assessment for the first time. The model was sophisticated enough to account for the
position of each major discharge of effluents within the river. This model enabled study of the
production of various quality effluents at different locations and their impact on the river as a
whole. The entire range of pollutants could be calculated no matter their type-oxygen
consuming, biodegradable or thermal pollution.
The study recognized the impact of ammonia and nitrate on water quality. It showed
that ammonia discharged in effluents made a heavy demand upon dissolved oxygen
resources during its oxidation in the lower Thames. The nitrate produced could provide a
reserve of oxygen to prevent onset of putrid conditions when dissolved oxygen levels are low.
The Thames Survey Committee concluded the discharge of nitrates could never affect an
estuary adversely,

106

and from this belief derived the concept of an environmental quality

objective (EQO).107 It was known the lower Thames could be kept free from public nuisance
(ie., the production of hydrogen sulphide) provided nitrate was present, and the Committee
concluded this should form the basis of a suitable standard, provided a margin of safety was
allowed. Reserves of nitrate begin to be used when dissolved oxygen fell to approximately
five percent saturation. The Committee suggested a standard for the lower Thames of a
minimum of ten percent saturation of dissolved oxygen in all places at all times, providing a
margin of safety against nuisance (hydrogen sulphide formation).
Concurrently with efforts on the regional level, national interest in pollution control
increased because of the upcoming 1951 “Festival of Britain”. On April 4, 1951 the Minister
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of Local Government and Planning set up a Departmental Committee on the “effects of
heated and other effluents and discharges on the condition of the tidal reaches of the river
Thames.” Known as the Pippard Committee for its chair, it recognized that not enough was
known about factors responsible for the condition of the lower Thames to formulate a policy
for its management, and that a prolonged study was necessary. Advantage was taken of the
work carried out under the auspices of the Thames Survey Committee by the W ater Pollution
Research Laboratory. This was further reason for the Thames Survey Committee to broaden
their work from the causes of silting to a study of sanitary conditions on the lower Thames.
The two committees worked closely together, with nearly all members serving on both, and
with the scope of research extended to cover both committees’ terms of reference.
Generally, the Thames Survey Committee remained responsible for the research program,
while the Pippard Committee collaborated by obtaining information on various discharges to
the lower Thames.
By 1961, three years before the publication of the Water Pollution Research
Laboratory Report, the Pippard Committee gathered enough information to formulate its own
report, published by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. The report contained
both general conclusions, dealing with the overall condition of the estuary and the aims and
methods of future management, and findings and recommendations on specific issues such
as the effects of particular effluents on water quality. The Committee concluded the Thames
was badly polluted and that large stretches of the river were deoxygenated, creating
insufficient biological conditions to support river flora and fauna (dead zones). It agreed with
the Thames Survey Committee that effluents containing oxidizable nitrogen were more
complex, and the key to river management. Using results of the W ater Pollution Research
Laboratory, it could scientifically demonstrate the impact of sewage on BOD levels and thus
make regulation possible. The Committee recommended the quality of the estuary be
satisfactory (for migratory fish), but that uniform quality standards need not necessarily apply.
In terms of river management, the status quo was endorsed with the exception of granting the
Port of London Authority equal powers with that of river boards to manage the lower Thames.
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The Committee believed its aims could be met if current polluting loads were reduced
by 75 percent.108 Such action would raise the quality of the Thames, in terms of dissolved
oxygen concentration, to levels that would permit establishment of migratory fisheries
(salmon and sea trout). It understood this would require high quality effluents, whose costs
were out of proportion to the benefits gained.
The Pippard Committee recommended the sewage outfalls with greatest effect on the
lower Thames (those effluents produced at Beckton, Crossness, Mogden, West Kent and
Acton) be required to produce higher quality effluents, as they contributed 90 percent of the
total sewage effluent discharged to the river. Other recommendations included
improvements to storm sewage overflow capacity, impacts of heated effluents, and location
of new facilities.
Following the Pippard Report the two most important developments leading to
improvement in the Thames were rebuilding of the Beckton and Crossness sewage treatment
facilities and granting to the Port of London Authority effective pollution control powers equal
to those exercised by the River Boards. The latter was accomplished through the Port of
London Authority Act.109 This enabled the PLA to grant discharge consents, to keep track of
the amount and quality of effluents discharged into the lower Thames, and to meet the
environmental quality objectives set for the river.
The rebuilding of Beckton and Crossness during the 1960s and early 1970s resulted
in production of higher quality effluents, which generated correspondingly reduced pollution
loads. Beckton today is the largest sewage treatment plant in Europe, and produces a flow of
effluent as great as that of the Thames' largest tributary. It remained virtually unchanged
since its construction under the MBW in 1865 until 1932, when an activated sludge treatment
plant went into operation. In 1959 a £7.5 million expansion of the plant was completed. This
consisted of detritus removal, screen house, primary sedimentation tanks, a diffused air
activated sludge plant, sludge digestion, and new gas-fired turbines. In 1967, the GLC
authorized a plant capable of meeting the effluent quality called for in the Pippard report.
Eight further primary sedimentation tanks, eight diffused air-activated tanks, and a further
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forty-eight final sedimentation tanks were built to supplement the twenty-four already
installed. In addition, the sludge digestion plant was expanded to provide an additional thirtytwo tanks, capable of providing digestion treatment to the whole of the sludge. This
represented a fifty percent increase in the plant's overall capacity, allowing it to handle all
wastes then transferred. The reconstruction of Beckton was completed in early 1974.110
Preliminary work began at Crossness in early 1960 and the completed facility was
recommissioned in 1963. The Crossness plant also remained unchanged since its initial
construction in the 1860s, so an entirely new plant was designed. The works differed from
those at Beckton in that the activated sludge treatment was based on mechanical aeration.
Instead of the introduction of oxygen by means of fine bubbles of air, as in the diffused air
process, rotating cones in the surface of the mixed liquor throw the liquid in fine droplets into
the air where, in falling back into the tank, they absorb oxygen at the air-liquid interface. The
cost of the works was £9 million in 1963 prices. Crossness was built after the first stage of
Beckton improvements, and almost immediately after the works began to produce nitrifying
effluent in 1964, sulphide disappeared from the Tideway. No sample containing sulphide has
been found since, confirming the prediction of the Water Pollution Research Laboratory that
nitrate would provide a safeguard against sulphide formation in the river.111
The British experience with pollution control in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries consistently showed a number of failings. Early efforts to centralize pollution
control under a rational and centrally controlled administrative system were defeated by the
tradition of local authority. The missed opportunities of the 1840s and 1850s were to have
important consequences for the next century. The elevation of locally controlled sanitation
efforts meant that every municipality acted in its own interests. Urban wastes were
transferred from one “sink" to another across mediums (i.e., from land to water). Additionally,
establishment of local authority over the environment meant river ecosystems were divided
into a number of separate administrative parts, making holistic management impossible.
Industrial technological change produced greater amounts of wastes which local authorities
deposited into rivers and streams with negative effects for those downstream who used the
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river for a variety of purposes, ranging from drinking water to coolants. National legislation,
first passed in 1876, was weak and ill conceived. The permissive nature of the legislation left
polluters in charge of regulation. Since effective action meant polluters would have to bear
increased costs, there was no incentive for them to take action. As it was cheaper to produce
clean drinking water through filtration and chlorination than it was to treat sewage, the
majority of local authorities passed their wastes onto the “commons” of the river. River-based
authorities were unable to effect real change because they were not supported by central
government and because they did not control entire watersheds, preventing them from
working within the natural ecological framework required for river ecosystem’s health. Finally,
science and technology were revealed as “false” authorities which all sides claimed for their
own positions and used to justify their actions. Evolving knowledge and recognition of the
limitations of science led to the “best practicable means” approach used in the 1876 Act, an
approach still used today. Together, all of these factors led to the despoiling of the natural
environment and the destruction of the common resource of the river.
The relationship between promotion of social science, natural science and state
centralization is informative to understanding developments through the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Social science, particularly the use of population studies of health and
morbidity were successful in identifying the problems associated with epidemic diseases
spread through unclean water. This laid the groundwork for government action. The use of
the hard sciences, chemistry then bacteriology, was critical in helping the nation understand
the natural processes involved with water contamination, which was in turn used by some to
safeguard the populations health. While “science” was used by all sides in various debates
over water quality to justify their own ends it did continue to support the idea that
technological solutions were available to the problem of pollution control. Centralization,
although defeated, still offered the best opportunity for applying new measures in a uniform
manner throughout the nation.
Improvements at the sewage treatment facilities at Beckton and Crossness pointed
the way to the future as they helped to mitigate some of the more pernicious effects of river
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pollution in the lower Thames. The improvements also demonstrated how local agencies
could work together in a positive manner when sufficient political will was present. However,
improvements to the two sewage treatment plants did nothing to solve the primary problem of
dumping large amounts of effluents into the river. These effluents, no matter their quality, still
had a negative effect on the river ecosystem. Ultimately, the structure of pollution control
was not fundamentally changed, as was required to ensure positive advancements.
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C H A P T E R III

CENTRALIZATION AND AUTHORITY IN BRITISH WATER INSTITUTIONS

During the 19th century, authority over the water environment was largely defined in
terms of local control. Municipalities were proud of the infrastructures they had built. London
was particularly proud of its road and railways, its sewerage system, and the Embankment.
They viewed their efforts as achievements of a representative and progressive society. While
not perfect, they represented the popular will. Therefore, it is not surprising that they fought
against any form of centralization. They believed they were more responsive than central
government and better situated to respond to the current and future needs of their
populations. While in most cases true, localism could not ensure the larger common good.
On the Thames and other British rivers, municipalities worked independently to implement
environmental controls, which prevented a coordinated approach that may have proven more
successful. The principle of local control, and its implied relationship with local democracy,
began to be challenged obliquely through a series of small steps. These steps created larger,
more complex administrative units in the second half of the twentieth century.
Many of the events surrounding water in the middle decades of the twentieth century
are best understood within the context of the local v. central authority debate. Everincreasing amounts of pollution effectively “killed” large sections of British rivers by mid
century. 1 Critics of pollution ranging from industrialists to recreational users pointed to the
declining health of British rivers as evidence that the current system was not functioning.
They argued that municipalities could not be trusted with responsibilities towards pollution
because it was in their financial interest to pollute. Pollution is fundamentally a human
problem, a byproduct of our existence as organisms. As cities concentrate population so do
they concentrate pollution to unprecedented levels. In Britain, municipalities control the
sewers and sewage treatment systems and thereby directly influence the quality of effluents
discharged. As a result, cities, through expenditure on plant and equipment, can directly
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improve river water quality if there is sufficient political will. However, municipalities failed to
increase the quantity and quality of their capital resources congruent with population growth.
As may be expected, sewage treatment could not meet the increased demand and resulted
in increased pollution to the point where some sections were ecological dead.2
As the twentieth century progressed and water pollution worsened, the nineteenthcentury solution of local authority over the environment began to be questioned. Successive
governments began to look for more efficient means of preventing pollution, leading to new
national legislation creating larger administrative units in 1951 and 1961. While thought to be
more efficient and effective, they only served to further complicate pollution control as they
added water supply functions to their responsibilities. The new units faced difficulties in
balancing their various roles in investigating and regulating water supply with their
contradictory role of ensuring pollution control. For example, water management included the
approval of abstractions from the river. As abstractions reduce river flow, they negatively
impact a river’s pollution carrying capacity. Achieving a balance of abstractions with polluting
discharges is necessary to maintain the river’s health.
Two critical precursors to legislative changes in the mid-1970s were the 1963 Water
Act and the 1971 Central Advisory Water Committee Report on the Future Management of
Water in England and Wales.3 The 1963 Act serves to illustrate the trend towards defining
authority over the environment at ever-higher levels. The 1971 Central Advisory Water
Committee report set the tone and many of the terms of the debate that surrounded both the
1973 and 1974 Acts. London’s experience is also instructive: while at the forefront of efforts
to improve the local water environment through the coordinated activities of several bodies,
the metropolis faced fundamental questions that serve to illustrate Britain’s difficulties in
effectively responding to water pollution.
Small Steps
In 1915, the final report of a Royal Commission on Sewage Disposal4 recommended
the formation of a national authority to harmonize the activities of local authorities in regard to
sewage disposal. Because this recommendation came in the midst of war, it received little
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practical response at the time. But the recommendation did not fade away and by 1926 the
time had come to act. Stanley Baldwin’s Conservative government, through the third report
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Standing Committee on Rivers Pollution,5
endorsed (the concept of) the creation of a central authority to balance the various interests
involved in the pollution question (municipalities, industrialists, fishermen, etc.). The
committee looked to a time "when the nation will awaken to its duty" and warned that delay
would mean greater expense and the likelihood of failure in the future.6 7 Along with
numerous articles and letters on the subject, The Times contributed a powerful editorial on
the need for new machinery to manage rivers from source to mouth.8
Concurrently, the Ribble Joint Committee9 attempted to convince the Ministry of
Health (successor to the Local Government Board) of the need to amend the 1876 Act. In a
meeting with Health officials, the committee's chief inspector, George Etherton, explained the
inadequacy of its powers and the frustrating delays caused by its numerous procedures.10 In
a memorandum to the Ministry of Health, prior to a meeting with officials in the spring of
1927, he detailed the weaknesses of the 1876 Act and offered amendments to correct
several deficiencies.11
Additional pressure upon the government came from the newly formed Pure Rivers
Society, an organization careful to emphasize that it was not a fishing group but represented
diverse interests, including riparian owners, amenity groups and the tourism industry. They
pointed out that the majority of river pollution that was occurring was illegal and in defiance of
the 1876 Act. They also urged the appointment of a central water authority to act as an
enforcement agent.12
Most important of all was the formation of a joint committee by the Society of Medical
Officers of Health, the Fishmongers' Company, the Salmon and Trout Association, and the
British Waterworks Association. The BWA’s concern derived from a fear of using polluted
river sources to meet the need of a growing domestic demand for fresh water. Acting
together, these groups urged the government to set up a central authority and to intensify
scientific research on the best way to handle industrial effluents.13A meeting with Lord
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Balfour (Lord President of the Council), Neville Chamberlain (Ministry of Health), and W alter
Guiness (Ministry of Agriculture) proved awkward, as they countered with the age-old
argument that such action would be dangerous to the competitive position of the British
manufacturing economy. Citing the need for more time to study the problem, Lord Balfour
made only one concession, a commitment to support more scientific research.14 This led to
the formation of the W ater Pollution Research Board (1927) as part of the Department of
Scientific and Industrial Research. The Balfour decision repeatedly produced more delays,
as the technical information produced was used by both sides to augment their positions.
The condition of rivers grew worse during the next two decades. The double
constraints of the Great Depression and the Second World W ar placed river pollution outside
of the realm of consistent public action. Real action required higher public expenditures,
which were not possible during the Depression or the Second World War. For example,
bomb damage to London’s sewage treatment facilities, sewers, and water systems, occurring
during “the Blitz”, was not completely fixed until after the war. Yet, adequate supplies of
clean water were essential to support the civilian population and the industries were they
worked. Water was classified as a vital national resource. An initial report presented to the
Ministry of Health by its Central Advisory W ater Committee in the summer of 1943 spelled out
a preliminary policy.15 Government itself took action in the spring of 1944, and Parliament
received a Government White Paper containing proposals for a "National Water Policy."16
Part I of the White Paper became the basis for the Water Act, introduced early in
1945 and enacted the week following the end of the war in Europe. This imposed upon the
Ministry of Health the responsibility for the conservation and proper use of water resources
throughout England and Wales. It reconstituted the Central Advisory Water Committee as a
national statutory body whose services now would be available to any ministry concerned
with water matters. It also provided penalties for the pollution of water used for human
consumption, placing more stringent water quality standards on water suppliers.17 A few
months later, the newly elected Labour Ministry of Clement Atlee followed with a similar
measure for Scotland.
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The planning commissions of the 1930s and the wartime experience of a centrally
planned economy increased the likelihood of public acceptance of centralized river
management. Government had directly intervened in the management of the economy
during both world wars with great success. The majority of the population believed that the
interventions were responsible for their victories in both wars. The example of activist
government successfully bringing forth policies for the good of the nation lessened public
fears of central government intrusion into their lives.
Following recommendations by the Royal Commissions of the 1860s and by various
anti-pollution groups over the years, the wartime report of the Central Advisory Water
Committee contained proposals for new river boards that had the sole responsibility for
administering the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act of 1876.18 These proposals were
incorporated in Part II of the Government White Paper of 1944. At the opening of the
Session of 1947-48, the King's speech gave notice of the government’s intent to establish
river boards as a solution to the river pollution control problem. The Labour Minister of
Health, Ernest Brown, commented on the importance of clean water for all. He argued that
the prevention of water pollution would help undo the evil effects of the industrial revolution
and bring the living conditions of all people into “accord with modem conceptions of a decent
life for the citizens.”19
20
The River Boards Act of 1948 created 32 regional boards to take over all functions,
including the control of river pollution, which had previously been scattered amongst 1600
authorities. The Act was intended to create a single authority for each river, which would act
in the river’s best interest. The Act included all of England and Wales with the exception of
the Thames and Lee catchment areas and the administrative county of London. London,
characteristically, had escaped conforming to national standards via the influence of the City.
The 1948 Act coincided with a growing movement in favor of changing the law on
river pollution. In 1946, Clement Atlee’s Labour government requested that the Central
Advisory W ater Committee review pollution legislation with a view towards modernization.
Rather than await the results, the government proceeded with the River Boards Act so as to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

87

have these boards established and in place and “straining at the leash” to apply the
anticipated changes in pollution law.21 The new act gave River Boards the power to prescribe
effluent standards, laid down in by-laws, subject to confirmation by the Ministry of Health.
They were not intended to be uniform, but were to vary according to conditions in each river
or part of a river.22 Special provisions for mining interests included in the 1876 act were
discontinued.23
Late in 1950 Labour’s new Minister of Health, Aneurin Bevan, introduced legislation,
based on the recommendations of the Central W ater Advisory Committee, to replace the
1876 Act. The bill empowered the Boards to impose standards for determining what was
poisonous, noxious or polluting matter. The Ministry of Health expected to have a series of
standards laid down for different reaches of a river, in each instance ensuring a "gradual
rising rather than a lowering of standards."24
The passage of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act in 195125 repealed the 1876
act and a new era of consolidated river management came into force. All discharges were
subjected to a consent process. Applicants had to quantify the nature, composition,
temperature, and maximum volume and flow rates of their effluents. This housekeeping act
consolidated the powers of the Boards, enabling them to know precisely what municipalities
were placing into rivers through their sewerage systems. This information provided the basis
for rational decision-making on behalf of each River Board.
26

Further change came in 1963 , when the 32 River Boards were consolidated into 29
River Authorities.27 With the larger structure came new pollution control measures that
sought to control discharges to underground strata that threatened underground aquifers.
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Control was established through application of a consent procedure administered by the
River Authorities. The Act extended River Authorities’ powers, enabling them to sample
effluent discharged into inland or coastal waters in their area. River Authorities were also
given the power to undertake emergency measures to mitigate or remedy pollution incidents,
and to make by-laws protecting water resources. Thus, the 1963 act continued the
centralization of pollution control and extended the authorities’ powers beyond the river itself
to all those areas that might affect the river. Consolidation was based on the idea that a
River Authority’s control should extend over an entire watershed allowing the complete
management of the hydrological cycle. The consolidation was significant because for the first
time hydrological and ecological arguments were used to define the size of the authority.

28

Consolidation did not create an integrated industry. Various functions associated
with water utilization and management remained divided among a number of bodies. Water
supply remained under the control of municipal and private undertakings; conservation and
land drainage were the responsibilities of River Authorities, and local authorities retained
control over wastewater and sewage. The 1963 Act, however, helped shape perceptions of
existing structures and glaringly pointed out the inadequacies of divided authority.
The Water S updIv Industry & Consolidation of Local Authority
Britain’s water supply industry was created piecemeal through acts of Parliament and
the actions of individuals who formed private companies to supply cities and towns with
water. The industry was mostly governed by market competition, only having to conform to
certain quality standards. Competition between water companies usually meant that supplies
were unevenly distributed amongst populations, with the poorer neighborhoods receiving
service last. Many municipalities were frustrated by this situation and desired the authority to
provide this service. They saw it as a logical extension of their controls over streets, sewers,
and power. They also believed that they could provide higher quality service at lower price
than the water companies because they were not motivated by profit. Municipal control of
water supplies would both reinforce local control over another sector of the water
environment and consolidate and rationalize this important service.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

90

In many towns of the industrial midlands and north of the nation, municipal control of
the water supply was achieved in the second half of the nineteenth century. For example,
Liverpool's Waterworks Act of 1847 enabled the council to purchase the local water
companies and embark on the "Rivington Scheme" at a cost of over one million pounds. The
scheme engineered a series of linked lakes and reservoirs at Rivington Pike near Chorley
and brought the water to Liverpool by gravitation.29 Similar achievements were made in
Bradford under the Waterworks Act of 185430, and in Leeds under acts in 1837,1852, and
1867 whereby water became "cheap and plentiful enough for its use to be taken for granted
by all sections of the population."31
When Birmingham took control of its water companies in 1878, local control of public
utilities was commonplace. Nevertheless, Birmingham's experiment in "gas and water1'
socialism received greater publicity, and more lasting recognition, than the efforts of any
other city. Without doubt the publicity resulted from Joseph Chamberlain's leadership as
mayor of a rapid program of civic improvements. The example set by Birmingham "made
local government ever more attractive to important local businessmen, who brought to civic
affairs a corporate sense of mission and financial flair which generated the golden age of
municipal collectivism."32 Chamberlain's efforts in Birmingham were, of course, built on his
personal reputation and the efforts of civic gospellers before him.

33

In comparison, London’s water supply system was irrational and inadequate. As late
as the 1890s, water supplies "in the east end and many other parts were fitful, costly and, in
some cases, confined to a common tap to supply a crowd of nearby tenements."34 London
had eight separate water companies supplying the city by the 1850s. Unfortunately, their
boundaries were ill conceived and ill-defined, leading to direct competition, an irrational
system of charges and inadequate investment. Although these problems were eventually
overcome north of the Thames (where the companies agreed to operate in defined areas)
competition south of the Thames continued with adverse consequences for both supplies and
public health.35
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Dissatisfaction with the private, commercial provision of water in London persisted
well into the twentieth century. An initial but unsuccessful attempt was made to gain control
of the water companies when the LCC was formed in 1889. Concurrently, attempts were
made to gain control of the companies through direct acquisition and consolidation. Neither
strategy proved successful but it demonstrated the need for action, which was eventually
fulfilled through the Metropolis Act of 1902, which created and vested the Metropolitan Water
Board (MWB) as London’s water supplier.

36

The new, single-purpose authority contained representatives from the LCC, the City
Corporation and the recently created metropolitan boroughs, which replaced the vestries.37
The MWB soon achieved a scale of supply not approached by any other water undertaking in
Britain. By 1914 it was supplying 244 million gallons of water a day to a population of over
6.5 million while the next largest undertaking, the South Staffordshire W ater Company, was
supplying only 16 million gallons a day. By 1935 the MWB was responsible for the water
supply of almost 20 percent of the population of England and Wales.38
The growth of local authority control over water supply is illustrated by the following:
whereas only eleven local authorities were operating waterworks in 1830, by 1880 the
number had risen to seventy-eight. By 1905, there were 1,142 municipal undertakings
employing capital of almost 130 million pounds. In contrast, approximately 230 private
companies employed capital of less than 20 million pounds.39 The scale of operation differed
sharply. In 1914, only 137 of the municipal undertakings were supplying water at rates in
excess of 500,000 gallons a day and only about seventy of the private companies achieved
this figure. By 1935 the eighty-five largest municipal and private undertakings were supplying
seventy-five percent of tyf? population. The number of undertakings remained broadly
constant throughout the inter-war period, although private companies began a long process
of merger that reduced their numbers from roughly 170 in the 1930s to 90 in 1956 and 33 by
1970.40
During the inter-war period, the linked issues of water resources, water supply and
appropriate management structures became matters of growing concern to the central
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government, as no central policy existed in regards to water management. The Ministry of
Health gradually succeeded in establishing itself as the Ministry with prime responsibility for
dealing with the water industry, but this was limited to prescription of components of water
quality. In 1922 it established an Advisory Committee on Water, which recommended the
adoption of legislation to safeguard supplies and prevent pollution. In 1934 the most severe
drought in fifty years prompted the British Waterworks Association, the Institution of Water
Engineers and the Water Companies Association to convene a joint conference to consider
national water policy. The conference published a report rejecting suggestions both for a
water grid (similar to that for electricity) or the nationalization of water supplies. Instead it
advocated continuation of the autonomy of individual water undertakings, but under the
auspices of a separate water department of the Ministry of Health. In any event, attempts to
rationalize the water industry and its legislative framework were not completed until the end
of the Second World War.
Development and Extensions of Pollution Control
The primary instrument of water pollution control was the discharge permit, a process
transferred to the River Authorities under the 1963 Act. Then as today, the principle tool of
water quality is the legal requirement that anyone discharging effluent to natural waters
(surface and underground) must obtain "consent" from the relevant authority. In practice the
River Authority receives applications for consent and issues a permit setting forth conditions
for the discharge. The comprehensive system of consent permits was adopted after nearly a
century of experimentation with other approaches to pollution control. Since water quality
maintenance is one of the most critical aspects of water management, it is worth discussing
how central government became involved in the process.
The first effort to address water pollution came in 187641 but the act was permissive
and contained a number of weaknesses. Enforcement powers were located with local
authorities, which was irrational since they were often the largest polluters; court costs were
borne by the complainant, and there were many counter pressures so few prosecutions
resulted; scientific criteria was pollution was ill defined, leaving the courts with few guidelines
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for determining violations; no penalties were prescribed for those convicted; courts could only
issue a stop and desist order but could do nothing about the environmental damage.
Fisheries interests gave organized leadership to the pollution fight,42 not just because
of the increasing damage from industrial spills, but also because first the Local Government
Board, and then the later the Ministry of Health insisted on limiting its concern to the health
consequences of water pollution.43 In 1923, the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act44
introduced the idea of biological factors in water quality. It made illegal the placing into rivers
of any matters"...to such an extent as to cause the waters to be poisonous or injurious to fish,
or the spawning grounds, spawn or food fish."45 This provision established a more precise
criterion of pollution-one that could be tested by the relatively simple technologies already
available. The Act created Fisheries Boards whose jurisdictions covered specified river
basins, a precedent incorporated into the design of later legislation. The Boards were given
powers previously exercised by local authorities in regards to pollution control. Thus armed,
the Fishery Boards were more vigorous in prosecuting violators than the previous local
authorities.
Early efforts to establish general standards for human water safety had few results.
A Royal Commission was established in 1898 to study water pollution. One of its later
reports (1912) recommended standards that would provide a guide for later enforcement of
the pollution control laws.46 The Commission's standards affected pollution control
administration even though, with few specific exceptions, they were not enacted into law nor
made a part of regulations having the force of law. Instead, they were referred to frequently
in discussions of pollution control and the River Boards informally adopted them as working
guidelines.47
When the River Boards were set up in 1948, it was thought that they would provide a
new and vigorous instrument to control pollution. Many legislative powers relating to rivers
were transferred to the Boards, including powers to prosecute polluters under the 1876 and
the 1923 acts. In addition, the Boards were empowered to enter onto property to take
effluent samples, which, if taken properly, were admissible as evidence in legal proceedings.
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For the first time, one authority was responsible for an entire river system, rather than the
previous system of leaving prevention in the hands of many local authorities. This was a
crucial step in defining authority over the environment and would eventually lead to more
effective pollution control.
Efforts in 1948 to give the Boards stronger regulatory powers were countered by
arguments in favor of the status quo. The Federation of British Industries and the National
Coal Board, fearful of more stringent enforcement measures, argued that the current
enforcement procedures already available were sufficient.48 But enforcement by court action
proved inadequate, and anti-pollution interests continued to press for better controls.
These controls would first appear as part of the 1951 Act. It authorized River Boards
to adopt "byelaws" establishing effluent standards as a basis for improving control, and it
required any new discharge, or a substantial alteration to an old discharge, to obtain consent
from the River Board. Each discharge permit could prescribe the conditions of discharge,
including location, character, and capacity of the outlet, and the conditions of the effluent.
The conditions attached to each permit were to be recorded in a register and made public by
the River Board. (However, this valuable public record was not available until 1985 for a
variety of reasons which will be discussed at length in a later chapter.)

Violators were

subject to a single fine up to a limit of E200.49
The River Boards failed to adequately control pollution due to their administrative
structure. River Boards were consolidated administrative entities. The largest pressure to
pollute derived from the municipalities who were well represented on the boards. As a result,
the boards' need to pollute eclipsed their responsibilities regarding pollution. This perception
was supported by water professionals (engineers) who objected to the imposition of
standards due to their inflexibility. For example, their largest objection was that standards did
not consider the differences in the conditions of the receiving waters.50 According to the
professionals, no standard could match the flexibility of a discharge permit. While this
statement is still true today, discharges still must be monitored to ensure compliance. Simply
granting a discharge permit stating particular criteria does not guarantee that the discharger
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will comply. The lack of any systematic monitoring of effluents, which might have gone far in
ensuring compliance, was a critical failure in the design and implementation of the new
system. Additionally, the new system only applied to those discharges not covered under the
previous system and did not allow the River Boards to fundamentally alter previously granted
permits.
The need for better control over existing discharges led to further study by
Parliament’s Armer committee, which recommended that a consent procedure similar to the
1951 Act be applied to pre-1951 discharges.51 This recommendation would form the basis of
the 1961 Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act. River Boards were finally granted the power
and duty to license every discharge into the natural waters within their jurisdiction. The Act
strengthened penalties on violators by setting no limit on fines that could be imposed by the
courts upon a conviction, but limited the fine to £100,000 for a summary conviction. Section
5 of the Act required periodic review of any conditions imposed within the discharge consent
and allowed the River Boards to make reasonable variations or revocations of the permit.
This last provision allowed the licensing system to maintain some measure of flexibility. The
discharge consent powers of the 1951 and 1961 acts gave each River Board a
comprehensive system of licensing discharges, theoretically giving them the ability to directly
control all major sources of pollution. However, while River Boards did bring all discharges
under control, they did not limit pollution. Few permit conditions were changed and the net
production of pollution increased. Thus, the combination of the permissive nature of the Acts
and the influence of other local authorities on the Boards effectively blocked overall
improvements.
The 1963 W ater Resources Act52 provided few new substantive powers affecting
discharge controls. However the Act did produce a move towards larger more centralized
administrative units for water sen/ices management, centralized the water services and waste
industries, and placed conservation and water supply responsibilities in the hands of the 29
consolidated River Authorities created under the act. It was thought that combining these
responsibilities would provide for greater motivation and more rigorous application of the law,
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as the authority responsible for providing clean water would also control the pollution that was
placed into rivers. Unfortunately, this was not the result, as the old conflict between society’s
need to pollute and enforcement remained. The new River Authorities, responsible for
pollution control, were also in many cases the single largest polluter, as the agency
responsible for waste disposal. Having the polluters responsible for issuing their own
discharge permits was a classic example of a conflict of interest that promoted inaction. This
was exactly the same situation that had existed almost a hundred years earlier. The only
difference in this case was that one authority was responsible for an entire watershed’s water
supply and pollution control, instead of the hundreds that had existed in the nineteenth
century.
With creation of the new authorities, river management changed from a system of
local authority based on individual rivers, to a more centralized one based on hydrological
and ecological principles applied to an entire watershed. This was significant because it
allowed for efficiencies through economies of scale and more importantly because it based
management principles on sound scientific principles. The dual functions of providing water
and waste disposal services made it necessary to think in terms of watersheds instead of
individual rivers. Hydrological considerations were the key to maintaining adequate supplies
of water in rivers. As discussed in the previous chapter, rivers have a natural carrying
capacity of pollution. But this carrying capacity is affected by a number of factors including
the amount of water in the river. Since a large amount of water supplied to cities and industry
is abstracted directly from the rivers, this affects the equation of how much pollution could be
placed into a river. Conversely, the greater the amount of pollution placed into a river the
greater the amount of water it requires so as not to exceed the river’s given carrying capacity.
This complex problem became the primary mission of the River Authorities. Unfortunately,
this focus meant that moving water from one part of a watershed to another became the
locus of action within the Authorities, relegating pollution control to a secondary position. In
the Thames Valley this went so far that schemes were designed to abstract water from one
location and pump it into the river at another, so that pollution could be disposed of in a third.
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The 1963 Water Resources Act also created a central body, the W ater Resources
Board, which provided a focus for national concern about water resources and their effective
development and management. The Board was composed of eight members who were
appointed by the Minister of Housing and Local Government (later the Department of the
Environment). The Minister designated a chairman and deputy chairman. The law required
that the Board have at least one member who had expertise on Wales, but no other
qualifications were prescribed. The Water Resources Board was independent in exercising
its statutory authorities.
The Water Resources Board was responsible for general surveillance of River
Authority actions relating to water availability, water quality control, and the development and
implementation of water conservation projects. The Minister of Agriculture, Food and
Fisheries (MAFF), was responsible for supervising matters of drainage, flood control and
fisheries. The Minister of Housing and Local Government (later Department of Environment)
continued to exercise supervision of River Authorities concerning water suppliers. Local
governments held authority relating to matters of water supply services and in the
administration of waste discharge permits.
The Board assumed a positive leadership role in providing River Authorities with
policy and procedural guides. In its first full year of operation (1964), it developed six
comprehensive memoranda clarifying, interpreting, and suggesting procedures for carrying
out the new statutory provisions. Some of these memoranda were the subject of two-and
three-day conferences with appropriate officials and/or employees of the River Authorities.53
The memoranda covered a number of subjects that indicated the Board’s priorities: control of
abstraction and impounding of water; periodical surveys of water resources, including twentyyear demand projections, and proposals for necessary action; hydrometric projects
(movement of water from one area to another); water in underground strata; water quality;
control of abstractions of water in underground strata.
While the memorandum related to water quality dealt directly with pollution control, all
of the memoranda concerned the effectiveness of pollution control functions. The Board is
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significant in that it demonstrated central government's preference for central over local
control and recognized the need to collect and analyze information regarding the systematic
control of Britain’s entire hydrology.
The 1963 Act gave the Minister of Housing and Local Government the responsibility
for the rationalization and operation of water supply services provided by private undertakers
and local governmental units, and the provision of sewerage and sewage treatment systems
by local authorities. In addition, the Ministry supervised the operation of River Authorities by
determining "minimum acceptable flow" of water in rivers through the licensing of
abstractions, by approving rate schedules, and granting consents for effluent discharges.
Powers affecting water use and development were associated in the Ministry with a wide
range of supervisory functions over local governments, including those relating to finance and
planning.
The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food had responsibilities to recommend
grants for drainage and flood defense projects (such as the Thames Barrage), and to provide
policy guidance in the administration of fishing regulations and fishery improvements on
inland waters within River Authorities' areas of jurisdiction. The drainage grants directly
affected some rivers as they allowed cities to remedy inadequacies in storm sewers and
create excess capacity at sewerage works. The Ministry was responsible for determining the
minimum requirements for certain fisheries, such as Thames River salmon, and then working
collectively with other agencies to implement them. As discussed previously, the salmon
fishery on the Thames was destroyed during the first half of the twentieth century due to
excessive pollution. Efforts by the PLA, the Thames River Board (Thames River Authority
after 1963), the Thames Conservancy, and the Lee Conservancy during the second half of
the twentieth century met with some success, largely due to scientific studies that determined
the specific water quality levels necessary to support the fisheries
The two Ministries (Housing and Local Government and Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food) shared responsibility for general supervision of the River Authorities, particularly with
respect to their establishment, membership, and general operating policies. However,
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despite the appearance of authority on paper, the Ministries’ powers regarding water
management were limited. The Ministries could only initiate action if a River Authority
defaulted in its responsibilities, and this was rare.
Major deficiencies in the 1963 system of water management became evident early
on. First, there was inadequate authorization to force creation of regional distribution and
disposal systems. While River Authorities had been charged with water management
responsibilities, the Ministry of Housing and Local Government was in overall control of
consolidating water distribution and disposal enterprises among municipalities. Bureaucratic
self-preservation prevented the Ministry from working to develop economies of scale and
force integration of water management and disposal. Moreover, while River Authorities were
given powers to purchase, construct and manage sub-regional distribution and disposal
systems, the Act failed to make allowances for the capital financing necessary for this
purpose.
A second deficiency related to River Authorities’ inability to levy abstraction charges
reflecting the true value of water, which influenced price, demand, and conservation. Instead,
charges were based upon the Authority’s annual revenues and capital costs, thereby making
the system inefficient. Additionally, the use of abstraction charges to promote efficiencies
was restrained by not passing them on to consumers. Rates charged by water undertakers
were monitored and subject to adjustment by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government.
But inaction by the Ministry to promote realistic (retail) water prices made rationalization of
abstraction charges difficult.54 Moreover, the Ministry’s authority was independent and
superior to that of the River Authorities and the Water Resources Board. Thus, close
cooperation in the administration of water charges as a tool of water management was
difficult if not impossible to impose. If close cooperation had existed and water was priced as
a commodity, capital would have been generated which could have used to promote further
conservation efforts and pollution control.
The 1963 Water Resources Act provided England and Wales with a comprehensive
institutional system for water management. However the system still reflected a greater
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dependence on, and experience in, regulating water uses than in the development and
management of water as a resource. All the conditions and procedures for regulatory
activities were carefully prescribed in the statutes. The inadequacy of legal powers to foster,
or to construct and operate, regional waste collection and treatment systems prevented their
development and the economies of scale that would have resulted from their construction.
Regional waste collection and treatment systems were a critical aspect of the water
management system. Unfortunately, it was precisely this area where British practice was
inadequate. Without the power to finance these systems themselves, River Authorities were
left to the vagaries of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, which had both contrary
institutional priorities (i.e., building housing), and political constraints (i.e., the wishes of the
Prime Minister). Additionally, central government supervision was split between the new
Water Resource Board and the existing Ministries. The lack of clear jurisdiction prevented
the Board from being effective in its planning functions. To counter this the Board developed
close advisory relationships with the River Authorities that became quite sophisticated.
Lastly, and most importantly, the Act built into government a concept of integrated
administration of water resource activities. This precedent would lead to further integration in
the 1970s.
The 1971 Central Advisory Water Committee Report
In April 1971, Edward Heath’s Ministry of Health’s Central Advisory W ater Committee
published its report on the organization of water supply, river management, sewerage, and
sewage disposal.55 It described the existing situation as confused and illogical. There were a
variety of interests identified by the Committee. These included 198 statutory water
undertakers in England and Wales obligated to provide supplies of piped water for domestic
and non-domestic consumers; 1300 sewerage and sewage disposal authorities, which were
either local authorities or joint boards; and 29 River Authorities, responsible for water
conservation, land drainage, fisheries, pollution control, and in some cases navigation. Other
interests included central government departments, specifically the new Secretary of State for
the Environment;56 the Water Resources Board; the British Waterways Board, a public
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corporation which owned the great bulk of canals and was the navigation authority for certain
navigable rivers; navigation authorities, such as the Port of London Authority (PLA); local
authorities through application of drainage and amenity powers; the internal drainage boards
within the River Authorities’ areas of jurisdiction; the Central Electricity Generating Board, a
large user of water; industrial firms; agricultural interests; commercial fisherman; and
advocates for sport and recreation.57
Inevitably these diverse interests tended to conflict. For example, the sewerage
authority was content as long as its drains emptied into the river. What happened to water
quality downstream was someone else's problem. The river authorities, charged with
maintaining the quality of the water, failed to perform adequately and stop such abuses
because their members were often also members of the very same sewerage authority and
were reluctant to prosecute themselves. The statutory water undertakers, in their turn, faced
the filthy condition of rivers, from which they had to abstract supplies for their consumers.
The Central Advisory Water Committee subscribed to the obvious view that the
relationship between the various authorities must be changed so that comprehensive water
management plans could be formulated, and once agreed upon, a system of organization
and financial arrangements was needed for their implementation. Although the committee
was in agreement concerning the need for Regional Water Authorities, they were divided
over the functions and constitutions of those authorities.
Concurrent with the report of the Central Advisory Water Committee, the government
had two other Parliamentary reports that impacted water: the Report of the Working Party on
Sewage Disposal, known as the Jeger Report, and the Report on the Disposal of Solid Toxic
Wastes, known as the Key Report. The relevance of the Key report lay in the knowledge that
the annual disposal of 14 million tons of house and trade refuse and 20 million tons of
commercial and industrial wastes, excluding power station ash and mineral wastes, could
and did affect water quality, especially underground sources of water. The Jeger Report
recommended measures to strengthen existing legislation for controlling water pollution
through control of sewage disposal. It outlined controls for discharges to all tidal rivers and
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estuaries, coastal water pollution, discharges of sewage from boats, accidental pollution by
spillage of oil or toxic chemicals, effluents poured into sewers, storm overflows, and dumping
at sea. It also recommended additional financing for research and development. The
proposed changes meant that some industries and local authorities would have to spend
more for treatment or disposal of effluents.58
The two-year study by the Central Advisory Water Committee, and the reports of the
Jeger and Key committees, charged with finding a way to establish order amid the chaos,
solved nothing. After emphasizing the urgency of the problems involved and agreeing that
far-reaching measures were necessary, these committees were unable to reach a unanimous
view as was their charge. Instead, faithfully reflecting a multiplicity of entrenched and
conflicting interests, they promoted two entirely contradictory solutions.
The Central Advisory Water Committee Report split over solutions. One group of
advocates argued that the conservation, supply and treatment of water constituted a cycle
and ought to be treated as such by a multi-purpose organization.59 A second group, much
concerned with maintaining the status quo, asserted that water services were an integral part
of local government and were best provided by single-purpose authorities at the local level,
who were closer to the people. The argument was therefore the familiar one between those
whose priority was efficiency through centralization and those whose first concern was to
safeguard the sovereignty of local democracy.60 Local democracy in this context was more
about the preservation of the historical system of municipal control of services than about the
loss of participation. These advocates needed to safeguard their ability to act independently,
which in the context of pollution control, meant a continuation of their ability to pollute at
levels that served the needs of their individual communities rather than the needs of the
watershed they were located within or the nation as a whole.
Politically, the water quality issue in 1971 was essentially little different than that
which had existed in 1876. The multiplicity of actors involved in the process would not
support the structural changes necessary for and therefore could not agree upon a solution.
While some developments had occurred: better science, more exact standards for discharges
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were in place, the forging of links between agencies, industry, and advocates, and most
importantly, an ever increasing focus on water quality by the new centralizing river
authorities, these developments did not solve the fundamental problem of overuse of the
rivers as a dumping ground for waste. What was required from these developments to
produce results was a resolution of the multiple divisions in pollution control between local
and central government. Reorganization of local and central government, (the story of the
next chapter), would set the stage for radical reform of pollution control in the 1970s.
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C H A P T E R IV

GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION AS A PRELUDE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL REORGANIZATION

The reorganization of the British government at the national, regional, and local level
between 1965 and 1973 created a new political order that enabled reform of the
environmental machinery of government. As a result of reorganization those concerned with
water quality were able to focus reform and regulatory efforts on fewer specific agencies,
rather than the diverse groups that had existed previously. The reorganization of local
government and the creation of regional governmental bodies provided a precedent utilized
to reorder water services in 1973 to the regional level. Coupled to the reorganization of local
government was a reordering of central government on a more rational and centralized model
that resolved many areas of overlapping authority.
Organizational reform was driven by patterns of urbanization that did not conform to
geographic political boundaries. In September 1965, Mr. Richard Crossman, Minister of
Housing and Local Government, in Harold Wilson’s first Ministry argued in an address before
the Association of Municipal Corporations that public disillusionment with local government
derived from the sense that it was seriously out-of-date. He thought that the county boroughs
and county councils as presently organized were archaic institutions, whose size and
structure made them increasingly ill-suited to fulfill the important functions (including pollution
control) with which they were charged. Contrary to historic patterns therefore, government
reorganization began at the local level, in London, then proceeded to the regional and
national levels. This chapter will describe these changes and show how they set precedents
that were later adopted for water services.
While the history of local control is strong in Britain, it works in relationship with the
national government, which has significant powers of its own.1 Fewer checks and balances
exist between the executive and legislative branches than in the United States. Members of
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the British cabinet are also members of Parliament, and in the twentieth century are usually
tied together by party-related and cabinet-centered mechanisms of cooperation and
discipline. Sharing in administration, although taking political and policy cues from ministers,
are a cadre of elite administrative officers from the professional civil service.
Britain’s political structure gives great powers to party leaders who are entrusted to
govern. Legislative rules preserve a sense of fair play and. provide room for critical review,
but there are few checks on what the government may accomplish. The British system rests
on a tradition of responsible leadership regardless of which political ideology is dominant. It
presumes that a pragmatic consensus is achievable. While in power, party leaders who form
the government are given leeway, although the representatives of the opposing parties are
expected to question and criticize, forming the "loyal opposition." However, until the leaders
are forced out of power through the loss of an election, their government has scope for action
restricted only by the size of their majority.2
The central government, acting through its various ministries and departments,
maintains firm control over virtually every functional sphere. Whether the issue is education,
housing, transport, economic development, or more recently the environment, an appropriate
ministry is ready with its policy group, inspectors and other officials hovering over and
stipulating the activities of local government offices and staff. Local government
representatives exercise considerable initiative, but always with the realization that central
governmental agencies generally hold veto power. This veto is often cloaked in the form of
persuasion when the central government wishes to avoid openly opposing local opinion.
Alternatively, as will be seen in environmental matters, it achieves its goals through fiscal
controls, specifically control over borrowing and spending, typically in the form of central
government grants.3
The central government thus assumes direct responsibility even for exploring
governmental reform when it is thought necessary. The device typically employed in Britain
is the Royal Commission. Made up of “experts” representing diverse viewpoints and interests
and endowed with great prestige, commissioners can search out possible alternatives to a
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given problem and can produce an ordered set of recommendations providing a basis for
legislative action. When a government is ready to act it usually issues a “White Paper” that
outlines the initial legislative ideas that might solve a particular problem. The "White Paper"
is then used to begin a process of consultation between the government and interested
parties. After consultation is completed a specific bill is usually put forward in Parliament to
enact the agreed-upon proposals. However, the recommendations of a Royal Commission
can safely be ignored if they prove awkward or difficult to the present ministry. The Royal
Commission mechanism works in Britain because it coincides with expectations that the
government in power will initiate the needed reforms. Moreover, the commissions are
charged with obtaining a consensus that provides a basis for action. Thus, it is expected that
a Royal Commission will present a complete and packaged proposal that is feasible-political,
financial, and other considerations having already been debated and considered. However,
whether those recommendations really solve the problem, or only appear to, is open to
debate. This has been especially true of Royal Commissions that have dealt with pollution in
Britain. For example, the 1865 and 1868 Royal Commissions on the Pollution of Rivers
produced a set of recommendations that were only partially applied, with no effective
enforcement mechanism, as was seen in the 1876 Rivers Prevention of Pollution Act.4
In Britain, local governments are known generically as "local authorities." There are
several varieties: counties, county boroughs (independent of and parallel to counties), and
lower-tier authorities over which counties serve as upper-tier umbrellas, such as drainage
and sewerage boards. All local authorities are governed by elected councils. These councils
are notable for their size, which is usually larger than in other European nations.
These large councils are in principle representative of the people. They rely heavily
on committees and subcommittees that assume responsibility for specific functions. As such,
they sometimes follow the pattern of Parliament, and are also consistent with a political-party
approach to council organization, where one of the parties is recognized as in power, and the
other major party, or parties accept(s) the role of opposition.
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The reorganizations of London metropolitan and other local governments along the
lines of enlarged county units are critically important to understanding how pollution control
functions became organized in Britain in the 1970s. The consolidation of local governmental
functions at the county level in the 1960s set a series of precedents that were later used to
transfer these functions from the local to the regional level.
The British experience with reorganization of local government also served as a
precursor to acrimonious debate over issues of local control and local democracy. Public
perceptions regarding reorganization were colored by arguments both for and against
changing the existing governmental system. Arguments in favor of change were generally
cast as professional issues of management and efficiency. They argued that Britain’s
population growth coupled with ever-increasing urbanization had outgrown the abilities of
local government to meaningfully serve them. New governmental units were required to
address these societal changes so that efficient planning could be accomplished. Population
and urban patterns suggested regional units. It was argued that larger units were more
efficient at decision-making regarding scarce resources and would more evenly distribute
benefits. Those opposed to change argued that larger units were not “close” enough to the
people to serve them and were viewed as unrepresentative. Opponents were afraid of the
potential power of larger units to redistribute resources from local to regional priorities. They
also thought larger units, even if representational of local interests, would not truly represent
the full spectrum or have the sophistication or knowledge of specific local conditions to make
a difference.
To a limited extent both arguments were true. Larger governmental units did “fit”
patterns of development. Long-range planning required a holistic approach, not one divided
between competing local authorities with overlapping responsibilities. Local authorities were
correct in their fear of the removal of their powers. Larger governmental units would mean
the “end” of the current system but it was not the end of local representative government per
se, as officials were still elected. Interests would still operate, but they would shift their efforts
from local to regional units. Those afraid of the financial powers of larger units were correct
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in that larger units implied taking more interests into account and decision-making for the
good of the whole community.
London was the first to feel these changes. Between 1945 and 1957 limited efforts
were made to review and patch up local government. In desultory fashion several reports
came forward, but they carried admonitions not to meddle with the London County Council
(LCC)5 or to consider major reorganization within Middlesex County, an almost solidly
urbanized set of suburbs located north of LCC territory. While the Labour Party was in power
(1945-51), its leaders were mostly concerned with major nationalization efforts, and were in
any event not disposed to direct critical inquiry at the LCC, a body dominated by the Labour
Party. However, when the Conservative Party came to power in 1951, (under Winston
Churchill) local government review efforts were undertaken. Three governmental White
Papers were issued between 1956 and 1957 (during the Ministries of Sir Anthony Eden, April
1955 to December 1957 and Harold Macmillan, January 1957 to October 1963) proposing
review of local government in England and Wales. The reviews were couched in restrictive
terms and indicated that no reform would be undertaken unless agreed to by a majority of the
local governments affected. This was largely the course of events over the next several
years. The Local Government Act of 1958 authorized the Local Government Commission of
England (a ministerial controlled body) to review, under somewhat limited powers, the
organization of local government outside of the London Metropolitan Area.
In January 1957 Henry Brooke, Minister of Housing and Local Government in the
Macmillan government, obtained authorization to establish a Royal Commission on Local
Government in Greater London. Its chair, Sir Edwin Herbert (later Lord Tangley) was largely
independent of ties to local government and proved resourceful in analyzing problems,
identifying the most prominent alternatives and designing a completely new governmental
system.6
The Herbert Commission was directed to examine the conditions and management of
local government in London. Excluded from its consideration were police (a central
government function, in the case of London), water (under the Metropolitan Water Board)
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and, tacitly at least, public transport (a responsibility of the London Transport executive, a
public corporation under central government supervision).7
The Herbert Commission heard evidence from more than 200 authorities and
organizations. There were 117 local governmental units within the commission's review area
of 840 square miles. The Commission held 70 sessions taking oral evidence, spent 88 days
visiting local authorities in the review area, and held 44 other meetings, and read large
volumes of written evidence, including 117 communications from the public at large. Major
central government departments submitted recommendations, as did the political parties,
many professional organizations, associations of local authorities, and individual local
authorities. As can be expected, much of the evidence argued in defense of the status quo.
Some varied from this course and offered major theoretical alternatives, such as the report
from the London School of Economics.8
In October 1960, the Herbert commission recommended that a two-tier governmental
structure be created.9 This was to include fifty-two new Greater London boroughs, each with
a population of 100,000 to 250,000, to which as many functions as possible would be given.
A Greater London Council (GLC) would also be created, encompassing an area with about 8
million residents. The GLC would assume responsibilities for such functions as might be
dealt with over the entire area. All previous multi-function local governments would be
superceded, with the exception of the City of London, which retained its special exemption.
The organization and operations of the Metropolitan Police and the Metropolitan Water Board
were not affected by the proposal, largely because they were considered efficient in their
responsibilities and because they already served the entire metropolis.
The commission's report provoked acrimonious debate. It was bitterly opposed by
the existing London County Council (LCC), and the London Labour Party, as representing a
move to dismember the Labour Party stronghold within the County of London. It was
inadvisable, they argued, to break up the LCC by distributing to the boroughs such major
functions as education, health, welfare, and housing. Some outer suburban areas resisted
inclusion within the proposed Greater London Council. As the drafting of the London
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Government bill proceeded, the Herbert Commission recommendations underwent
substantial changes. In the end the voting was heavily partisan, with the Labour Party
opposing the legislation to the end. Yet the Conservatives were triumphant.
The London Government Act of 1963 excluded nine urban districts and boroughs in
five outer counties from the area under the jurisdiction of the GLC. This reduced the
proposed area to 616 square miles, compared to the commission's recommendation of 716,
and the original commission review area of 840 square miles. The number of new London
boroughs was reduced to thirty-two (plus the City, recognized, as always, as a special
case).10 Thus a set of thirty-four governments- the GLC, thirty-two London boroughs, and
the C ity- replaced the greater complexity of ninety-two earlier governments in the same
geographic area. Two counties, London and Middlesex, were replaced entirely and parts of
four others, Essex, Kent, Surrey, and a small portion of Hertfordshire, were separated from
their home counties and incorporated into the GLC. Three county boroughs, Croydon, East
Ham, and West Ham, were also absorbed. The counties had been upper-tier governmental
units, and the county borough single-tier. Lower-tier governmental units that were also
absorbed included twenty-eight metropolitan boroughs within the old LCC and thirty-nine
municipal boroughs and fifteen urban districts within the counties outside the LCC.
After the reorganization of London's government, attention turned toward the
operation of local government throughout England and Scotland.11 However, this task was
left to a new Labour government under Harold Wilson, who took control from the
Conservatives in October 1964. In 1966 two Royal Commissions (England and Scotland)
were established to make a general review of local government and recommend new forms
of administration. The English Commission was headed by Sir John Maud and the Scottish
Commission by Lord Wheatley. Their terms of reference were to consider the structure of
local government outside of Greater London, in relation to existing functions; and to make
recommendations for authorities and boundaries, and for functions and their division, having
regard to size and character of areas in which these could be effectively exercised and the
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need to sustain a viable system of local democracy.12 Wales was excluded, as proposals for
local government reform in the principality already were well advanced.13
Although the new system of municipal government in London was not within the
English commission's terms of reference, it heard evidence on how the system worked, as
this was relevant to local government reorganization elsewhere in England. Among its
achievements, the GLC could claim the reduction of local authorities from nearly ninety to
thirty-four and the provision of a central planning authority. Under it, London local
government conformed to the two-tier structure advocated by many municipal experts.
During the course of its work the Maud commission heard a wealth of evidence that
generally supported either of two recommendations. One was the creation of between eight
and ten large regions, consisting of areas previously covered by the Regional Planning
Council and Regional Planning Boards. These regional units of government would be
charged with large-scale infra-structural functions, such as economic planning, major
highways, land use, technical education, public health, water and energy supply, and air
pollution. The other tasks of government were to be accomplished by a second tier,
consisting of units between 300,000 to 1,000,000 inhabitants. Such a solution was backed
by a number of representatives of the academic world and such professional groups as the
National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) and the Town Planning
Institute.14
A second solution, supported by the County Councils Association and many
government departments, favored the creation of a first tier of some thirty-five to forty cityregions, fairly large areas consisting of central cities with a large hinterland attached and
comprising populations of 300,000 to 3,000,000 inhabitants. A more representative second
tier of local government could be added in some areas. The regional Economic Planning
Councils and Boards were to remain as coordinating and advisory bodies.15
The recommendations of the 1969 Redcliffe-Maud Commission mainly followed the
second scenario.16 The Commission preferred a single tier system resembling the county
boroughs. For the major urban areas, a two-tiered structure resembling London's system
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provided for top tier metropolitan counties and second tier metropolitan districts. The
envisaged division of responsibility between the two called for the counties to provide the
major environmental services, while the districts would deal with personal services.
However, victory by the Conservatives and Edward Heath in the 1970 General
Election meant that the Redcliffe-Maud proposals were never implemented. Although a twotier system for metropolitan areas was accepted, the proposals for unitary authorities for the
remainder of England were rejected. Instead, opting for uniformity, a two-tier system was
also adopted for England and Wales, based on existing counties but with the addition of
smaller county districts. Thus, in large part, the first scenario entertained by the Maud
Commission was implemented by the Conservatives via the Local Government Act of 1972.
Under the Act the fifty-eight county councils in England and Wales were reduced to
forty-seven. The eighty-two county boroughs were abolished and the 1,249 borough, urban
and rural district councils replaced by 333 county districts. Additionally, the Act created six
metropolitan counties within which there were thirty-six metropolitan districts. Briefly, in the
non-metropolitan areas, the county councils received the bulk of the powers (education/social
services) with the district councils playing a secondary role. However, in the metropolitan
areas, the districts received the bulk of powers.
In many ways the reforms of the 1960s and 1970s did not please anyone as neither
Party gained all they desired, which may suggest that indeed the best solution was selected.
Nationally, politics in the 1960s and early 1970s was dominated by issues surrounding
Britain’s role in world affairs, attempts to join the European Community (EC), and settling into
a pattern where government played a larger role in economic affairs but a smaller role in
issues of rr)prality. Beginning in the late 1960s and continuing throughout the 1970s and
1980s politics became more hostile as issues like membership in the EC and the proper role
of trade unions in a welfare society raised ideological passions. Both parties suffered
politically from “stop-go” economic policies that failed to revitalize the pound or provide
consistent means of fighting inflation. Even with the ability to change taxing and spending
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levels annually neither party was able to effectively manage the economy to produce growth
and maintain full employment.
The instability in Britain’s economic policies in the late 1960s under Wilson’s Labour
government produced conditions that threatened the party’s historical base of political
support, the trade-union movement. Attempts to hold down inflation by controlling wage
increases in nationalized industries proved difficult. Strikes increased throughout 1967 and
1968. The government responded with an Industrial Relations Bill that would have mandated
a 28-day cooling off period, a secret ballot by all union members prior to initiating a strike and
penal sanctions for those who did not comply. The Bill produced a storm of protest within the
Labour party that would ultimately lead to the Bill’s withdrawal, in return for a promise by the
Trade Unions Council’s General Council that it would monitor work stoppages.
A consequence of these difficulties was a series of political reverses in parliamentary
by-elections, one indicator of the nation’s political mood. This was carried over into local
elections where the party suffered major reverses. The GLC was lost to Conservative control
in 1967 for the first time since 1934. By 1969 Labour only controlled a few elected borough
and county councils throughout the nation. Even with these reverses, an improving economic
situation in 1969 encouraged Wilson to call a general election. Always one to listen to polling
data, Wilson was encouraged by another shift in public mood that indicated support for a
continuation of the Labour government. In a surprise, Wilson was defeated in 1970 by
Edward Heath, who had reminded the nation of Labour’s broken promises of steady
economic growth, harmonious labor relations, and ability to handle the increase in crime and
violence within British society.
Heath won election not through defending the status quo but through promises of
specific reforms, including a reduction in taxes, a new industrial relations bill that would make
union contracts legally binding, and a renewed effort to join the European Community. Heath
also believed that greater long-range efficiencies in governmental operations were achievable
(i.e. savings for the central government) through a reform of local government. It is against
this national backdrop that decisions regarding local government were made. Neither party
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would get all they desired and the competition raised ideological passions.
The Labour Party opposed reforms, fearing the possibility of built-in Conservative
majorities within the redefined counties and districts. Labour’s recent experience with
significant electoral reverses at the local level justified their fears. They believed that new
larger councils, drawn by a Conservative government, would inevitable favor the
Conservative Party. They criticized the size of the administrative areas as too large and
remote to facilitate meaningful local participation. This criticism applied particularly to the
county councils, the metropolitan councils, the GLC and the Inner London Education
Authority (ILEA). However, it was also leveled at the London boroughs and districts. Further,
the allocation of functions (particularly education) was criticized and the duplication of some
functions such as housing was claimed inefficient. The London and other metropolitan areas
in the top tier authorities were criticized as too weak, too expensive, too bureaucratic and
irrelevant. However, attempts to strengthen them were resisted not least by the metropolitan
districts and the London boroughs, who following the tradition pattern, fought to hold on to
their responsibilities. In the non-metropolitan counties the districts were said to be too weak
and many former county boroughs, trapped as they saw it in politically hostile counties,
retained nostalgia for their former civic independence.17 Finally, and most importantly, there
was a growing consensus that the reorganization had not achieved the economies of scale
envisioned and that local government was too costly. Indeed, this was particularly true as
local government reorganization had occurred without reference to the central question of
funding.18
Dissatisfaction with the new system soon emerged in London, predictably, as it was a
Labour stronghold despite the Conservative's ability to gain control of the GLC19. Some
boroughs were not easily reconciled to their new limited roles as part of a larger metropolis
controlled by the GLC. Richmond, Kingston and the former county borough of Croyden felt
less kinship with London than with neighboring parts of Surrey. Further, the "outer London
giants" such as Havering in the east and Hillingdon in the west found it difficult to create a
sense of corporate identity. Finally, many of the new boroughs encountered internal
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difficulties in reconciling old differences of politics and practices in the interests of an imposed
and somewhat artificial unity. Paddington and St Maryiebone, for example, were not readily
reconciled to each other let alone to being subsumed under Westminster. Dissatisfaction
also emerged concerning the role of the GLC itself. Broadly speaking, the London boroughs
and the then-bipartisan London Boroughs Association (LBA) were dubious about the benefits
of a top tier authority and generally hostile to the GLC's power to raise revenue by
precepting20 on the taxes of the boroughs. This latter particularly rankled with the wealthy
boroughs, such as Westminster, Kingston, and Chelsea, who provided the bulk of funds. At
the GLC it was felt that the authority was not fulfilling the strategic role it had been
established to meet and was dabbling in too many services, thereby creating unnecessary
overlap with the boroughs 21
When the Conservatives took control of the GLC following the 1977 local elections,
their leader, Horace Cutler, appointed Sir Frank Marshall to undertake an independent inquiry
into the role of the GLC. Marshall was the ex-chairman of the Association of Metropolitan
Corporations and former Conservative leader of Leeds City Council. London's Labour
boroughs refused to cooperate with the inquiry and did not give evidence or accept Marshall's
Report as having any official status. The report sought to give the GLC a truly strategic role
by devolving powers from central government to the authority and from the authority to the
London boroughs. Most controversially, the GLC would take control of local government
finance in London, collecting funds centrally and subsequently distributing them to the
boroughs according to the GLC's perception of needs. The Marshall Report failed to
convince its critics that a stronger GLC would be an improvement over the status quo.
Importantly, central government (now controlled by Labour) was strongly against promoting
the GLC to something close to a regional government, possessing its own tax base.
Dissatisfaction in London was mirrored throughout the nation. Many of the large
towns and cities that had lost their borough status and had been absorbed into the
surrounding counties campaigned for a return of their lost powers. In early 1979, Labour's
Secretary of State for the Environment, Peter Shore, produced a white paper, Organic
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Change in Local Government. It proposed that the structure of local government should be
more flexible and allow for variations in different parts of the country. Cross and Malien, in
their study of local government, have observed that;

what in essence this amounted to was that the district councils of these cities
would regain the responsibility for education and social services and some
traffic and planning powers, which they had lost to the county councils under
the 1972 Act. ...it reflected the dissatisfaction with the 1972 Act felt by many
and in particular, Labour supporters who saw these major powers transferred
from the authorities which they often controlled, to the counties which they
rarely did.22

The proposals for change died when the Labour Government lost the May elections in 1979.
They did, however, contain a notion more substantial than merely freeing some of the Labour
controlled cities from the Conservative counties. The proposals expressed disquiet about the
benefits of the two-tiered system. Increasingly it was felt that unitary, all-purpose districts,
based on the modified model of county boroughs, would be more efficient and more local
than what had been put in place by reorganization.23
When the Conservatives returned to power in May of 1979 under Margaret Thatcher
they set about removing what they saw as unnecessary metropolitan counties. They also
were determined to abolish the GLC and, subsequently, the Inter London Educational
Authority (ILEA), which had become an arena for Labour-led programs. In a 1983 white
paper, Streamlining the Cities, the government depicted the metropolitan counties and the
GLC as a wasteful and irrelevant tier of government. The now Labour-controlled GLC had
become the government's particular bete-noir under the left-wing leadership of Ken
Livingstone, and the ILEA was also associated with what the government saw as
unwarranted profligacy at the public's expense. By 1983 the GLC had lost many of its former
powers. Mrs. Thatcher transferred virtually all of its housing programs to the boroughs and
assigned planning responsibility for docklands to the London Docklands Development
Corporation. Similarly, London Transport, operated by the GLC since 1969, was transferred
to London Regional Transport in 1984. Briefly, the GLC was left with a rump of peripheral
functions and largely justified its existence in terms of its grant-making activities to various
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voluntary organizations. Under the Local Government Act of 1985 the metropolitan counties
and the GLC were abolished and their responsibilities transferred to the metropolitan districts,
London boroughs and various single-service "quangos", or quasi non-governmental
organizations. The ILEA received a brief reprieve as a directly elected body but was
ultimately abolished in 1989 and its responsibilities given to the inner London boroughs.24
During the twentieth century changes in the functions carried out by the local
authorities occurred without reference to or reform of their boundaries. Although after 1888 a
number of local authorities experienced sufficient population growth to obtain county borough
status, the nineteenth century boundaries persisted until the 1960s and 1970s. The reforms
of the 1960s and 1970s also took place without specific consideration of local government
financial arrangements. The implementation of the 1972 Act generated demands for higher
expenditure, but coincided with the economic recession that followed the first major hike in oil
prices. The result was a crisis in local government expenditure that persists to the present.25
The reorganizations of London metropolitan and local government along the lines of
enlarged county units are critically important to understanding how pollution control functions
came to be exercised in Britain. The Conservatives’ consolidation of functions at the county
level set precedents for regional government that served as examples for the reorganization
of water and sewerage functions in 1973 and 1974. Their efforts also politically charged all
issues including environmentalism, which in turn would lead to more acrimonious debate
between the two parties. However, another step was required to complete the reform cycle,
the central government itself. Reorganization at the national level was sought to produce a
more efficient and rational model for British government that would better serve the populace.
From a broader perspective, many of the activities that government was undertaking;
evolving a regional economic strategy, local governmental reform, reform of planning,
housing, and transport under the Wilson ministry were concerned directly, or indirectly with
pollution. As Britain groped towards a new structure, the population became conscious of
environmental issues by a series of accidents that illustrated the immediate impacts of
pollution. The increased public awareness of pollution and a desire to see something done
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about it encouraged both parties to adopt national strategies. Both parties began examining
the overlapping functions of several governmental departments and began preparing ideas
for central government reorganization.
With the ascension of Edward Heath and the Conservatives in 1970 reorganization
was placed on the national agenda. The birth of the Department of the Environment was one
of the consequences. While not unexpected, its genesis was strange. No one had expected
the Conservative Party to win the election that year, yet they returned to Parliament with a
working majority. No one expected that the environment, having been virtually written off as
an issue during the election campaign, pushed aside over larger issues such as inflation and
slow economic growth, would make a sudden and dramatic reappearance in the fall. As it
turned out, the environment proved to be the great "sleeper'1issue of the year.26
The reorganization of central government in general and the creation of the
Department of Environment in particular fit within Heath's vision of creating efficient
government. The new Department of the Environment ultimately brought together disparate
functions into a comprehensive structure where the environment and related development
issues were addressed in a strategic manner.
The word "environment" appeared for the first time ever in the Queen’s Speech
delivered to both houses of Parliament on July 2,1970. The Queen reminded her audience
that "rising production and a steadily growing national income must provide the resources for
improving the social services and the environment in which we live." She promised that her
Ministers would "intensify the drive to remedy past damage to the environment and will seek
to safeguard the beauty of the British countryside and sea-shore for the future." While at first
that summer seemed to be a period of inaction, in actuality Heath's Government was
preparing for a major overhaul of the national government and its environmental machinery.
The overhaul was on the same scale as the reorganization of social services undertaken by
Beveridge after the Second World War. To some extent, it was a bipartisan affair.
Consensus existed on several changes and would likely have been implemented regardless
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of who won the election. However, it was the Conservatives who were able to claim credit for
these changes.
Edward Heath presented a white paper on the Reorganization of Central
Government to Parliament in October 1970.27 Its opening paragraph stated its main
intentions:
This Administration has pledged itself to introduce a new style of government. More
is involved than bringing forward new policies and programmes: it means resolving
the issue of the proper sphere of government in a free society; and improving the
efficiency of the machinery intended to achieve the aims it sets for itself within that
sphere.2

The white paper's central intention was to deal with the re-ordering of responsibility for
functions between the departments dealing with such matters as trade and industry, overseas
aid, social services, education, and the environment. It also aimed at improving the decision
making process of central government, with the objective that it would “remove the need for
continual changes for a considerable period in the future.”29 In order to accomplish this task,
the white paper considered central government from both an “analytical” and a “functional”
approach.

Principally, the white paper saw the need to develop a more strategic form of

decision-making. This shaped the analytical approach, which aimed at assessing the
relevance of departmental policies to the government’s broader objectives.

30

A system of

Programme Analysis and Review (PAR) was set up to provide departments with a formal
means of improving policy formation and decision-making. The Central Policy Review Staff
(CPRS) was created to coordinate this process and provide the Cabinet with a nondepartmental source of advice.31 It would reinforce the system of inter-departmental
committees by providing “a clear and comprehensive definition of government strategy."32
The inter-departmental committees themselves, while bringing ministers together to ensure
Cabinet agreement, were limited to particular subject areas, while the CPRS would link

individual policies to the government’s overall strategy.
In the functional approach advocated, the white paper aimed to create more strategic
units of government. It identified the need to remove areas where ministerial departments
overlapped, causing delay and conflict in decision-making. The white paper clearly stated
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that the aim of creating functionally integrated departments was to reduce “parochial”
departmentalism. A large department would have “less need to fear for and defend its
interests against other interests so that in the formative stages of policy it must and will be
able to discuss issues with other departments.”33 A second factor was that large departments
would have greater control over resources and thus create efficiencies, one of the broad
objectives of the government’s overall strategy. A note of caution was struck: issues that
required collective Cabinet consideration might be decided within the new departments. This
presented a difficulty, as one of the major advantages of large departments was seen to be
the resolution of conflict within the “line of management rather than by inter-departmental
compromise.

34

The white paper was debated during its second reading in the House of Commons
on November 3 , 1970.35 No major environmental issues were raised during the debate and
minor issues, such as noise pollution generated by the Concord, were easily handled by the
Government. That evening the bill was passed and the Department of the Environment was
created. The importance of having a body responsible for overall environmental planning
was critical for later developments, specifically the reorganization of the water authorities in
1973.
The new Department of the Environment contained all the functions of the former
Ministries of Housing and Local Government, Public Building and Works, and Transport.
While the Ministries and their Ministers were abolished by statute, they remained functionally
within the new Department. In allocating Ministerial responsibilities, Mr. Peter Walker,
Secretary of State for the Environment, achieved a total rearrangement of tasks. Instead of
three separate sovereign pyramids, one single large edifice with the Secretary of State at the
apex was created. Strategic powers left to the Secretary of State included control over
issues of policy and priority, and public expenditure, which determined the operation of the
department as a whole. The Secretary also took charge of the Department’s coordination
work on environmental pollution. Through this pioneering action, Britain became the first
nation in the world to create a ministry-level department to handle environmental issues.36
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The development of the Department of Environment was significant for British
politics, because it provided the opportunity for combining disparate policy areas into one
organization. Britain’s previous experience with planning convinced both parties that
management from the center was possible and desirable, albeit extremely complex. It
recognized that the best means of preventing pollution to rivers was through coordinated
planning that took a long-range view and could weight all the factors of urban and industrial
development. Planning controls would assure prevention or limitation of pollution. It is of
historical note that Britain was the first nation to seek to rearrange their national
governmental organization to accomplish this goal. Other nations either followed the British
model or created special pollution control agencies such as the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to monitor and control pollution.
The complexities of pollution meant that the Department of the Environment became
a department of everything. Where the “environment” began and ended was not clearly
defined initially. Given that the new department’s operational scope was so large offered
hope that proper coordination would be forthcoming. Its control over local government
organizational structure, which was responsible for the majority of pollution control functions,
eventually enabled it to address such issues in a systematic manner. Unfortunately, the
Department’s greatest potential strength, or bringing together disparate areas was also its
greatest weakness. Internal battles waged to determine which aspect of operations should
have funding priority during times of scarce resources was a difficult challenge. At times this
translated into the water environment not receiving all the funding necessary to achieve
stated objectives.
The new Department had other allies at the national level. In October 1968, then
Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced his intention to establish a permanent Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution. Wilson's rationale for the move was multifaceted.
He believed that creating a permanent Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution would
signal that his government was serious about environmental issues. The permanent nature
of the Royal Commission also signaled the permanent nature of pollution problems in an
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industrial society such as Britain. He understood that pollution and its control would continue
to evolve as a political issue and a permanent Royal Commission would serve to address it in
a consensual manner. The announcement was greeted with skepticism. The public
interpreted the move as a cynical way for the government to be seen taking action on the
environment in the run-up to the election, while actually doing nothing. All royal
commissions, said the critics, take minutes and waste years. A permanent royal commission
would not even have the merit of transience, but would always exist. However, the mere
creation of a permanent royal commission on environmental pollution raised environmental
issues and pollution controls to a new prominence nationally. The members of the new
commission took their charge seriously and began planning a number of reports covering
several critical environmental areas. Conscious of public criticism of previous royal
commissions, they acted swiftly in several areas which was key to their success.37
The reports of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) laid out an
extensive, detailed agenda for the Department of the Environment and the new regional
water authorities it planned to create. Assuming a more centralized, integrated authority over
water supply and waste disposal, the reports outlined specific methods of applying the
conclusions reached by previous studies and applying them to the nation as a whole. The
relative success of the Commission’s recommendations in the Thames estuary led to the
adoption of similar strategies in other river basins. Because it coincided with the
reorganization of government and made clear recommendations on means of combating
pollution, which illustrated the possibilities of that reorganization for environmental
improvement, the Commission’s work is worth reviewing in some detail.
The RCEP was granted its Royal Warrant on February 20, 1970. It was composed of
a diverse mix of experts including Sir Eric Ashby, DSc (Chairman); Mr. Aubrey Buxton, a
Director of Anglia Television and British Trustee of the World Wild-life Fund, William
Launcelot Scott, Lord Bishop of Norwich; Sir Solly Zuckerman, Chief Science Advisor to the
government; Dr. Frank Fraser Darling PhD, Vice-President of the Conservation Foundation;
Neil Atkinson lliff, Deputy Chairman and Managing Director of Shell Chemicals U.K. Ltd; and
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Vero Copner Wynne-Edwards, Chairman of the Natural Environment Research Council. Its
first report38 was completed within a year and presented to Parliament on February 16,1971.
The report was very thorough, setting the tone for all the reports that followed. It presented
an overview of the British environment and predictions about future developments. The
Commission employed new ecological terminology, demonstrating a linguistic shift in
environmental matters. For example, in the summary, the Royal Commission stated:
"The success of the clean air policy is encouraging but more needs to be
done to apply this policy throughout the country and to enquire into the
effects of pollutants from road vehicles. There are possible long-term effects
of atmospheric pollution on global weather and climate. Pollution of the land
continues; domestic refuse and industrial waste of all kinds, and particularly
toxic materials, are an ever increasing problem; there is need to accelerate
the trend towards the use of less persistent pesticides; valuable manure from
intensive farming is wasted. Not only is the state of some of our rivers
depressing: too many of them are so polluted that they cannot be used to
meet our growing needs for water. The estuaries and inshore seas are
increasingly treated as an open drain and dumping ground. Oil pollution of
the sea is still substantial and the danger of tanker accidents remains: waste
disposal to the sea and exploitation of the sea floors are causing international
concern. The disposal of radioactive waste, though satisfactory at present,
will need more attention for the future. And noise is rapidly becoming one of
the most disturbing features of modem society."
The Commission’s reference to global warming, the persistence of toxic and radioactive
chemicals in the environment and water pollution made it clear that this body was one that
would intelligently draw conclusions with both the immediate and long term in mind. The
RCEP made its report not to any one department but to the Crown. However, its principle
target was inevitably the new Department of the Environment, where controls over pollution
of air, land, and water were clustered.
The Commission’s Second Report: Three Issues in Industrial Pollution39 addressed
three issues the Commission felt required public discussion prior to the formation of
comprehensive pollution legislation:
(a) Should information about industrial effluents and wastes remain (as it is at

present) secret?
(b) Should we try to get some sort of voluntary “early warning system” for the
possible impact on the environment of new chemicals or similar products, both in
their production and use, as happens already over the use of drugs and
pesticides?
(c) Should there not be— pending comprehensive legislation which we know is on
the way—some regulation to control the tipping of potentially dangerous wastes
on land?40
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These issues went to the center of difficulties previously experienced in pollution control.
Secrecy about the content and amount of industrial wastes and effluents released into the
environment was an impediment to successful mobilization of environmental concern. The
Commission, realizing the political necessity of building public support for pollution control
measures and their related costs, thought it important to take away the veil of secrecy that
shrouded discharges. The public’s “right to know” and to act based upon such information
should not be denied. Another issue surrounded voluntary testing of new chemicals to
determine their impact on the environment. If such an “early warning system” worked, it
would provide an increasingly worried public with better information about how to either limit
or control harmful discharges to the environment.
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s the public became environmentally conscious
and began to seek better environmental standards. A series of spectacular pollution
incidents, lectures on the BBC, and a media blitz on environmental topics all fueled public
concern for the environment. Public opinion survey data on environmental concerns and
questions are not available for the 1960s and only become reliable in the mid-1970s.
However, Lowe and Goyder argue that British attitudes towards the environment mimic those
in the U.S., which will serve to illustrate the point. That data suggests that public concern
with environmental issues is more socially representative than the membership of
environmental groups. Members of environmental groups have higher levels of income and
education and hold higher status occupations than non-environmentalists. Data also shows
that while there are approximately equal numbers of environmentalists and antienvironmentalists as a percentage of the population, passive support for environmental
reform was much greater reaching upwards of 50 percent. Similar conclusions can be drawn
about British perceptions of the seriousness of the problem and the need for remedial action,

including willingness to pay additional taxes to determine the outcome. As Stanley P.
Johnson, a contemporary and active participant reported, accidents like Aberfan and the
Torry Canyon changed the way people thought about pollution.41 Pollution of estuaries was
one of the most visible signs of pollution and the RCEP’s Third Report, published in
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September 1972, provided a blueprint for estuarial management.42 Although remedial work
was in hand in the recommendations of the Pippard Committee, the RCEP’s report reviewed
and rationalized the situation. The RCEP’s report is significant because it provided the model
that would ultimately lead to the cleansing of the Thames. The timing of the report was also
important because it preceded debate on legislation designed to transfer water services to
regional authorities.
The Commission expressed concern about the polluted state of some estuaries, and
the absence of appropriate legislation to deal with them, such as that available in the case of
non-tidal rivers. It found the public expressed two general attitudes. One was an emotional
approach which, recognizing that polluting discharges can damage or destroy shellfish, birds
and fish, considered that all such contamination should be stopped to reverse the process of
destruction. A second tended to underrate the damage done and stressed that discharging
sewage and industrial effluents to estuaries considerably reduced the costs that would
otherwise throw a very heavy burden on industry and the local community, and could involve
the risk of unemployment. This was a traditional response, carrying the concern of British
business and taxpayers as expressed by Neville Chamberlain in 1926.43
The Commission adopted an intermediate, consensus approach. It considered that
there was a practical limit to the burden that should be placed upon the community for the
abatement of pollution to estuaries, this limit being defined as the point beyond which the
marginal cost of abatement exceeded the marginal cost of the damage done. Since data on
such costs were not readily available, a more pragmatic approach was desirable. The
Commission recommended two methods of controlling discharges to an estuary; first, the
removal of all pollutants from effluents which can accumulate in river sediments or living
organisms (i.e. heavy metals, PCBs) which are not made harmless by natural processes; and
the adoption of “pollution budgets” to measure the pollution load of sewage effluents as a
managerial tool.
The RCEP recommended that river management should exploit rivers for waste
disposal up to the level that did not endanger aquatic life, or transgress the standards of
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amenity that the public desired or was willing to fund. Quality standards should be controlled
through the discharge permit process to ensure that exploitation did not exceed those
standards and pollution budgets should be employed as a management tool to require close
cooperation between river and planning authorities.44
The Commission outlined two simple biological criteria for estuarial management: (a)
the estuary should be able to support on the mud bottom the fauna essential for sustaining
sea fisheries; and (b) it should allow the passage of migratory fish at all states of the tide. It
also recommended that central government integrate overall pollution control of estuaries
with a national policy for waste disposal, implemented through an executive responsible for
controlling the pollution of an entire estuary in a single regional authority. This was obviously
a step towards transference of pollution control functions from local to regional control. The
Commission also proposed amendments to existing legislation, giving water authorities
greater control over all discharges to sewers, rivers, estuaries and coastal waters. These
statutory powers were in fact conferred on water authorities under the 1974 Control of
Pollution Act.
It was also recommended that the government should take the lead in helping to
reach international agreement for the publication of monitoring data regarding the quantities
of certain pollutants reaching the sea. Regional water authorities should be responsible for
monitoring discharges; essential substances should be examined, and certain typical
organisms used as "indicator species monitored.45
The Commission recommended that greater effort should be devoted to developing
mathematical models for deriving pollution budgets, and that there should be further research
into the toxicity of common pollutants to aquatic organisms; on non-biodegradable
substances and their accumulation oh and release from river sediments; and on the effects of
trace amounts of organic chlorine and mercury compounds on photosynthesis by marine
phytoplankton. The members of the Commission could not agree on a policy for charging for
the control of pollution, as enough study on this topic had not been done. However, it was
the view of the majority of the Commission that the established consent system be replaced
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by a system of charges that would more efficiently make the polluter pay for use of
waterways for waste disposal. Thus market forces would provide inducements for polluters to
abate pollution.46
To some extent the previous work and reports of the Pippard Committee on the
“Effects of Heated and other Effluents and Discharges on the Condition of the Tidal reaches
of the River Thames” (1961) and of the W ater Pollution Research Laboratory on “The Effects
of Polluting Discharges on the Thames Estuary" (1964) anticipated the findings of the Royal
Commission. The Commission’s Third Report observed that the "improvement brought about
in the (Thames) estuary provides an excellent example of how the scientific study of an
estuary can be used to pinpoint the action required to clean up pollution."47 As a basis for
estuarine management, however, the Report did lay down clear guidelines for defining water
quality targets. These were patterned on those adopted by the Water Pollution Research
Laboratory ensuring aquatic life a minimum of safety in all places at all times.48 In effect, this
required establishing an environmental quality objective (EQO) for the estuary, rather than
adopting fixed emission standards for individual discharges, even thought that would be the
means of limiting pollution.
Implementation of the Commission’s recommendations in the Thames estuary
provided a significant test case for the country as a whole. Its relative success led to the
adoption of similar strategies in other river basins. Implementation required the following
steps:
(a) to control and remove, as far as possible, toxic, non-biodegradable substances
from effluents;
(b) to accept the need for an EQO permitting passage of migratory fish at all states of
the tide;
(c) to establish a pollution budget to allow the EQO to be achieved; and
(d) to monitor the estuary to confirm that the EQO was being met, and to examine the
biota to ensure that the benthic49 organisms required to support sea fisheries were
present.50

The control of toxic, non-biodegradable substances required better monitoring of effluents.
Effluents containing these substances enter the river as discharges from sewage and
industrial works, or as sewage sludge.51 They are difficult to control in domestic sewage
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because householders have rights to connect directly to main drainage systems, making
monitoring of their individual discharges impracticable.

For industry the situation was rather

different. Legislation-such as the Public Health Act, 1936, the Public Health (Drainage of
Trade Premises) Act, 1937, the Public Health Act, 1961 and the Control of Pollution Act,
1974-required industry to seek water authority consent to make a discharge.

52

While the consent system may seem to resemble fixed emission standards in terms
of the conditions they impose, in practice they operate quite differently. A simple hypothetical
example will illustrate. Assume that there are two sewage treatment plants located along the
Thames River discharging the same amount of effluents into the river. The first plant is
located above London, the second below. To achieve the EQO’s for the section of the river
they are located on, they will require different discharge consents affecting the quality of their
effluents. Plant one is located along a stretch of river that is relatively clean, allowing the
plant to discharge lower quality effluents to the river without causing harm to the river at the
point of discharge. Plant two on the other hand is located below the city where the river still
contains pollution from plant one. As a result plant two will have to produce higher quality
effluents in order to maintain the EQO at that point in the river. Conversely, higher quality
effluents may be required at plant one, so that plant two may dispose of middle to lower
quality effluents and still operate within the EQO. As a result, local conditions at the point of
discharge often determine the quality of effluents prescribed by the consents. Condition
variables may include water volume at point of discharge (volume has a direct correlation to
dispersion, and thus to the amount of effluents of a specified quality that the receiving waters
can handle), temperature, salinity of the water, and the over-quality of the receiving waters.
Thus, using the consent system, it has been possible to limit concentrations of toxic, nonbiodegradable substances in sewage, and therefore in the effluent discharged to the lower
Thames and in the sludge disposed of at sea. Similar controls were exercised under
legislation such as the Port of London Acts, 1964 and 1968, and the Control of Pollution Act,
1974.
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The EQO derived for the lower Thames required that it provide suitable conditions for
the passage of migratory fish at all states of the tide. As early as 1964 the Water Pollution
Research Laboratory Report, “The Effect of Polluting Discharges on the Thames Estuary"
had estimated that a dissolved oxygen concentration of not less than thirty percent was
required in April and May to re-establish a salmon fishery. April and May were the months
that smolts migrated to sea. Smolts are adversely sensitive to pollution and the thirty percent
requirement was designed to protect them and enable the rebirth of fisheries.53
The RCEP’s Third Report also recognized the importance of promoting fisheries to
the nation and recognized anglers’ organized efforts at Keeping waters free of pollution. The
report called for fishery committees to continue in all British waters in which exclusive British
fishing interests were maintained.54 The Commission assumed that the Minister of
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food (MAFF) would retain his responsibilities for supporting and
protecting fisheries and fishing and would maintain organizations under his aegis
representing the fishery interests, but that these would be supportive of the activities of the
river authorities.55
A Thames Migratory Fish Committee sat from 1973-77, first under the Thames River
Authority, and later, under the Thames W ater Authority. It reported that restoration of the
salmon fishery was possible with a minimum dissolved oxygen concentration of thirty-five
percent saturation in May, with a temperature not exceeding twenty degrees Celsius.56 The
river experiences its worst conditions in the summer quarter (July-September), and
statistically the dissolved oxygen level of thirty-five percent in May corresponds to a minimum
average of thirty percent for the third quarter of the year. For management purposes, a
quarterly minimum average is an inconvenient measurement. However it corresponds to a
ninety-five percentile value of not less than ten percent dissolved oxygen saturation in all
parts of the river at all times, so this was taken as the standard.57
Somewhat ironically, this was precisely the standard suggested by the Thames
Survey Committee back in 1964, although that Committee considered that the thirty percent
dissolved oxygen saturation level for migratory fish would be unjustifiably expensive to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

132

achieve. This standard, however only applies to the most polluted reaches of the lower
Thames; in other areas for other reasons, particularly abstraction for drinking water, more
stringent standards were adopted.
The lower Thames pollution budget has been locally administered by an array of
authorities with pollution control responsibilities in the Thames estuary. These have included
the Thames Conservancy, the Lee Catchment Board, the Port of London Authority (PLA), the
Greater London Council (GLC) and the City of London. The Thames Water Authority only
had pollution control functions in the non-tidal portion of the river.
While the RCEP's pollution budget and EQO recommendations were borrowed from
the work of local London authorities, and significant progress towards achieving the lower
Thames pollution budget was well underway, the third report placed pressure on all local
authorities responsible for aspects of pollution control to reexamine their operations and plan
for the future. Having established the EQO for the lower Thames at 30 percent saturation of
dissolved oxygen, the RCEP pollution budget allowed industrial and metropolitan waste
disposal to use up to seventy percent of the dissolved oxygen in the river.
The creation of a working mathematical model possible of examining all discharges,
their quality and quantity, and oxygen demand requirements constructed by the local London
authorities in the 1960s, was a significant breakthrough for river management. The model
made it possible to plan how discharges and abstractions would impact the river to determine
what quantities and qualities of effluents were necessary to attain the stipulated EQO levels.
There are obviously an infinite number of possible arrangements of suitable effluent qualities,
but there were also some practical restraints because some sewage works had already been
upgraded to previously set standards. Taking these constraints into consideration, the model
prescribed the most efficient use of capital for upgrading the facilities in the lower Thames.
For example, while the Crossness upgrade had been completed in 1963, the upgrade at
Beckton had not. Thus, taking the Crossness effluents and calculating what would be
required of the Beckton effluents allowed the redesign of the plant to meet the EQO. A
similar approach was adopted in the improvement of the Long Reach (West Kent) facility
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located further downstream. In this case the model determined that it would not be beneficial
to redesign this facility like Beckton. Instead the works were designed to produce a non
nitrifying effluent so that its discharges would offset nitric amounts already in the river at that
point being discharged upriver.58 Similarly, the model was able to help determine where
plants could be sited that discharged heated effluents to meet the thermal budget stipulated
by the EQO.
The EQO in the lower Thames was met through the coordinated efforts of several
authorities working together. During the course of the 1970s and early 80s migrating fish
began to reappear in the river. Success on the lower Thames set a precedent for other local
communities and influenced the formulation of standards elsewhere in Britain. The recovery
of the lower Thames was a testament to the ability of government to operate to benefit the
community as a whole.59
The establishment and maintenance of successive generations of EQOs has had a
tremendous impact on how Britain handles pollution control. In the case of water pollution,
the building of precise machinery to monitor discharges to rivers and streams allowed for
effective planning as British society continued to develop and grow. Under the consent
system individual discharges may be changed, providing the British government the means to
impact water quality or cleanliness on any river or stream. This has the effect of redefining
cleanliness from being a technical problem to one of political will. With political will, discharge
consents can be tightened to demand higher quality effluents from those who use rivers and
streams as sewers. While costs may sometimes be politically prohibitive for officials who
operate in a democracy, they may be overridden by public demand for action.
The reorganization of local and national government in Britain between 1945 and
1973 created a new political order that enabled reform of the environmental machinery of
government. Those concerned with water quality were able to focus reform and regulatory
efforts on specific agencies, rather than battle the pervasive localism and the odd dispersal of
authority that had previously existed over several levels of government. The reorganization
of local government on a regional level provided a precedent used to reorder water services
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in 1973 on a regional framework. Coupled to the reorganization of local government was the
reordering of central government on a more rational and centralized model that resolved
many areas of overlapping authority in central administration. The creation of the
Department of the Environment centralized the majority of natural resource functions under
one ministry, providing the opportunity for both more efficient administration and the
production of consistent policies. It signaled the willingness of the British government to take
a leading role in pollution control, which had heretofore been under the nominal control of a
variety of local councils. The reports of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
provide a counter example to the common belief that royal commissions “take minutes and
waste years.” It produced a series of timely reports that provided a framework for legislative
action, particularly towards water pollution and waste disposal. Action in 1973 and 1974
would reorder water services in Britain and provide a new framework for pollution control.
The reorganization of local government effectively transferred pollution control
authority to the regional level. Reorganization of the national government in 1970, with the
creation of the Department of the Environment, gave pollution control efforts new legitimacy
and draped them under the power of central authority. This provided opportunities for the
future, as Britain’s pollution control machinery would continue to evolve. Some issues
continued to remain unresolved. It was still unclear as to what “authority” over the
environment meant. While the central government now held the power to order
improvements, it was not clear that they would be able to do so in the changing political
climate of the middle 1970s given the transfers of political control from party to another and
the split between control of one party at the national level coupled with control of regional
bodies by their opponents. Furthermore, those actions would have to be implemented by
regional authorities operating under a new set of priorities that did not necessarily correspond
to those at the center. Thus, while the structure of pollution control showed improved, direct
action to “solve” the environmental question still remained open.
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CHAPTER V

THE WATER ACT OF 1973: THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL
AUTHORITY OVER POLLUTION CONTROL

Following the successful reorganization of British central government and the
creation of the Department of Environment, Britain embarked on major reform of her pollution
control structure. In 1971, the Department of Environment's first secretary of state, Peter
Walker, proposed legislation to reorganize the more than 1,400 local and regional agencies
responsible for water supply, sewerage, and water conservation in England and Wales. In
their place he planned to establish ten regional water authorities consolidating their activities.1
The boundaries of the new regional authorities were based on natural watersheds rather than
on the jurisdictions of local governmental units. While the 1963 Water Act had extended the
previous river boards authority to the entire length of a given river, the proposed regional
authorities would consolidate those boards to an entire watershed encompassing a larger
area. Each would be responsible for all policies regarding water from source to tap and
beyond including disposal. The impetus for this proposal came from officials of the Ministry
of Housing and Local Government (a predecessor of the Department of Environment) who
thought that local authorities were neglecting their responsibilities for water management.
After intense negotiations (described below) the legislation was approved by
Parliament in 1973 and implemented the following year. The Water Act (1973) represented
the farthest-reaching reform in the history of water administration. It has been called "as
radical a policy switch as can be cited in post-war Britain."2 While environmental pressure
groups did not play a critical role in shaping the legislation, one of its immediate effects was
to strengthen the pollution controller's ability to manage environmental problems.
The shift toward a regional structure placed several groups at a disadvantage. These
groups included local governmental authorities (particularly water supply and sewerage
authorities), local planning units, and other local agencies. Groups whose power to influence
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events derived from electing officials to local boards were hampered when those same
officials assumed minority status within the new regional structure.
Among the loose association of groups that administered or were concerned with the
water environment, the shift toward a regional structure meant a shift in orientation or even
status. Local groups were forced to compete with regional and national groups for access to
decision-makers. Regional and national groups, who were already well placed within the
institutional structure of the state, were able to influence the underlying structure of relevant
legislation. Environmental advocacy groups were also forced to adapt. While sharing
common goals, many of these groups used different tactics to shape events and influence the
public. Their different perceptions of existing problems and their solutions would prove
significant in shaping legislation.
The design of the 1973 Water Act also represented the first movement toward
ecological systems management. Based on river basins, the proposed structure
demonstrated the primacy of environmental over utilitarian concerns. Britain was
geographically suited for this type of structure, given its large watersheds and unitary nature.
It was politically suited to this form because it did not share its river valleys with other nations,
as was common on the Continent. The move towards ecological systems management was
based on both a logical extension of previous administrative reforms and a realization that the
management of the water environment required standards and systems of control that
conformed and complemented existing hydrological structures.
Britain is often thought of as a "wet" nation, receiving considerable rainfall and not
facing huge water shortages. This perception is not entirely accurate. While it is true that
Britain does receive considerable rainfall, it is distributed unevenly, largely in the western
portions of the nation, while its populations and industries are located largely in the
southeast. As such, Britain has to transfer considerable volumes of water from the "wet" west
to the relatively "dry" east. The primary conveyors of water are rivers that, like the Thames,
are reused several times as they flow to the sea. Industry and the public require clean water
for different purposes. Industry requires it for many of its manufacturing processes and the
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public for amenity and recreational purposes. In order to meet these disparate needs Britain
built new regional water authorities to manage entire river basins. In this way the entire
hydrological cycle could be managed to meet the water needs of the public and industry.
Reuse of water dictated that better care was given to water quality.
Phase I: Initiation (1960s and 1970’s /Dec 2 1971 - Jan 23.19731
On December 2,1971, Mr. Peter Walker, Conservative Secretary of the Department
of the Environment, announced proposals for the comprehensive reorganization of water
services, including sewerage and sewage disposal.3 This was the Department of the
Environment's first major action upon its creation. Ten new Regional Water Authorities
(RWA) were to be established, with responsibility for water services based on regional
watersheds. Out of deference for Conservative sensibilities the proposals did not abolish
statutory water companies, those bastions of private enterprise, but there was no doubt that
the reforms leaned toward a clear regional structure based on hydrological considerations
and natural watersheds. The functions of the RWAs would include prevention and control of
polluting discharges to rivers and estuaries, augmentation of river flows by storage schemes,
treatment of water for public use, and sewage treatment.
Concurrently, RWAs would have the duty of ensuring the full development of rivers,
canals, and wherever appropriate, reservoirs for amenity and recreation. Of the 209,000
acres of inland water in England and Wales, rivers and canals made up just over half; the rest
were reservoirs, lakes, and ponds. Fishing was allowed on only 257 reservoirs out of the 500
owned by statutory water companies, sailing on only forty-three, and canoeing on only six.
As a result, national water policy became part of the wider vision of creating a “decent”
environment. With the explosion of leisure time and increased mobility, sport and recreation
became an important part of the overall “quality of life.” The single-purpose functional
approach to water resource planning had outlived its usefulness and was now to be replaced
by a multi-purpose structure.
With reorganization of the water services, the Government proposed to allocate over
£800 million for new sewerage schemes and improvements to effluent treatment over the
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five-year period 1971-76. This sum, equivalent to more than £13 per capita, would have
been by far the largest sum spent on sewerage and disposal in any five-year period in British
history.4 These proposals recognized the interrelationship between effluent treatment and the
overall health of the water environment. Without additions to infrastructure it would be
impossible to improve the quality of rivers to a level where they would be accessible for
amenity purposes. The Government’s proposals recognized that the largest threats to the
natural river ecosystems were of human origin. Dumping of untreated industrial effluents and
human sewage into British rivers was to be targeted and improved. It was believed that by
restricting industrial effluents and improving effluent quality Britain’s rivers quality could be
raised to the point where natural processes would help rivers cleanse themselves. This
would allow a continuation of the abstracting of river water for human consumption and
utilization. The proposals embodied the traditional gradualist British approach. They
emphasized planning and administrative reform and use of the self-cleansing quality of
“natural” water.
Secretary Walker’s announcement of the proposals should be considered the mid
point of the initial phase of legislative proposals. Several interrelated factors helped reach
this point. These included the re-organization of local government, creation of the
Department of the Environment (the first Ministry to be directly concerned with environmental
issues), creation of the permanent Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP),
the 1971 Report of the Central Advisory Water Committee (CAW C)5, the Key and Jeger
Reports, and the knowledge that water consumption across society was increasing
exponentially. (See chapter 3 and 4 for a discussion of these topics) At the end of 1971,
plans for the future management of water in Britain were split between two contradictory
views. Faithfully reflecting a multiplicity of entrenched and conflicting interests, it listed two
entirely contradictory solutions.
The initial proposals announced by the Government on December 2,1971 were
intended to be one package that would restructure the existing system of providing water
services and strengthen environmental controls. The two parts of this package, new
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machinery and tougher standards, would eventually split into two separate bills, which would
become the W ater Act of 1973 and the Control of Pollution Act of 1974. The 1974 Act is the
focus of the next chapter; the remainder of this chapter concerns the 1973 W ater Act.
Section one covers the initiation phase of legislation and delineates the process leading up to
the Bill put before the House of Commons in January 1973. Section two examines the Bill as
initially proposed, as well as the changes it underwent during its passage through Parliament
(January to July 1973). Section three describes implementation of proposals that became
law in July 1973 and took effect in April 1974.
I. Legislation
Discussion of the initial phase illuminates how different groups defined the proposals
and how these different definitions led to compromise. For the Government, this was a
continuation of the local government reform processes begun in the 1960s. Building on the
1963 London Government Act, which changed the structure of London’s government, and the
1972 Local Government Act, which created a regional structure for the rest of England and
Wales, the initial proposal sought to provide a similar structure for water services throughout
England and Wales. Ten new multi-purpose regional water authorities were established
based on natural regional watersheds. The multipurpose authorities would assume total
responsibility for managing all aspects of water services, including water supply, sewerage,
and sewage treatment and disposal. In addition, they were responsible for river development
including drainage, amenity, and pollution control. Centralization of these numerous
functions into a regional structure was intended to rationalize the system of water
management in Britain, making it both more efficient and cost-effective. The Government’s
plan to spend some £800 million on new sewerage treatment facilities and sewerage projects
was intended to reduce the amount of pollution flowing into rivers and thus improve river
conditions throughout the nation. From the Government perspective, the initial proposals
represented a means of improving the existing system, which at the time split responsibilities
among a variety of authorities, and a means of exercising control over local governments,
which in their view operated for the benefit of the locality rather than the nation.
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The proposals immediately created a furor amongst local authorities, who stood to
lose control over traditional aspects of their operations. In their view the proposals would
deprive them of their traditional powers, weakening them in their relationship to the central
government. This was a threat to local democracy, which they felt they represented.
Local authorities attempted to influence the debate and change the meaning of
several of the proposals. In April of 1972 the Local Government Association, representing
the Association of Municipal Corporations, the County Councils Association, the Rural District
Councils Association, and the Urban District Councils Association, lodged several objections
to the Government’s plan. Their first complaint related to the swiftness with which water and
sewage services were to be reorganized under the Government's plans. They asserted that
the 1974 timeline for water reorganization would be impossible considering that local
government reorganization was to occur during the same period. They further argued that
the timeline was no longer than that allocated for London’s reorganization, where they
claimed, an officer’s health was impaired by the amount of work required. Reorganization of
local government would be taxing enough without synchronizing it with the reorganization of
water and sewage services.
However, the association’s strongest objections were reserved for the proposed
appointment of chief executives (i.e. chairmen) in the 10 regional water authorities and their
powers. The Government’s consultation papers made it clear that not only would the chief
executives be full members of their governing boards, but they, and a majority of each Board,
would be appointed by the Government. The associations argued that the chief executives
would be little more than minions of the Secretary of State for the Environment, and would
not be responsible to (i.e. under the influence of) local voters. They argued that water and
sewage services were so important to the life and health of their communities that they
should be administered under the fullest control of elected representatives from local
government.6
The local authority associations perceived the proposals as an attack on both
themselves and traditional local control. This would be a theme heard throughout the debate,
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and would eventually move the Government. Clearly, local associations feared that
regionally appointed officials would not listen to their concerns and would subordinate local
issues to those of the entire region. This was a transparent bid by local authorities to gain
control of the new structure, and by doing so, preserve as much as possible their ability to
control events that affected their communities.
The Government indeed intended to create positions that were independent of local
authority control, which, in their view, helped create and perpetuate the pollution problem in
the first place. The Government believed it critical that experts, not politicians, direct the
activities of the new regional authorities, given the scope of the proposed multipurpose
regional authorities.
In May 1972 the seven river authorities responsible for the Great Ouse, East Suffolk
with Norfolk, Lincolnshire, Kent, the Wye, Gwynedd and Somerset areas, which included
4,600 miles of river and 13,700 square miles of England and Wales, made a different
criticism of the Government’s proposals.
The “W et Seven,” all have special difficulties in land drainage due to their location in
mostly low-lying areas. They argued that their difficulties were local, needing decentralized
administration on a reasonably democratic basis. They insisted that land drainage and sea
defenses should not be given to the regional authorities, but instead should be placed in
autonomous bodies designed to handle this specific problem (i.e. single-purpose authorities).
They feared that conservation issues would dominate the agendas of the new authorities.
They saw conflicts within the new authorities as to the degree of protection given to a town,
the conflict of claims for flood protection and amenity, and the placement of sea defenses.
They also believed that their local position placed them in a better posit6ion to address this
problem, than a regional authority, which they feared would not give it the importance it
deserved.7
The President of the Association of River Authorities, Lord Nugent of Guildford,
formerly a junior minister in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF),
somewhat agreed with the “W et Seven’s" position. Generally, he emphasized that regional
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water authorities must be concerned with all functions and services, including land drainage
and fisheries. He allowed that local people might be given statutory duties in land drainage,
with some scope possibly for raising funds by precepts8 on ratepayers. However, he pointed
out, such precepts were often opposed by local authorities, especially on the scale required
for land drainage.9
On July 20,1972, the council of the Association of Municipal Corporations met with
Secretary Walker to discuss the proposed reorganization of water services. The council took
the opportunity to present joint proposals from the four authority associations as alternatives
to the Government’s plan. The joint proposals supported a structure composed of a national
water authority to provide overall coordination, regional bodies to plan water supply and
sewage disposal, and single-purpose authorities, all of which would retain local governmental
elements, to administer the services. They did include regional bodies, but only for planning.
They still retained their original position that local authorities should administer services.10
In October 1972, industry joined local authority associations in their concern that the
proposed regional water authorities would not be responsive to their needs and were not
locally controlled (i.e. they could not control them through political support of individuals). An
unnamed “leading authority on commercial water policy” was reported in the Times as stating
“The proposed regional water authorities have very wide powers and it is very worrying that
they will be responsible to no one. They will be monopoly suppliers responsible neither to
Parliament nor local government—and they will not be subject to normal commercial
pressures.” Clearly, “normal commercial pressures” referred to the ability of local commercial
interests to influence local authorities. A larger theme of equal concern to industrial interests
was that “The Regional Water Authorities will be able to dictate the feasibility of development
plans merely by agreeing or refusing to provide the water. The Government’s plans hold
strong implications for industry.”11
The Department of the Environment’s response to these demands was described by
the associations as totally inadequate. A joint letter to the DoE stated, “The preliminary
response to our consultations indicates that concessions which you are offering fall far short
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of meeting our needs.” and that “The Government is busy constructing larger and stronger
local authorities yet taking away from them the ability to arrange their own water supplies.”
As a result, considerable support was generated for a local government boycott of
preparations for water reorganization. The four local government bodies—the Association of
Municipal Corporations, Urban District Councils’ Association, Rural District Councils’
Association, and the County Councils’ Association— advised their members to refuse to
serve on steering committees and working groups that would help in the transfer of functions.
They stated that if their concerns over the structure were not addressed, they would not
participate in helping to implement the new system.12
A reluctant ally of local authorities was the Water Resources Board. In its annual
report of 1971 it called for creation of a national water services authority.13 The report
argued that the widely accepted principle of unified water management within river basins
was not rigorously applied in England and Wales. The Board’s own work, of planning the
nation’s future water resources, was restricted by its lack of formal responsibility for water
quality or other aspects of river management, such as fisheries. The report urged creation of
a single national water authority covering the entire field of water management. The Board
argued that this national authority should be responsible for planning and coordinating both
water supply and disposal of effluent, and should have power to develop and operate
regional water conservation schemes. In addition, new comprehensive river basin authorities
would be responsible for river management and water supply and disposal; responsibilities
then would be split between river authorities, local government, joint boards and water
companies.14
On the surface it would seem the W ater Resources Board would have supported the
Government’s proposals, given that they suggested the creation of a national water council
and integration of water services into a new regional structure. However, this was not the
case because the Government’s proposals would eliminate the independent Water
Resources Board and replace it with a National Water Council under the control of the
Secretary of State for the Environment. The Board found common cause in opposition to the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

148

proposals. From its perspective the Government’s proposals were misguided in eliminating
an independent body, active in the field of water services, that drew attention to difficult
problems that other organizations with a political interest might not want to address. Since its
inception under the 1963 Water Act, the Board had acted as such a body and expected to
have a role to play in the new system. When that was not forthcoming, their perception of the
proposals changed, even though they supported creation of integrated regional authorities to
provide services.
Other organizations supported the proposals to restructure water services. In a letter
to the Times Mr. Peter Liddel, Chairman of the Association of River Authorities, stressed the
importance of sensitivity and informed public opinion, both to support development of their
(river authorities) work and to influence their direction. He argued that the parrot-cry “there
are no votes in sewage” had been heard too long in town halls. He stated that

This sensitivity cannot be done by river authorities alone, keen as they are to help
within the resources available to them for publicity. I hope schools and educational
authorities up and down the land will now take up the opportunities which clearly exist
to link local field work and discussion of how public authorities deal with the local
environment with the more traditional academic studies in biology and other relevant
sciences.15
He argued that the forthcoming publication of a survey of water quality in rivers and
canals brought together by the river authorities, industry and local councils showed that while
some improvement was being achieved, much remained to be done, especially on larger
rivers in more densely-populated areas.16 He argued that articulate public opinion was most
needed in support of river authorities’ efforts to bring about faster progress in cleaning up
rivers and keeping them clean for the future.17 The river authorities’ support of the proposals
was based on their own self-interest. Understanding the problems associated with the
current system, they supported a new regionally based integrated structure. It may seem that
they were working against their own self-interest, but in fact the Government intended that
the existing authorities within the new regions combine themselves to form the new regional
authorities. In this way, they would not be really eliminated, only merged into a new
structure. In other words, the Government did not intend to re-invent water services within
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Britain, only make them more effective through an integrated system.
Criticism of Mr. Liddel’s letter and the river authorities was immediately leveled by Mr.
Owen Davies of Magdalene College, Cambridge. He responded, “a sensitive and informed
public opinion...can only come about once the authorities have the will and the power to
release the relevant information to us.” He argued that the public was prevented from
knowing the truth about pollution by both the Official Secrets Act and section 12 of the Rivers
(Prevention of Pollution) Act 1961. The Official Secrets Act prevented release of discharge
consent applications, to guard against industrial espionage. The 1961 Act prevented the
public from knowing the facts because any information “furnished to or obtained by a person
in connection with an application for consent of information derived from a sample of effluent
obtained under the Act shall be guilty of an offense and be liable to a fine not exceeding one
hundred pounds or three months imprisonment.”18 Mr. Liddel’s call for public action in
support of the River Authorities, while laudable, said Mr. Davies, was ludicrous given the
inability of the public to know anything about the water that they used in their daily lives.
These two letters to the Times demonstrate some of the complexities and contradictions
inherent within British water services.
The Institute of Water Engineers, composed of chemists and bacteriologists, agreed
with Mr. Davies about the lack of information. In testimony given before the Central Advisory
Water Committee, which helped form the basis of the Government’s proposals, they called
for more money to be spent on sewerage and sewage treatment. The Institute stated in its
written report that

modern technology is progressing so fast that often the chemicals used and
produced by industry are generally not known. If they are known there is frequently
no available data to enable their toxicity to be assessed. There is no guarantee that
chemicals which are water-soluble can be removed from water by conventional
coagulation and filtration procedures. Furthermore, in general the quality tests
conducted in a typical waterworks laboratory will fail to reveal the presence of
anything unusual in water thus contaminated.19

The Institute estimated that as much as 25 percent of England and Wales’ water
supply was drawn from sources that were frequently or continuously polluted in degrees
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varying from slight to dangerous, and a further 25 percent from sources liable to sudden
capricious pollution varying from slight to severe. The report proposed provision of more staff
(e.g. water engineers) supplied with better-equipped laboratories to help fight against this
problem. They concluded that

The present position in the fields of water supply, river engineering, sewerage and
sewage disposal, and prevention of pollution is only partly satisfactory. There is a
need for all these services to be more effective, and for them to act more closely in
20
conjunction with each other.

The Institute discussed two possible solutions. First, that the river, water and
sewerage services could be left as single-purpose services, coordinated nationally and locally
when necessary. Second, three-purpose authorities combining water supply, sewerage and
sewage disposal services could be established to cover river catchments or several
catchments at a time. The Institute supported the second of the two solutions, as it would
create an integrated system of water services. The report suggested that the second option
would require about 15 water and drainage boards for England and Wales, each responsible
directly to the Minister of Housing and Local Government,21 for all functions of water
conservation, water supply, river engineering, trunk sewerage and sewage disposal.22
The Institute report demonstrated how chemists and bacteriologists perceived the
problems facing the water industry in general and water pollution specifically. A new
integrated structure would allow for the type of management and application of resources that
would make pollution control effective. The chemical threat from modem industry could not
be combated with current technology, or even properly identified with the current level of
sophistication in water laboratories. In addition, no data existed on the toxicity of chemicals
discharged to waters so the threat to public health was unknown. This they proposed to
combat with new technology and more sophisticated water quality testing. They supported

an integrated structure that would increase the pollution controls the Government proposals
attempted. They were not threatened by the new proposals, as local authorities were, as
their role would only become more important and influential in the future. They criticized local
authorities for not integrating their operations, or recognizing the threat of modern industrial
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effluents. The Government proposals took into account and addressed this problem with new
funds earmarked for research into industrial effluent composition and new water purification
technologies.
Surprisingly, the Trades Union Council (TUC) also supported the Government’s
proposals. During consultations with the Department of the Environment they supported a
restructuring of water services and urged the Department to adopt measures necessary to
control pollution arising from industry and agriculture. In considering the issue of stimulating
economic growth through industrial and technological development, while preventing such
developments from leading to pollution, the TUC concluded that workers should not be faced
with the choice of either accepting pollution or paying for its elimination through a reduction in
jobs or earnings. They argued that if it were necessary to restrict production of some goods
due to pollution considerations, suitable alternative work should be found for workers so
displaced. The TUC stressed the necessity of making this principle part of a national anti
pollution policy.23 The TUC’s concerns were not directly addressed by the Government. But,
indirectly they did assure the TUC that if such a situation were to develop it would receive
their utmost attention. It is interesting that the TUC supported the initial proposals. While it is
true that cleaner water would provide economic benefits to companies that employed TUC
members and would provide them with more recreational and amenity opportunities, the
issue of pollution control in general and water quality specifically was generally against their
interests. The majority of TUC members were employed in industries that were labor
intensive and competitively weak such as coal. The costs of water quality were sufficient to
break the operating margin of weaker companies and represented a realistic threat to jobs.
The answer to TUC support may lie in the fact that the new structure promised to create new
union jobs associated with sewage disposal. In addition, those weaker industries were job
losses were expected could not be combated via a contrary position on this issue.
The initial period, or proposal and consultation phase, offered a number of
opportunities for defining the new national water policy and the structures intended to
implement it. The Conservative government and the Department of the Environment were
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the primary initiators of the reform. While bi-partisan support existed for improving
environmental management and producing a national water policy, the structure of the
Boards, with an appointed chairman and working majority, provisions for metering for
services, the retention of the statutory water undertakers, and the integrated structure which
would place supply, sewerage, and sewage disposal all under one structure, clearly
contained a Conservative flair. The lines of debate were clearly drawn. The Government
perceived the new system as a means of rationalizing the water service industries, which
they believed would provide both better service and cost less in the long term, a typical
Conservative argument attached to many reforms. In contrast, local authorities, largely
controlled by the Labour Party at this time, perceived the reforms as a means of eliminating
their control over traditional services. Being largely elected bodies, they argued that their
elimination was a threat to local democracy that in their view was the bedrock of British
society. This argument is somewhat spurious, as “local democracy” largely did not exist in
Britain until the 1920s, and that democracy was representative at best. The true issue is one
of local control, whose origins have a long history in Britain. Ironically, the Labour party, with
the greatest history of centralization in Britain, went into opposition on this issue and became
the defenders of local control. One motivating factor for Labour was their attempt to rebuild
support amongst their traditional base and secure support from the local authorities that
stood to lose control over traditional functions. It was hoped that this bedrock work would help
lead the party back into power. As such their motives were politically, not environmentally
oriented. Their opposition to the new structure had more to do with the threat of weakening
their support amongst local government than with any environmental agenda.
An examination of the bill placed before Parliament demonstrates that the preParliamentary debates yielded a compromise. Two related matters outside of the debate
over the reorganization helped to bring this situation to fruition. First, given the bill was highly
controversial, and that consultations revealed bitter differences, the Government knew that
bringing the bill to the House would prove contentious and would hinder the ability of
Parliament to move on to other pressing issues, primarily efforts to control inflation that
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dominated the political agenda. The Government had the option of delaying the legislation,
but that would have proved embarrassing, considering it had been promised in the Queen’s
Speech. Seeing there was no political possibility of delay, the Government decided to split
the proposals into two parts, one dealing with administrative reforms, the other to be offered
the following year dealing with environmental pollution controls. The Government made
another dramatic decision to initiate the bill on reorganization before the House of Lords.
Knowing they stood little chance of getting all the initial proposals on reorganization through
the House of Lords, the Government made several key concessions. Introduction of a bill to
the Lords with the “awkward bits cut out” (i.e. the debate over pollution control standards)
solved the Government’s dilemma. Legislation on water was possible, and honor, so far as
the Queen’s speech was concerned, would be satisfied.24
The bill was introduced to the Lords on January 23,1973 and received a second
reading on February 5,1973. The new Secretary of State for the Environment, Mr. Geoffrey
Rippon, presented the bill.25 He outlined the six major objectives of the Government’s policy.
These were:
first, to secure an ample supply of water of appropriate quality to meet the growing
demand of the people, industry and agriculture while at the same time ensuring that it
is not wasted; secondly, to provide adequate sewerage and sewage disposal
facilities to cope with the natural increase in water use and with new housing,
industrial and agricultural development; thirdly, to ensure that the vital contribution of
land drainage and flood protection to urban and agricultural areas alike is maintained,
and , where appropriate, expanded; fourthly, to achieve a massive clean-up of the
country’s rivers and estuaries by the early 1980s; fifthly, to make the widest use of
water space for other purposes, including recreation and amenity and, where
appropriate, the protection and development of salmon and fresh water fisheries and
the provision of water needed for navigation; finally, and not the least important, to
protect the interests of those who may be affected by proposals for the development
of water resources in any one of these respects.26

Secretary Rippon went on to detail several changes in the bill that were different from the
initial proposal. In setting the stage for these he argued that the various consultations made
over the previous year had been given full consideration, and from that consideration two
issues had generally been resolved. First, the Government had decided the existing
structure was inadequate to the needs of the future and therefore changes were necessary.
Second, regional water authorities were needed to plan and coordinate activities of the new
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policy.27
He argued that the real division of views stemmed from whether a one-tier or two-tier
structure was most appropriate to achieving the objectives. He restated that the Government
was satisfied the only means of achieving the main objective of the reorganization was to
provide for integrated management of water services through a unitary structure (i.e. a onetier system). Further, that because water services had become increasingly multi-purpose,
the regional water authorities should be responsible for all water services; should own all
assets and be solely responsible for finance; and that other bodies could act as the agents of
the new water authorities in the appropriate circumstances.

28

He argued that the alternative structure favored by the local authority associations, a
two-tier system, would have the regional river authorities responsible only for planning and
co-ordination. Below them would remain the present water undertakers, sewerage and
sewage disposal authorities and the existing river authorities. The flaw in that system was
the supposition that regional water authorities would have control over second-tier authorities.
He argued that this would either be too loose or too tight of a structure to allow for the
flexibility necessary in dealing with elected bodies.29
The first substantial concession offered by the Government in the bill was that, in all
the regional water authorities, the local authority members would have a majority over the
chairman and the appointed members. He argued (and hoped) this change would satisfy the
objections raised by the local authorities.30 Another change, in view of the decision to grant
local authorities majority representation on the new regional water authorities, as that the
proposed consultative councils were no longer necessary and were not contained in the
proposed bill.
He pointed out that the proposed structure was not just an adaptation of the structure
set up in 1963 under the Water Resources Act, but was radically different and therefore
needed a new central structure. He argued that, with an effective regional structure, it was
correct to replace the W ater Resource Board with the National Water Council. Because the
proposals rested on what he termed a maximum devolution of power with a clear line of
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command from the Secretary of State to the regional water authorities, a central body such
as the W ater Resources Board was no longer necessary. However, a body was required to
provide a forum in which matters common to all regional authorities could be discussed.
Beyond that, it was not necessary for the National Water Council to have executive functions,
which would only interpose another line of command between the Secretary of State and the
regional water authorities, although the Council would provide a convenient format for
consulting with the regional authorities.31
A central planning unit would also be necessary at the national level. The proposals
for a central water planning unit, whose tasks would be determined by a steering committee
composed of representatives of the involved Departments and of the National W ater Council,
and which would be given independence in publishing its reports, would prove an effective
answer to creating a national plan.32
The Government also proposed that the British Waterways Board and the Inland
Waterways Amenity Council would remain in existence with their present responsibilities
unaltered. The new regional authorities would be responsible for fostering and promoting
recreation, an area previously under the control of the British Waterways Board. It was
expected the new regional authorities and the British Waterways Board would coordinate
their activities in discharging this function, in addition, the bill did not contain provisions to
promote more effective control of pollution. This would be put forward in more
comprehensive legislation, concerning all areas of the environment, in the next session.33
Clearly, the bill as presented took into account many of the concerns expressed by
local authorities. Local authorities, redefining the issue of regional authorities’ structure as
one that did not foster local democracy, were able to gain majorities on the governing boards,
a position they previously did not enjoy. They would, however, remain in opposition to the
appointment of the chairmen by the Secretary of State for the Environment. While the Water
Resources Board was still to be eliminated by the bill, the National Water Council was
designed to perform many of the same functions and would enjoy the independent ability to
publish its findings, regardless of content. This, like the appointments to the regional
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authorities, would remain an issue throughout phase two of the legislation primarily because
the WRB was so highly respected by all interests.34
II: Parliamentary Passage (January 1973-Julv 1973)
As the bill moved into the House of Commons the political parties began to alter the
terms of debate. While water reorganization remained ostensibly the topic, partisan political
and ideological disputes between the parties dominated the debate. It is important to
remember that the 1970 election gave the Conservative government of Edward Heath only a
slight majority.35 Every issue provided an opportunity for Labour to attack the Conservatives.
Instead of a simple “machinery” bill that reorganized water services, Labour characterized it
as an attack on the principles of local government. Worse still, provisions allowing the new
water authorities to explore metering of water were perceived by Labour as an attempt to
make water a commodity, instead of a right of the people. The Conservatives, took the bait
offered by Labour, resulting in an over-politicization of the issues.
The bill was short, containing only 36 clauses.36 However, it had several detailed
schedules that provided for the new machinery. Part I set out the Environment Minister’s
duties regarding national policy for water and established the areas and constitution of the
nine regional water authorities for England and the Welsh National Water Development
Authority. It also detailed the appointment of the majority of the members of the regional
water authorities from the local authorities and provided for the appointment of the chairman
by the Secretary of State, of two or three members by the Minister of Agriculture, and the
remaining members by the Secretary of State. It also established the National Water Council
and delineated its composition and functions.37
Part II provided for the transfer of functions from the existing authorities to the
regional water authorities, powers relating to those functions, and powers for certain special
arrangements. The most important of these arrangements governed the relationship of
statutory water companies to the regional authorities. The Government believed there was
no valid reason to extend the scope of the public sector by abolishing the water companies
and transferring their assets to the regional water authorities. At the same time it recognized
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that to secure integrated management, the regional water authorities would have to exercise
considerable control over the water companies.38
A second special arrangement concerned sewerage. Clause 15 required the
regional water authorities to arrange for their sewerage functions to be discharged on their
behalf by the new disposal authorities and, where appropriate, by the new town corporations.
Local authorities, subject to general policy direction by the regional water authorities, would
initiate proposals for new sewerage works, which the regional water authorities would pay for
but which would be carried out by the local authorities. This arrangement was perceived by
the Government as an important element in associating local government with the work of the
regional authorities.39 Other special arrangements were concluded regarding fisheries and
land drainage, retaining a role for local committees.
The Government attached great importance to recreation, which was termed the
“fourth dimension” of their water policy. Consequently, Clause 19 bestowed on regional
water authorities the express duty of putting water and associated land under their
jurisdictions to use for recreational purposes. Because of the complexities of this task (e.g.,
fishing and water skiing are incompatible) the regional water authorities would require help in
carrying out these responsibilities, Clause 21 created the W ater Space Amenity Commission,
which would advise Ministers, the National Water Council, and the regional water authorities
on how best to promote recreation in their areas.40
Part III of the bill dealt with financial issues. The financial aspects to the
reorganization were vital, but ultimately proved ineffective. The bill provided that net costs of
all water services, except land drainage, were to be met by means of charges for services.
The net cost of land drainage would continue to be met, as before, by precepts on local
authorities and internal drainage boards and charges on agricultural land. Accompanying the
bill was a Financial Memorandum from the Treasury that clearly showed no significant
changes in total expenditure were expected in the short term. However, in the long term the
Treasury expected to reap economies of scale.41 Governmental grants for water services
were to continue, but expenditures on some of the services, notably sewerage and sewage
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disposal, which were borne by taxes in the past, were to be paid for separately by charges.
Charges for water supply and other water services consequently appeared higher, unless
account was taken of the corresponding reduction in rates 42
Clause 28 covered installation of meters. The Government made a point of stating
that it was not its intention to introduce metering in the short term. The high estimated cost of
such action—about 500 million pounds if the entire country was to be m etered- was used to
make the point that this was very unlikely. All the bill did was to empower regional water
authorities to charge by metering, and to introduce this for different consumers at different
times.43
Part IV of the bill contained a number of miscellaneous provisions regarding the
recruitment and transfer of staffs to the new authorities. A Water Services Staff Commission
covering England and Wales was established to handle arrangements for the recruitment and
transfer of staff to the new authorities, to ensure that the interests of the staffs affected were
protected, and to advise the Secretaries of State for this purpose.44
Mr. Rippon, in finishing his opening arguments for the bill, linked it to the public health
movement of the nineteenth century. Quoting a Member of the House who said, in 1849,
“sewers are in, and not before time.” He stated that,

The present environmental movement is sometimes regarded as uniquely modern.
In fact, the crusading spirit underlying what we are all trying to do has much in
common with what the great propagandists, administrators and engineers of the
nineteenth century were doing.
W e might say today that water services are in. I believe that in introducing and
considering the Bill we are inheritors of a great tradition, and are making an effective
advance on what has been done by our predecessors.
Taken in conjunction with the proposals which we have on hand for further action on
pollution, we are building a second great wave of preparation for dealing with the
health and prosperity of our people. Of course, there are differences between us
which cross party boundaries. In fact, they are found in various organizations. They

are the sort of differences that are bound to arise on anything that is worth
discussing. However, on the essential aim and purpose of the Bill we are sufficiently
at one for me to be able quite confidently to commend the Bill as a whole to the
House.45
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Mr. Denis Howell (Birmingham, Small Heath), the shadow environment minister,
responded for the Labour Party with a shot across the bow of the Conservative ship. He
stated:

W e used to have a Ministry of Housing and Local Government. In those days the
Ministry ensured that houses were built and that local government was based on
principles of local democracy. W e now have the Department of the Environment. It
builds fewer houses and is busily engaged in the desecration of local government
and local democracy.46

Mr. Howell detailed several of Labour’s objections to the bill. One of those was the
apparent trend that he believed was removing local government from the people. Linking the
Water Bill to the 1972 Local Government Act, he argued that in both cases local governments
would lose much of their power through loss of their responsibilities. He stated that, “As a
result of this Bill every local authority in the land will lose its water undertaking.”47 He saw
this as unconscionable, especially considering water companies were to be left in private
ownership. Worse yet, those responsibilities that were to be taken away from local
authorities were to be placed in the hands of the central government:

At the core of the Bill is the fact that more and more power, if it does not go through
the regional arms of Ministries, will go directly to Ministries and Ministers. Under
these proposals not only will the man from the Ministry know best but he will be the
only man who will know anything. That will happen because so often the information
which we and local representatives should have, as a basis upon which democratic
discussion and argument about the development of public services can be sustained
and maintained, will in many cases not be available to the people who need it.48

Mr. Howell believed the Conservatives were destroying the traditions of British society, and
that the W ater bill contributed to that trend. Additionally, he believed the bill denied the
principle of public ownership of water supplies by leaving them in the hands of private
companies. He argued that, “Water resources are our national and natural heritage. They
belong to the people.”49 Furthermore, society was entitled to harness these resources for the
good of the nation without private exploitation. Coupled to this fundamental right was that
water should be readily available to the nation. He perceived the bill as a threat to this
principle, because metered water was proposed for the first time. Thus, the ability to pay for
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water would take precedent over the fundamental right of the people to have a plentiful
supply in support of their needs, no matter how they might use it. He pointed to the
opposition from local authorities as evidence this was true.50
He agreed with the Government about the need to make improvements in the
management of water services. He argued that Labour understood that the future needs of
society demanded a reorganization of water services, and he agreed with the Government
that the hydrological cycle should be the basis of any reorganization. Furthermore, it was
evident the geography of river basins and water supply did “not fit in tidily with our units of
political control and our system of government.”51 Hence it was the one service that required
government be tailored to it. He also argued it made sense for the authority that deals with
supply and transportation of water also become the responsible authority for the treatment
and disposal of sewage and waste 52 Additionally, he stated that anything done to insist upon
proper levels of purity in the waste disposed, either in rivers or the sea would gain the support
of the Labour Party.53 However, the Labour Party believed the only sensible solution to the
water supply issue was the establishment of a national grid system like those in other public
services.54 A national grid system would essentially nationalize water resources under
central government control and allow for their allocation to the nation. It is interesting that Mr.
Howell argued for nationalization while at the same time arguing against the central control
necessary to enable such a system to operate.
Examining the structure of the governing boards of the regional river authorities, he
argued that the appointment process would enable the Government to pack these bodies
with “blue-eyed boys representing the political and philosophical ideology of the
Government....”55 To support his charge Mr. Howell pointed to the new town corporations,
rent security committees, hospital boards, and other bodies the Government had already
packed with Conservative supporters. He also found fault with the Government’s proposal to
appoint the chairmen of the new authorities. He argued the structure would guarantee the
Government’s ability to control the national water authority, as each of the chairmen would be
a member of that body as well. He questioned why this was necessary and if it was sound
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practice. “If the principles of local government are not to be denied, as they should not, the
regional water authorities should at least be allowed to elect their own chairmen. They know
their own people best.”56
Mr. Howell also criticized the size of several of the new authorities, which he felt were
too large and as a result too removed from the people they were intended to serve. Using
the proposed Sevem-Trent authority as an example, he argued that it was simply too large to
effectively serve the interests of the region. Stretching from Wales to the North Sea, even
based on hydrological cycle and the geological basin, it would be unmanageable, and was
not justifiable in terms of local government. However, he reserved his sharpest criticism for
the proposed Thames Water Authority, which would stretch from the Cotswolds to Canvey
Island (located at the mouth of the Thames estuary) and would encompass the London area.
He argued that the criticisms of the Greater London Council were correct:

...if we are to have a regional water authority at all, then the Greater London Council
is a regional authority. That was the purpose when it was created by the previous
Conservative Government, in the face of our opposition. That being the case, and
since it is not disturbed by the new round of local government functions, it ought to be
given immediate power to act as the regional water authority for its area....
To come back to the position of the Greater London Council, how can an elected
local council responsible for the whole of London not be responsible for the River
Thames? It is an absurdity that the River Thames is now to be removed from the
control and influence of the GLC.57

(Mr. Rippon interjected that the Thames is a long river which has never resided within the
confines of the GLC and at present the GLC was not responsible for the Metropolitan Water
Board, the Thames Conservancy or the Port of London Authority.)58
Mr. Howell concluded his criticism by listing those associations in opposition to the
bill. They included The County Councils Association, the Association of Municipal
Corporations, the Urban District Councils Association, the Rural District Council Association,

and the British Waterworks Association. He argued that all of the listed bodies were opposed
to the concept of bureaucratic control embodied in the Government policy.59
The debate lasted another five hours and consisted of approximately twenty
speeches by members of the House. Most of what remained rehashed previous criticisms
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from slightly different perspectives. It should be noted that one area of opposition to the bill
was consistent from both sides of the House, that being the abolition of the Water Resources
Board.60 All members praised the Board’s work. Most believed it was a mistake to abolish
the Board, as it would leave no independent body to research and act on water issues. Most
also felt the National W ater Council, which would replace several of the functions of the
Board, would not enjoy the same independence and would therefore lack the same
effectiveness. Mr. Nigel Spearing (Acton) read into the minutes an outside view from the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) that stated,

The CBI sees very considerable cause for regret at the proposed demise of the
Water Resources Board in the form in which we now know it. In the few years of its
existence it has had a remarkable record. It has built up an unrivaled technical
expertise of a multi-disciplinary character and this, coupled with the considerable
independence it has enjoyed, has made it a force to be reckoned with. Although the
CBI agrees that the ultimate decisions on future long term plans must obviously rest
with the Department of the Environment, it sees much merit in forward planning
studies being executed by a body which enjoys a substantial degree of
independence from the normal administrative work of the Government Departments,
which is insulated from political pressures, and which is also free of the possibility of
embarrassing the Secretary of State in the exercise of his appellate functions.”61

Spearing also produced a response from the Metropolitan Water Board concerning the issue
of research on water matters. The board argued that research should be under the “National
Water Council, rather than in the Government’s own creatures, the proposed Central Water
Planning Unit, and a new, ill-defined industrial research centre.”62 The W ater Resources
Board itself had this to say about the Government’s proposal for the National W ater Council:

The Government’s proposal is for a central planning unit staffed by civil servants and
reporting both the Departments and to the Council. This proposal is welcome in that
it recognizes the need for central planning capability. But it has a serious weakness
that the units will serve two masters and will be unable to resolve conflicts which will
necessarily and rightly arise between them. The central planning unit should be an
arm of the national W ater Council. W e recognize that Ministers will also need some
expert advice of their own, but we do not believe that this need result in any wasteful

duplication of effort. The proposed Industrial Research Centre has a vital defect (in)
that it fails to bring together the existing range of research and development
expertise to match the new range of functions on which the regional water authorities
will need research and development support.63

Spearing concluded his remarks by stating it was up to the Government to explain why they
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wanted to eliminate such a successful organization. Answering his own question, he charged
that the Minister and Whitehall created the new organizational structure for themselves. He
charged that while the Water Resources Board produced an annual report, there were no
assurances the new planning unit would do the same. The proposals were a backward step
for democracy, and led Britain towards the creation of a “semi-corporate” State that he could
not support.64
Mr. Spearing then attacked the Government’s proposals concerning London. While
the Government gave land drainage powers to the Greater London Council (GLC), they took
away the GLC’s control over its main sewers, sewage works, sludge boats and other
apparatus encompassing London’s main drainage. He stated that the whole history of local
government in the last century was built upon the need to avoid disease by means of public
health and drainage. He argued that, “If there was ever a unit of local Government
embedded in the very roots of London it is the main drainage and engineering services of the
GLC. To suggest that they should be taken from the GLC and be administered by the
Thames Regional Water Authority is ludicrous.”65 He concluded his remarks on the matter by
suggesting it would be far better to allow existing agencies to continue as agents of the water
authorities so there would be linkage with all the other local services.66
In the Government’s official rebuttal at the conclusion of debate Mr. Griffiths, the
Undersecretary of State for the Environment, argued that the debate had been a largely
forward- looking exposition of a necessary reform. He characterized the W ater Bill as the
third pillar of the Government’s modernization program, the other two being reorganization of
local government and of the health service. He charged that the Labour Party’s solution to
water reorganization was to nationalize everything and establish a United Kingdom board that
would run the entire system.67
Mr. Griffiths then reiterated several points concerning the Government’s policy. First,
that future water supply needs of the nation required changes in organization. The fact that
water fell in the north and west while demand rose in the Midlands, East Anglia and the
South, required changes. A possible solution to this problem included the building of more
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reservoirs, which were unpopular, or more estuarine storage, or new groundwater projects, or
desalinization. However, the best and least costly option was to use existing rivers which had
the capacity to be used several times over their length, which could move water to where it
was required, and which had the capability, if not abused, of purifying and restoring the
quality of water for drinking purposes as they proceed to the sea.68 Rivers were endorsed
within the bill, and by a succession of previous Acts, as the means of achieving a ready
supply of water. What was required of the nation was to create a system within which their
management would produce the best results. Hence they were the centerpieces of the
Government’s water structure. He pointed out that Britain at that time took more than a third
of its water supply from rivers, and this was surely to increase in the future. The central
problem was that these same rivers received large quantities of sewage and industrial
effluents. Thus, the first leg of the national water policy, embodied within the bill, was a plan
to bring together all aspects of water conservation and supply, sewerage and sewage
disposal, the prevention of pollution, fisheries, and land drainage and reclamation. That was
the reason for creating all-purpose authorities to manage each of these tasks in a coherent
and mutually supportive manner. Coupled to this was the fact that rain did not fall, rivers did
not flow, and water-bearing beds were not laid down, on the basis of any human boundary.
Hydrological and geological realities, not political or administrative frontiers, needed to form
the basis of water planning. For these reason the Government presented a reorganization
that conformed to this basis.69
Support for the Government’s reorganization plan was widespread. Engineers and
chemists in support included the Institution of Civil Engineers, the Institution of Water
Engineers, the Institute for W ater Pollution Control, the Society of Chemical Industry, and the
Society for W ater Treatment and Examination. Administrators included The Society of Clerks
and Treasurers of the W ater Authorities, the Association of River Authorities, the
Confederation of British Industry, the Central Electricity Generating Board, the trades unions,
including the National Union of Waterworks Employees, and the Association of Waterworks
Officers. Environmental bodies included the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution,
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the Committee for Environmental Conservation (representing the main conservation and
environmental bodies in the nation), the National Angler’s Council, the National Federation of
Anglers, and the Salmon Trout Association.70
Responding to questions of how the reorganization would be implemented, Mr.
Griffiths indicated there would be no sudden overnight change that would prove disruptive.
The intention of the Government was to set up regional water authorities in a shadow form by
the middle of 1973, allowing their chairmen-designate to help in the preparations for the fullscale transfer in 1974. Provisional management units for all services would be provided,
including water supply, sewerage and sewage disposal, and river management. For water
supply, the provisional units would be the existing statutory water undertakings, for river
management the existing river authorities. The greatest area of change would arise in
connection to sewerage and sewage disposal, which would be transferred from the local
authorities. Provisionally, the local authorities would continue to operate, but they were
asked to join district level bodies to help in the transfer of their functions to the regional river
authorities.71
He then assured the House that on the research side, the Government would ensure
that the Water Pollution Research Laboratory, the W ater Research Association, and the
Water Resources Board would provide the best methods of research available to the
industry. With this, he commended the bill to the House for the good of the water industry
and the nation as a whole. The House divided 220 for the bill, 210 against. The vote was
primarily along party lines and was a narrow victory for the Conservatives.72 With that the bill
was commended to Standing Committee D for further consideration.73
Standing Committee D sat 19 times from February 20th 1973 to April 12, 1973.74 It
handled 349 proposed amendments during this period. Several issues were raised in
Committee that demonstrated the different perceptions of Conservatives and Labourites as to
the purpose and function of the bill. A few examples will be sufficient to demonstrate this
point. They include financial arrangements that would govern the system, centralization of
the planning function within the Government’s control, selection of chairmen for each water
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authority, and the case of London within the Thames Valley.
One of the amended clauses concerned finance, specifically the relationship between
the central government and local authorities in regard to sewerage and sewage disposal.
The purpose of the amendment was to allow regional water authorities to precept rates of
local authorities to finance their operations.75 Government proposals were to change the
system of finance from one based on local authority rates to one based on charges for water
authority services, including water supply, sewerage, and sewage treatment and disposal.
To Labour, this meant water would become a commodity consumers would have to
purchase. As Mr. Ted Rowlands (Merthyr Tydvil) stated,

If there is no form of precept on local authority rates and if the cost of sewerage and
sewage disposal is to be borne by the consumers themselves, there will be a very
significant increase in cost to a large number of residents in the poorer communities
which up to now have had central Government support in the form of a rate
resources grant.
... .I hope it is not the aim of the Bill to transfer this heavy financial burden from
central Government to the local community. That has been a feature of much of the
Government’s legislation. Unless the new clause is accepted there will be a dramatic
transfer of the financial burden from central Government to local householders.

Mr. Graham Page, the Minister for Local Government and Development, replying for
the Government, stated that the proposed amendment would “change the basis of the
financing from direct charges for services provided to local taxation through the general
rates.

76

He also indicated it was the Government’s intention that,

the whole of the charge for sewerage and water supply will fall on the
consumers.. .That is the basis of charging under the Bill.... It is the basis of the Bill
that these services, as the Central Advisory Water Committee has said in more than
one report, should be paid for by the consumer.... Charges rather than taxation is the
principle of financing here. The new clause...would reverse that and make the
principle taxation rather than charges. That would lead to the uneconomic use of
resources.77

Mr. Rowlands responded that, “This is the difference between the philosophy of the
Government and that of the Opposition. The Minister said that he believes in charges, not
taxation. W e believe in taxation and not charges.”78 He went on to demonstrate the
differences between the parties on this and larger issues within the bill:
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W e regard water services and sewage disposal matters as an important, intrinsic part
of social service and public health in the service of the community. W e do not regard
it as a commercial enterprise. That is the difference between the two sides... I hope
that this debate has shown the divide between the Opposition and the Government,
and I hope that it will bring home to the public the practical consequences of the Bill.
Whatever the Minister may say, I believe that people will face heavy and increased
direct charges on households, irrespective of income or need, in the supply of water
and sewage disposal, both of which are basic community sen/ices.79

Despite its proclaimed relevance to basic political policy differences, the amendment
was withdrawn by the Opposition and was not pressed to a division of the House. The
reason is unclear: the Conservative majority would have defeated the clause, but the Labour
party could have pressed for a division and put the issue on the public record nonetheless.
This issue would become important in the future, particularly after 1979 and the election of
the Conservatives (and Margaret Thatcher). Thatcher would use this principle to realign
British society from a “socialist” to a “corporate" state, where sen/ices were paid for directly
by the consumer.
The two parties also clashed over the issue of planning within water services. Under
the Water Act of 1963 planning functions were carried out by the Water Resources Board in
an independent manner that garnered praise from both parties. Under the bill, the Water
Resources Board was slated for elimination, with its planning functions redistributed to the
Department of Environment and the National Water Council. Labour proposed that the bill
retain the Water Resources Board and strengthen its executive functions within the new
system.80 Labour’s concern here was that an independent body was being dismantled. They
feared that a split of powers within the new system would leave no independent voice to
advise society on water issues
Mr. Page responded that the new structure would enable all functions of the Water
Resources Board to be retained, but would more efficiently produce a national water policy.

Strategic planning would be vested in the Central Water Planning Unit at the national level
within the civil service. As to the Boards’ independence, he assured the house that the
Governments’ intention was for the Central Water Planning Unit to have the same type of
independence. He argued that staff of the W ater Resources Board had been within the civil
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service, and that staff of the new planning unit would also be as well, thus retaining
independence from the Government.81 However, he did not address Labour’s main concern
regarding centralization. Between the National Water Council, composed of regional water
authorities’ chairmen (who were Government appointees) and the Central Water Planning
Unit (vested within the Department of Environment), Conservatives would control the
direction of water services within the nation.
Conservatives and Labourites also differed over the method of selection of each
water authority’s chairman. Under the bill, chairmen were to be selected and appointed to
their positions by the Secretary of State for the Environment. In Standing Committee D the
Government accepted an amendment allowing water authority boards to select their own
chairmen.82 One of Labour’s main arguments was that appointed chairmen would be under
control of the Minister and this would give the Government too much power over water
services. They believed election of water authority chairmen from among their members
would reinforce the democratic principle. Once back in the House, Mr. Eldon Griffiths, Under
secretary of State for the Environment, moved that this amendment be overturned and the
power of the Secretary of State restored in appointing water authority chairmen. Mr. Griffiths
argued that the structure of the bill placed considerable responsibility on the Secretary of
State for the Environment and the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, to create and
conduct a joint national water policy. It was logical that the Secretary of State would have the
ability to select those individuals responsible for executing that policy. Additionally, people
appointed to these positions would have to demonstrate competency in the running of large
affairs. Those elected to the water authorities would not necessarily have these
competencies. Furthermore, the appointment process allowed the Government to search the
entire nation for those with the appropriate competencies, whereas this would not be the case
if the choice came through the process of local elections. Additionally, continuity would be
guaranteed under the appointment process, which would not be the case under chairs
governed by the electoral process.

83

Mr. Denis Howell responded that he had
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...rarely heard such a monstrous proposal as that in the Minister’s speech to reverse
the decision that the Committee took on an all-party basis after studying the matter
very carefully and objectively. The Minister’s arguments contained a total contempt
for the process of local government as it is known in this country.

Clearly the issue dividing the Labour and Conservative parties concerned their
perception of water authority board composition and function. For Labour, this concerned the
familiar theme of local government control. The bill attacked these principles and the
selection of chairs was just one example. They believed the boards, composed of both
elected and appointed members, should exercise democratic principles and elect chairs from
their own number. Without this, the chairs would be little more than the puppets of the
Government, and local interests would be subject to the whims of Whitehall.
In contrast, the Conservatives perceived the boards as corporate-style managing
bodies. The chairs were to be executives who would exercise leadership, both within the
board and within the nation as a whole, in constructing and executing water policy. As
executives they should be selected for their ability to perform these functions. While the
democratic process of electing chairs might produce those with these capabilities, they could
not guarantee it. And so it was reasonable that the chairs be appointed, as it guaranteed
selection of those with the proper capabilities. The Conservatives did not perceive the issue
as one concerning principles of local control and democracy, but one of competency. The
issue was resolved in the Government’s favor by a narrow margin of 157 to 139, along party
lines.84
Finally, the two parties differed over provisions establishing the Thames Regional
Water Authority in relationship to London sewers and sewerage. As discussed in previous
chapters, London had long been a leader in water issues and had well managed if
overlapping structures for this purpose. The Greater London Council received powers under

the London Government Act of 1963 with respect to main drainage. It looked after the major
trunk sewers, undertook sewerage works, was responsible for the sludge vessels which put
out to sea, and undertook flood control and land drainage. The London boroughs managed
the smaller sewers that discharge into the trunk main sewers. The Port of London Authority
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was responsible for pollution control, navigation, and recreation on the Thames from
Teddington W eir to the sea.
The bill set forth by the Government proposed to take away the main drainage (trunk
sewers) and sewerage works from the Greater London Council and vest them in the new
Thames W ater Authority. This naturally caused a great deal of controversy and was opposed
by the Greater London Council, the London Borough Association, and the City of London. It
should be noted that political control of the Greater London Council was in the hands of the
Conservative Party during this period. In the standing committee, members from both parties
joined together to table amendments that would have created a London Water Authority.
This authority would have been responsible for all aspects of river management concerning
the Thames within the Greater London Area, and would have been under the control of the
Greater London Council.85 These proposals were defeated in Committee by only one vote
and engendered considerable controversy.
Back in the House, other amendments also attempted to establish continuity within
the London area. Mr. Nigel Spearing (Acton) moved an amendment that could be
considered a half-measure. Instead of proposing that the Greater London Authority be given
responsibilities like a water authority, it proposed the status quo be maintained with regard to
sewers, sewerage, and water supply within the Greater London area.86
Mr. Spearing’s arguments were those previously heard concerning the right of local
government to control their supply, sewer, and sewerage responsibilities. The key difference
in relationship to London was that a two-tier structure already existed in London, which did
not exist throughout the rest of the nation. Mr. Spearing urged that the Greater London
Council, as a regional government, be vested with responsibilities for the management of its
drainage and sewer system. He said considering that London government as a whole
derived its roots from the Metropolitan Board of Works, which built the London main drainage
system, it was incomprehensible that these functions should be taken away from such an
organization and vested in such a remote body as the Thames Regional W ater Authority.

87

The Government, in contrast, considered uniformity to be more important than the
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interests of London and would not accept the proposals. In regards to water supply, the
Metropolitan Water Board would become part of the Thames Regional W ater Authority, while
private water undertakers would remain private, but under the direction of the new authority.
The Greater London Council was appeased by assuming new responsibilities over
recreational aspects on the Thames. However, this conflicted with the responsibilities of the
Port of London Authority, which was responsible for the surface waters of the Thames from
Teddington Weir to the sea.
The committee phase of the Water Bill demonstrated numerous differences in
perception between the two major political parties over a variety of issues. The most
significant of these concerned local representation and control within the new structure, the
operation of democratic principles in selecting chairmen and how the system would operate
financially. Conservatives out-voted Labour on a number of issues that influenced the
direction of water policy in Britain.
Ill: Implementation (July 1973 and Bevond)
Implementation of the Water Act of 1973 was scheduled to coincide with the
implementation of the 1972 Local Government Act in April 1974. The regional water
authorities were established with few problems. As these were to operate over an entire
catchment area, they were each organized with a centrally sited headquarters and offices
spread across the region, making use of local authority sites where possible. Some argued
over the location of the authority’s headquarters; the Thames Regional Water Authority, for
example, was sited in Reading, over the objections of members from London. When
possible, the majority of staffs for the new water authorities were derived from staffs of
previous river authorities. This was encouraged by the Government to retain the scientific
and practical expertise that the river authorities contained. Overall, more jobs were produced
as a result of the reorganization, which suited professionals working in that field.
Some of the Labour Party’s fears concerning the selection of the water authorities’
chairmen, the metering of water, and the loss of local government participation proved
correct. The selection of the water authorities’ chairs was accomplished through an open
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application procedure. The majority of chairs came out of the water industry or the local
authorities themselves (despite Conservative fears that local authority personnel would not
have “experience” with large ventures). Labour’s fear that water services would become a
commodity that the consumer would directly pay for was borne out. Water services since
1974 have been treated as a commodity. However, charges were not direct, but charges
based on the rateable value of property. They operate as a property tax and not a user tax
specifically. While local authorities were stripped of their control of sewers and sewerage,
they continued to play a role (albeit a secondary one) implementing the decisions of the
regional water authorities. They had representation on the new authorities and, for the most
part, their concerns were addressed within the new structure as their local expertise was
relied upon in the planning process. They continued to operate much the same as they had
before, but as part of a larger structure.
The new structure might have made more sustainable progress under less difficult
conditions. It managed well with the severe drought of 1976, so well in fact that integrated
management of river basin resources and water supply services seemed justified, reducing
worries about water resource adequacy. Its weakness turned out to be that, although
regional water authorities were not a nationalized industry, the Treasury wanted to limit their
investment spending as if they were.88 Moreover, the mid 1970s to the early 1980s was one
of Britain’s worst periods of economic performance. High inflation and a severe downward
economic spiral produced an economic crisis that forced the British Government (then under
the Labour Party) to seek help from the International Monetary Fund. As capital spending on
sewage works came to be severely limited, their performance deteriorated. This discredited
the other role of the regional authorities as controllers of pollution and protectors of basin
resources. A 1985 River Quality Survey showed the number of lengths of river downgraded
in quality overtaking those improved in quality for the first time since the surveys began in
1958. Moreover, the survey indirectly described worsening conditions. All through the late
1970s and early 1980s British economic production tumbled, with many industries forced into
closure. Many of the improvements in river quality were not due to more rigorous
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enforcement and better management on behalf of the water authorities, although this played
a part, but to Britain’s loss of industry with its consequent reduction of discharges to rivers.
In broad terms, the new-style all-purpose water authorities failed in what was
becoming their key mission—the protection of both tap water quality and river water quality
from increasing pollution by industry, agriculture, and discharges from sewage works.
Largely this was due to internal functional difficulties and lack of financial support from the
central government. The ambitious reshaping took water utility services out of local
government control, even though until 1983 local councils nominated (somewhat ineffective)
majorities of members to each regional authority’s governing board. However, this shift did
not turn water supply or sewerage services into a recognized or single-minded utility. No
serious effort was put into moving domestic water charges from the old property rates used
by local councils to the metered charging used by other utilities such as electricity, gas, or
telephones, even though this was provided for in the 1973 Water Act. The progressiveness
that river authorities showed in the 1960s was smothered by the problems of managing water
supply and sewerage services under the direct constraints that Whitehall wanted for macroeconomic reasons.
It is ironic the restructuring went sour just as environmental concerns were gaining
momentum in the 1970s and 1980s. The all-purpose river authorities were unable or
unwilling to respond to this trend, but did provide convenient targets for environmental
advocates. They either lacked public recognition for their efforts, being viewed as little
different from their local authority predecessors, or earned public hostility through failing to
fulfill their environmental goals. Despite these setbacks, as ideas of privatization began to be
developed in 1985, the idea of retaining power over river basin functions became very
important to those water authority leaders wanting to shed the financial handicap of
Whitehall.
While this study is not the place for a long discussion of privatization, it is crucial to
understand the processes at work. The Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher was
interested in divesting itself from as many public enterprises as possible. This fit the new
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economic model of free enterprise that gained her two election victories in 1979 and 1983. In
1979 the only specific pledges for privatization were those of the aerospace and shipbuilding
industries, and the sale of government shares in the National Freight Corporation. However,
the government became bolder over time. One by one, state-owned industries were brought
into better financial shape and, as the economic climate began to improve, were prepared for
privatization. By the time of the 1983 election, the list of candidates grew to include British
Telecom, British Airways, Rolls Royce, parts of British Steel, British Leyland, and the airports.
After British Telecom, other utilities were privatized with differing structures and regulatory
systems—gas, water, and electricity. By the time Margaret Thatcher left office in 1990 the
state-owned sector of industry was reduced by 60 percent.89
Coupled to this trend was another one regarding the structure of water authorities.
All during their history, environmental groups criticized water authorities for not rigorously
performing their pollution control function, especially in regards to sewage disposal. The
structure of the 1973 W ater Act left water authorities as both the regulator of discharges and,
due to their control over sewers and sewerage, the largest polluters within Britain.
Information regarding the publication of discharge information was provided for in the 1974
Control of Pollution Act (COPA), but this information was not actually produced until 1985, so
water authorities were able to hide the fact they were the largest polluters.90 However, the
worsening pollution in British rivers could not be hidden. Together, the worsening condition
of British rivers and the trend towards privatization would destabilize the regional structure for
water authorities agreed upon in 1973. Under the 1989 W ater Act the water industry would
be privatized and water authorities’ functions divided. A new agency, the National Rivers
Authority (NRA), was given statutory responsibility for pollution control. The private water
service corporations (PLCs) created by the Act were given the task of providing water supply
and sewage collection and disposal. The separation of the water authorities’ regulatory
functions from their water supply, sewerage, and sewage treatment responsibilities was
achieved with the prime objective of resolving these conflicting roles and providing the
commercial freedom to generate necessary capital investment in the water industry.
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Significant additions to the pollution control functions in the Act included provisions for
statutory Water Quality Objectives, Prohibition Notices, Nitrate Sensitive Areas, and Water
Protection Zones. Together, these would enhance the regulatory regime that eventually
translated into improved water quality in Britain during the 1990s.
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C H A P T E R VI

THE 1974 CONTROL OF POLLUTION ACT AND THE TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY
TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

In the last chapter we saw the transfer of water pollution control functions from local to
regional authorities. The 1973 Water Act established a system of regional water management
administered by ten new water authorities. However, this only represented a new structure of
administration. Specific measures to control waste on land, discharges to water, emissions to
air, and noise were contained in a second Bill, the Protection of the Environment Bill, first
introduced by the Conservatives into the House of Lords on November 27,1973. This Bill would
have a long history. It would first wind its way through the House of Lords and be reported to the
House of Commons, where it was lost due to a change of Government in February of 1974.1
With the return of a Labour government the Bill was reintroduced to the House of Lords as the
Control of Pollution Bill in May of 1974.2 The Bill sped through the House of Lords and was
reported out on May 21st 1974. The House of Commons debated the Control of Pollution Bill
during May and June and it went on to gain the Royal assent in August of that year.3
The 1974 Control of Pollution Act (COPA) transferred authority over discharges of
wastes to land, water, and the atmosphere to the Department of the Environment. Additionally,
new controls over neighborhood noise were established for the first time. Environmental Quality
Objectives (EQOs) for each sector of the environment, promulgated through regulations made
by the Secretary of State, ensured central government authority over the environment. At the
time of its inception, the COPA was the most comprehension piece of environmental legislation
yet produced by Parliament. It established a systematic approach to pollution control that
contained several general principles: central control of environmental management; the “polluter
pays” approach to remedy pollution; the “best available means” to limit pollution; and the
establishment of a comprehensive system of environmental monitoring and reporting open to the
public through registers. The Act was forward thinking in design. Powers given to the Secretary
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of State for the Environment allowed government flexibility in establishing standards and setting
implementation criteria. This allowed central government to strengthen quality requirements to
improve environmental conditions as circumstances allowed. However, this flexibility could also
be a weakness if government choose not to act.
The Act entrusted central government with overall responsibility for coordinating
pollution control, including monitoring and assessment systems. Since pollution effects were
generally experienced within the confines of localities, primary responsibility rested with local or
regional authorities. For example, the water authorities managed water resources and pollution
control on a regional level, while collection of wastes for disposal to land were managed at the
local level. Central government established the statutory framework for pollution control, but
implementation was delegated. Flexibility to local circumstances was guaranteed as local
authorities were given discretion over individual discharges through the discharge consent
process. Under this process local authorities could consider a number of factors, including local
resources and social priorities, the uses to which surrounding areas were put, and the capacity
of the environment to absorb pollutants.
Central government retained control of pollution problems that were not easily dealt with
at the local level. Besides issuing guidance and requests to the responsible regional or local
authorities for certain materials (e.g., exposure to radioactive materials), in limited cases national
standards were set. These were reserved for polluting products that were transmitted
throughout the country, for example polluting emissions or noise from motor vehicles and other
air-borne industrial pollutants, such as sulphur. In these cases the Secretary of State could set
national standards. One of the best examples in this regard was an British effort to limit the lead
content in gasoline, thereby reducing the ambient levels of lead content in the atmosphere.
Recognizing the need for an effective national monitoring system to underpin efforts at
pollution control, the COPA required central government to collect information on existing
pollution concentrations, long-term trends, and the significance of new emissions, to determine
where the most significant hazards were located and what resources were needed. Central
responsibility for this process allowed harmonization of monitoring systems. Previously,
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monitoring systems had developed in piecemeal fashion making the collection of comparable
information virtually impossible. It was intended that these systems would be centrally integrated
so that a complete picture of the natural environment could be constructed.
The COPA also recognized the importance of engaging the public in pollution control
efforts. Many environmental groups, scientists, politicians, and the Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution (RCEP) had called for publication of environmental data, much of which
had been shrouded in secrecy. The Act embraced this principle by establishing public registers
detailing discharge consents authorized by all levels of government. The public’s right to know
what pollutants were being discharged into the environment was believed essential for
establishing support for further governmental action to improve environmental quality. As a
safeguard to some businesses, whose industrial processes might be exposed by publication of
discharge consent information, the Secretary of State was given powers to exempt them from
the public registers. However, this was expected to be the exception and not the norm. A
further benefit of lifting the veil of secrecy over discharges was that it allowed comparisons to
monitoring and assessment data collected in the field. It was unfortunate that this did not occur
equally for all sectors of the environment as anticipated by the Act. For example, public registers
for discharges to water were delayed until 1985, whereas registers for noise and air pollution
were established during general implementation of the Act in 1976.
The COPA also established in law the prevailing “best practicable means” approach to
pollution control. Instead of establishing uniform emission standards for all sectors of the
environment, the British approach embodies flexibility with regard to local circumstances.
Authorities, both central and local, were expected to operate on the philosophy that standards
should be reasonably practicable. They should take into account local conditions and
circumstances, the current state of scientific, technical, and medical knowledge, of the potential
harm or nuisance involved, and the financial implications of the standards set. For example, it
would not be cost-effective for society to raise river water quality to drinking water standards for
all rivers in all places, but only to those rivers and places where drinking water supplies are
drawn. In practice this pragmatic approach permits the establishment of individual standards for
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polluting emissions that can be changed in light of technical advances and /or of changing
environmental needs. This approach allows greater flexibility and cost-effectiveness than
uniform emission standards as they are tailored to the individual discharge.
The “polluter pays” principle established that costs for pollution control would be bom by
the polluter. While there is debate over where these true costs lie in practice, this principle linked
financial responsibility for pollution to those who create it. The principle was double- edged:
polluters could be required to change their production process or otherwise treat their waste to
achieve what was hoped to be ever-improving consent conditions. If they did not achieve this
they were held liable for any damage to the natural environment. In addition, fines and prison
sentences were increased to give more weight to the consent processes seriousness. These
principles and their mechanisms became, and continue to be, the cornerstone of British pollution
control.
The Control of Pollution Act was organized into four parts, each dealing with a sector of
the environment. Part I dealt with land; Part II, water; Part III, neighborhood noise; and Part IV,
air pollution. As our focus is water pollution, I will first briefly describe the relevant measures
contained in Parts I and IV then concentrate on Part II.
Disposal of waste on land is important to the water environment as pollution may
migrate from disposal sites into groundwater. Part I provided for the implementation of many of
the recommendations of the Working Groups on the Disposal of Toxic Waste and Refuse
Disposal who had reported their findings in 1970.4 The Act provided a statutory framework for a
systematic and coordinated approach to waste collection and disposal for the first time in British
history. Regional (in some cases local) authorities were designated as waste disposal
authorities. They were charged with surveying and producing waste disposal plans for the
receipt of all household, commercial and industrial wastes and ensuring that enough sites were
available, either in the public or private sector, for these wastes.5
Control over waste disposal was maintained through the establishment of a new
licensing system, whereby all persons wishing to operate disposal sites or treatment plants were
required to seek a site license from the waste disposal authority. It was made an offense for any
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person to deposit controlled wastes on land, or to use plant or equipment to dispose of controlled
waste, unless a license was issued by the waste disposal authority and its conditions were
complied with. Penalties of up to £400 on summary conviction and a maximum of two years in
prison, or a fine or both, were provided as a deterrent against unlicensed dumping. While the
Act contained provisions for incarceration to give it more teeth, these have not been used.
Waste disposal authorities were able to impose operating conditions on privately owned sites
and held extensive supervisory and enforcement powers ensuring that these were run
satisfactorily and that the conditions of operation met. Waste disposal authorities were also
required to ensure that similar standards were also maintained at their own public sites.6
In addition to the creation of disposal provisions, the Act redefined the duties and
powers of local authorities as waste collection authorities. They were required to collect all
household waste free of charge, except in certain prescribed circumstances; to collect all
commercial waste on request; and to charge for the service unless the authority considered it
inappropriate.7
The Secretary of State for the Environment was given powers to prescribe, through
regulations, on hazardous and other difficult wastes. Producers were also subject to new
controls to limit their production of wastes.8 Working groups, composed of central government
officials and representatives from waste disposal authorities and industry were established to
analyze the main groups of industrial waste that might be classified as “special”, then make
recommendations regarding the best methods for handling and disposal.
Part I also placed new attention on the need to conserve resources and recycle waste
materials wherever it was practicable and economically viable. A number of provisions relating
to reclamation were contained in the COPA. For example section 2(4) of Part I of the Act
required waste disposal authorities to consider the possibilities for waste reclamation as part of
the preparation of their waste disposal plans. Section 20 gave waste disposal authorities powers
to implement reclamation and recycling projects, including provisions for plant and equipment.
Another provision enabled local authorities to buy and sell waste, giving them some flexibility in
handling wastes not suitable for disposal by commercial firms and those collected through their
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own systems. It specifically stated that waste disposal authorities would not compete with the
reclamation industries. Section 14 (which did not apply to Scotland) required collection
authorities to deliver for disposal all collected wastes (except waste paper and recyclable waste
materials); and enabled them to provide plant and equipment for sorting and bailing of waste
paper, or the processing of other waste for re-use. Additionally, section 21 gave disposal
authorities powers to use their waste for the purpose of producing heat or electricity, subject to
certain conditions.9 These provisions were designed to produce a comprehensive system so
that all wastes could be controlled.
Part IV of the COPA dealt with air pollution.10 It extended the powers of local authorities
to carry out investigations into air pollution by enabling them to obtain information about
emissions to the atmosphere from any premises other than private dwellings. Local authorities
were also allowed to make arrangements with the occupier for either the occupier or the
authority to carry out measurements; and require the occupier, by notice, to supply certain
information pertinent to their emissions. The Secretary of State for the Environment was given
powers to prescribe what types of information were provided to local authorities. The occupier
was free to appeal to the Secretary of State against a notice on several grounds including, that
the disclosure would prejudice a trade secret, be contrary to the public interest, or be
unreasonably expensive to collect. All emissions information obtained by local authorities were
to be held in public registers. Section 75 of the Act empowered the Secretary of State to make
regulations controlling the composition of motor fuels in order to limit or reduce air pollution. This
section superceded all previous voluntary agreements between the central government and
industry. Section 76 of the Act gave the Secretary of State new powers to limit or reduce air
pollution by making regulations to control the sulphur content of fuel oil burnt in furnaces or
engines.11 The provisions embodied in Part IV were significant and would parallel similar
measures for water. For the first time local authorities were able to collect comprehensive
qualitative and quantitative emission information and provide it to the public. Also, powers
reserved to the Secretary of State in Sections 75 and 76 allowed central government to move
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quickly to control the lead and sulphur content of fuels, which set a precedent for similar action in
other environmental sectors.
Parts I and IV of the COPA demonstrate central government’s willingness to assume
authority over major aspects of the environment. Working collectively with regional and local
authorities to collect information vital to carrying out their pollution control functions, the central
government was able to produce a comprehensive picture of the environment for the first time,
and by establishing public registers, share it with the public.
Part II of the COPA applied the same principles used to control and monitor land waste,
air and noise pollution to the control of water pollution.12 Part II extended legislative controls to
include nearly all discharges to inland and coastal waters. This included specified underground
waters and discharges to land that had an effect on water. Controls that previously covered only
non-tidal waters were extended to cover discharges through pipelines to tidal waters or the sea
and discharges from working mines (which were previously exempt). Virtually all forms of water
pollution were covered by the Act.13
Broadly, the Act ensured that all discharges (regular or continuous activity involving
draining effluents through fixed outlets) of trade or sewage effluent made to rivers, the sea,
specified ground-waters, or land were subject to water authority control. The authority could
refuse a discharge or subject it to reasonable conditions. Pollution could, however, be caused
by some casual or spontaneous activity not covered by the understanding of the term discharge,
and for which control by consent was neither practical nor desirable—for example the dumping
of containers of chemical waste into a river. The Act covered these types of entries by making it
an offense to place poisonous, noxious or polluting matter into water, and severe penalties were
assessed to those convicted of causing such an entry.14
In England and Wales applications for consent to discharge effluent into water or onto
land were made to the regional water authorities established under the 1973 Water Act. The
polluter was responsible for providing details in the discharge consent of the discharge’s point of
entry to the environment, the nature of its composition and temperature, and the daily amount
and maximum rate of discharge. These details were then advertised in national and local
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newspapers and professional journals for public comment. The water authority had three
months to review the discharge application and hear any objections. Appeals of water authority
decisions were reviewed by the Secretary of State for the Environment. Water authorities were
required to establish and maintain public registers containing information about all discharge
consents. These were to be located at the water authorities’ regional and local offices and be
available to the public during regular business hours. The registers contained, among other
things, prescribed particulars of applications for consent to discharge effluents; consents issued
and the conditions attached to them; samples and analyses of effluents and receiving waters;
and notes restricting certain agricultural practices to prevent the pollution of water.15
The regional water authorities were given powers and the duty to forestall and remedy
water pollution, returning the stream and its flora and fauna to their natural state, in so far as
practicable. If the pollution was caused by an illegal discharge, the bill was sent to the polluter.
If a damaging discharge was within the conditions set by the water authority, and the consent
was not due for review, the water authority had to bear the costs of the remedial work. Polluters
were protected from arbitrary changes to their discharge consents, as water authorities were
made liable for the changes in practices.16 But water authorities could impose more stringent
consent requirements when the discharger sought a renewal.
While the legislation was primarily concerned with preventing or controlling pollution
from the disposal of waste or surplus material, agriculture was viewed rather differently. Normal
farming practices sometimes resulted in water pollution. Farmers were therefore afforded some
protection by the Act. Briefly, so long as a farmer pursued “good agricultural practice” they were
protected from prosecution under section 31 of the Act.17 However, this protection could be
withdrawn if the water authority convinced the Secretary of State that pollution could be or had
been caused by a particular activity, in which case a pollution notice would be served on the
farmer. When a notice was served, the “good agricultural practice” protection was removed after
28 days. If the farmer continued with the particular practice and it caused pollution he was open
to prosecution in the same manner as any other polluter.

18

In addition, no compensation was

given to a farmer who changed his practices to comply with the pollution notice.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

187

Under the Act, penalties for pollution were substantially increased. For most offenses a
person convicted in a Magistrates Court was subjected to imprisonment for up to three months,
or fines of up to £400, or both; conviction in a higher court (trial by jury) led to imprisonment for
up to two years, or a fine (there was no limit in this case), or both.19
Overall, Part II strengthened water pollution control by enabling the new water
authorities to manage all threats to water under their jurisdictions and take action to limit
pollution. Most importantly, throughout the Act, the Secretary of State was given powers to set
standards, which would drive the pollution control efforts of the regional water authorities.
Parliamentary Politics
The Control of Pollution Bill did not generate the hostile division between parties
experienced during passage of the 1973 Water Act. There was support across all parties for the
Bill. During the Second reading debate in the House of Lords, for example, none of the fourteen
speeches given opposed the Bill. While differences did exist between the parties on a number of
points, some of which were pushed to a division of the House, none of them created the type of
overarching animosity experienced over the re-organization of water services in 1973. Three
issues serve to highlight the debates in Parliament. These were (1) the powers transferred to
the Secretary of State, (2) the contents of public registers, and (3) the provisions dealing with
agriculture.
Throughout the COPA, the Secretary of State was given numerous powers that
effectively transferred pollution control to the central government. In Part II, the Secretary of
State was given the authority to set standards, grant appeals for consents and pollution notices,
and prescribe regulations that determined the contents of the public registers. Of these powers,
the ability to set standards through regulations was the most important, for it determined the level
of river quality expected, which in turn determined the mix of discharge consents granted by the
water authorities.
The permissiveness of the Secretary’s powers over public registers was brought up in
debate over Clause 34 of the original Protection of the Environment Bill. This was the
Conservative bill introduced to the House of Lords in late November 1973, which was
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subsequently lost due to a change in government in February 1974. The Labour Party’s leader
in the House of Lords, Baroness White, offered two amendments seeking to strengthen the
clause. The first amendment argued that that language in the clause should be changed from
“may” to “shall” to make it clear the Government’s intention to make such regulations. Daroness
White pointed out that the language “has induced an impression, which seems to be
extraordinarily widespread, that the Government are not really firm in their intention in this
matter."20
Lord Aberdare replied for the Government that
I can give.. .an absolute assurance that the Secretary of State will be making these
regulations. It is really only a matter of drafting.. .that it is normal phraseology to use the
word “shall”.. .where an immediate duty is imposed; whereas “may” is not necessarily as
strong, but it leaves a little bit of flexibility, for example on the question of timing.21

Baroness White was unconvinced. She replied that
I am still not quite convinced that consistency is as essential as all that when people are
going to misunderstand the proposed legislation. I should have thought that one could
say, “provision shall be made by regulations for the maintenance by water authorities of
registers which may contain particulars”—putting the permissive part of it at the end of
the phrase rather than at the beginning. Of course, timing does not really matter in this
particular Bill because.. .Clause 97 provides: “This Act shall come into force on such day
as the Secretary of State may by order appoint; and.. .different days may be
appointed.. .for such different provisions of this Act and for such different purposes of the
same provision as may be specified in the order.” Therefore, if the Secretary of State is
not ready to make his regulations he does not need to activate this particular clause.
But that he must do it at some point of time is what people want to be assured about.22

The language, contrary to the response from Government, shows the permissive nature of the
Secretary’s powers. Baroness White was conect in her original assumptions. In the following
year, after Labour’s return to Government, she would help to redraft the Control of Pollution Bill
in a manner that placed the responsibility of action squarely on the Secretary of State. While the
drafting language of “may” and “shall" was retained in the second bill, the terms were used to
reduce the permissiveness of the bill, by making responsibilities clear. For example, the final

form of the COPA placed the responsibility for the maintenance of registers directly on the water
authorities. The language states that “It shall be the duty of water authorities to maintain, in
accordance with regulations, registers containing prescribed particulars of...” So, in this regard,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1§§

the change in government did indeed result in a strengthening of the bill. It is also interesting
that the Conservatives did not challenge the language and it became part of the completed Act.
One issue that persisted through all phases of the debate related to the Bill’s impact on
the agricultural community. This was a critical interest for many members’ constituencies. The
record reveals that both parties sought compensation for farmers while in opposition but would
deny that right while in government. In the initial Protection of the Environment Bill, Clauses 23
and 43 placed potential restrictions on farmers, if their agricultural practices led to water
pollution. The water authorities were given powers to stop some agricultural practices that
threatened the purity of water.
Lord Henley, speaking on behalf of the Liberal party, brought out the difficulties in the
bill. He asked:
I think some of the difficult points may concern agricultural practices. When is a practice
an established one? When is it a normal one? When is it a new one? When is it a
dangerous one? Conditions are changing; and you have as an example the fact that pig
slurry from, shall we say, 10,000 feeding pigs is no longer farmyard manure which can
be easily spread on the land with good effect; it now is, in a way, a noxious
liquid.. .which may find its way into the water courses. This is a difficulty which we shall
have to clarify.23

Lord De Ramsey also criticized this portion of the bill for Labour,
I turn to the restrictions on good husbandry, both the general restrictions under Clause
23, and the particular ones under Clause 43. I cannot help wondering whether these
restrictions are necessary or, if they are, whether they are practical. In any case, the
evidence will be far from conclusive and a question of compensation must arise24

In her winding up speech for the Conservatives, Baroness Young laid out the Government’s
position. She stated that
The noble Lord, Lord De Ramsey asked whether agricultural and other interests may be
affected by Clause 23(5) and may ask for compensation. This is a matter which is
currently under discussion. The powers in this clause are intended to deal with areas
where for instance, special geological conditions make water resources, often
underground water, particularly vulnerable. Any orders will of course be made only after
full consideration, and only where it is clear that the activities to be controlled are a real
threat and that pollution is occurring or will occur25
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This debate would continue during the committee stages of both bills in the House of Lords.
While numerous arguments were made both for and against compensation, none of them were
particularly convincing for the other side and the division continued.
During the second reading debate in the House of Commons on the Control of Pollution
Bill, Margaret Thatcher, speaking on behalf of the Conservatives, criticized the very provisions
that her party had supported earlier. She stated that
I note the changes in the clauses on pollution arising from good agricultural practice.
There is a fundamental dilemma here, that good husbandry may nevertheless lead to
pollution. I see what has been done in the amendments to the clauses. It may be that
some of my hon. Friends who are connected with the agricultural industry still feel it is
not enough. As we know, the agricultural industry is going through particularly difficult
times at present and may wish to pursue the question of compensation. I know of the
reasons why we should treat agriculture in the same way as we treat industrial
concerns. But equally, we realize that there is a difference, and hon. Members may
wish to pursue this matter in Committee in regard to treating agriculture differently. 6

Later, during the committee stage of the COPA, Mr. William Benyon, on behalf of the
Conservatives, put forward an amendment that provided compensation where a good
agricultural practice was discontinued as a result of a water authority notice. He argued that
There seems to be no difference between a farmer who, being dispossessed of land
because of the construction of a motorway, has to discontinue farming practices which
he has indulged in for many years, and a farmer upon whom a notice under this clause
is served. W e are not attempting.. .to support dirty farming practices or to get away from
the idea that the polluter must pay, but farming comes in a different category from
industry and mining... 27

Mr. Gordon Oakes, replying for Labour, likened what the Conservatives were suggesting to a
speeder who is paid for complying with the law.28 Mr. Ralph Howell replied that he could not
follow the Minister’s arguments. He stated that
If a farmer is restricted from carrying on his livelihood he will suffer serious damage. If a
farmer is prevented from applying nitrogen, that part of his business is ruined; just as
much as if a motorway had been driven through his land. It is recognized practice to
compensate for such disturbance in other spheres, and it must be recognized that it is
impossible to carry on farming without the application of nitrogen and other manures.

Something must be done to ensure that adequate compensation is paid to people who
suffer because a notice has been served upon them.29

Mr. Arthur Blenkinsop argued against compensation. He stated that
This amendment raises important general principles. How far do we go in awarding
compensation where there is a conflict of interest between the person concerned,.. .and
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the general public? For example, it is common to compensate farmers for the loss of
access to land where that affects their rights to develop the land. Some of us are
worried about that procedure and how far it takes us.... W e are now realizing the
dangerous implications of the use of modem chemical compounds on the land. It is
difficult to say that we shall compensate the farmer.. .to safeguard the public from their
effects.... This kind of rule might be applied to a whole range of other matters with
undesirable consequences....

Mr. Gordon Oakes, speaking against the amendment on behalf of Labour reminded the House

.. .when similar amendments to these came along during the tour of office of the
Conservative Government they were resisted—not only on the grounds of the
expenditure being open-ended, but also on the principle, that the polluter must pay and
that pollution is an offense... .The Labour Government, like their Conservative
predecessors, recognize that fanners are in a different position from that of the rest of
the community and that farmers may innocently pollute waters by adding various
chemicals to the soil in their pursuit of agriculture.... W e have gone further than the
Conservative Government went. Under Clause 46.. .the Government have modified the
Bill to include an even stronger safeguard for the farmer by making it plain that the
Minister for Agriculture will be concerned with all applications for serving warning
notices.... What the Opposition are asking for in their amendment is that compensation
should be paid for not breaking a law. That surely is quite unreasonable.31

The question remained unresolved and the amendment was pushed to a division in the
committee. The vote was tied, seven to seven, but was broken in favor of the Government by
the chair, Labour's Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine.
But the story of agriculture was not over. During the report phase of the bill, the
Conservatives again attempted to insert measures for compensating farmers. Mr. Ralph Howell,
speaking for the Conservatives, reiterated the argument that restrictions in the bill would create
severe hardships for farmers. He argued that the provisions would deter farmers from “using
fertilizers too enthusiastically” which would hamper food production. Mr. Denis Howell, speaking
for Labour, urged the House not to accept the new clause and advised against writing such an
unlimited financial obligation into the bill. While he expressed sympathy for the farmers and their
problems, he argued that this bill was not the proper vehicle to address them. He went on to

assure the House that these provisions would be carefully applied. Adequate proof of pollution
was required for their application, and the farmer had recourse to an appeals process to the
Secretary of State.32
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The new clause was not pressed to a division, as the Conservatives knew they did not
have the votes necessary. However, the above example is illustrative of many of the political
arguments that are found in the debates over the COPA. Both parties argued for or against
various provisions while in control of the government yet changed their position while in
opposition. This ambivalence may be nothing more than each party attempting to make political
points against each other. More likely, it is symbolic of the widespread support throughout the
House to pass this legislation, or a combination of these two factors.
It seems clear that all sides wanted to move forward. None of the divisive language that
characterized the 1973 Water Act was present in the bill. One of the reasons for this support not
expressed in the debates, but underlying the entire structure of Part II of both bills, was
confidence in the Department of the Environment to adequately implement the measures
consistently with British practices. The fears expressed by Labour over the powers of the
Secretary of State disappeared once they were in control of the state apparatus and their own
minister installed. The Conservatives for their part established the central structure of the
Department of the Environment and never attempted to curtail the central powers given to the
Secretary of State. Parliament was eager to pass this bill because, whatever its limitations, it
was a significant step forward in pollution control. Both sides wanted to be perceived as
supporting issues that had widespread public support. Thus, the bill passed through Parliament
and received Royal approval in August of 1974. With the passage of the Act many details of
implementation were left unresolved and in the hands of the Secretary of State for the
Environment. Yet economic conditions in Britain changed so rapidly that some of the provisions
were delayed or not implemented.
Implementation
The COPA stands out as the decade’s most significant environmental legislation. While
it was important for providing a coordinated and comprehensive approach to pollution control in
Britain, it was equally important for what it did not accomplish. Part II of the COPA, dealing with
water pollution, arguably the most important portion of the Act, was not fully implemented until
1985. Part II was delayed for several reasons, among them capital expenditure constraints
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imposed by the Secretary of State on the RWAs, the traditional problem of having the RWAs as
both polluters and pollution control authorities, and difficulties in prioritizing the RWA's multiple
functions. During the intervening period, the RWAs were under statutory obligation to improve
the quality of rivers and estuaries. However, pollution statistics demonstrate that river quality
actually declined during the interval.
Delay in implementation of Part II produced many harmful effects, the most serious
being an undermining of public confidence in the newly created system. One of the principles
embodied by the Act was governmental openness about what pollutants were being released
into the environment. This was to be promoted through publication of the details of discharge
consents, enabling public assessment of the water environment. Part II stipulated that all new
discharge applications were to be published and open to public comment for the first time. The
RWAs had an obligation to consider any public comment and make their decision within 90
days. Both the objector and the water authority had rights to an appeals process through the
Secretary of State. But the delay in implementation of Part II derailed publication of the public
registers, which undermined public confidence in the new system.
The Secretary of State for the Environment could have directed the water authorities to
produce and make public the registers any time after January 1976, when implementation of the
Act was set. But neither Labour nor Conservative governments gave such directions, even in
the face of criticism. One reason for this unfortunate result was that neither the politicians nor
the RWAs wanted to be blamed for the continued deterioration of river quality, which they knew
was taking place. From the position of the RWAs, the government did not provide them with the
capital financing necessary to make improvements, especially in the construction of effluent
treatment works that would have affected river quality. For the politicians, the economic crisis
that befell Britain, spurred by the doubling of energy prices by OPEC in 1973, precluded large
increases in spending; they were forced to shift resources into social welfare programs as a
result of large increases in unemployment. The government also believed that it could not allow
the RWAs to borrow, as that would only put additional pressure on financial markets, increasing
trends towards higher interest rates that they were attempting to hold down.
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Trends in the level of capital Investment In sewerage and sewage disposal between
1958 and 1990 are very clear. In 1958/9 approximately £200 million was spent.33 This increased
to a high of approximately £850 million in 1973/4, the year the RWAs were created. Investment
then dipped precipitously to approximately £400 million in 1981/2. Thus, during the first seven
years of COPA, capital investment dropped by more than half. Between 1981 and 1984
investment hovered between £450 and £475 million. Beginning in 1985 investment again
increased and continued to improve to approximately £600 million in 1990/1. While this
represented a welcome improvement, the 1990/1 level of investment was still approximately
£250 million less than was spent in the peak year of 1973/4.34 If investment had stayed constant
at 1973/4 levels, approximately £5,810 million more would have been invested between 1974/5
and 1990/1. The loss of capital investment is directly linked to a decline of river water quality
during this period. RWAs found themselves in a situation where they were unable to make the
improvements to sewage treatment facilities necessary to maintain effluent quality.
Concurrently, demand for sewage treatment services continued to increase, due to continued
growth and shifting of population resulting in a situation where the amount of human pollution
produced exceeded the capacity of the RWAs. Even though there was drop in the industrial
effluents being placed into rivers as a result of de-industrialization this was offset by the increase
and concentration of human wastes. Improvements in capital investment only began after the
Thatcher government hatched plans for the privatization of water services in 1984/5. This was
an obvious effort to improve the regional water authorities so that they would be viable in the
open market.
As a result of the steep decrease in capital investment in sewerage and sewage
disposal the RWAs were forced to work with limited resources to fulfill their multi-purpose roles
during a time of rising expectations. The strain revealed a fatal flaw in the structure of the RWAs
themselves. That flaw was their dual role as regulator and polluter. RWAs were responsible for
monitoring river quality and determining all aspects of discharges to the water environment.
However, they also controlled discharges from sewage works that, in many cases, were the
largest sources of pollution. The dual nature of the RWAs embodied the traditional British
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approach of combining multiple activities under one authority. The logic inherent in this
approach was that all aspects of water regulation could and should be handled by the same
authority. However, this approach assumed that all activities of RWAs would receive the same
priority and were compatible. Because the RWAs were operated by many of the same
individuals who had staffed the previous river authorities, other issues such as water supply and
flood defense predominated. Given the financial constraints imposed by the central
Government, budgets in the new RWAs were tight and water pollution efforts received less
attention and funding than other concerns such as water supply.
Implementation of Part II was continually pushed into the future by both Labour and
Conservative governments between 1974 and 1985. Both were able to accomplish this task by
simply not directing their Secretary of State to make regulations that would have brought Part II
into force. Both governments were complicit in this regard and the evidence of their inaction on
the water environment is clearly shown in river quality surveys.
The survey record on water quality is as discouraging as the record of capital
investment. Water quality surveys are important for a number of reasons. Most importantly,
they show the aggregate levels of pollution and changes in quality to the public. Secondly, they
are used by government to set pollution control priorities. Surveys of water quality in rivers,
estuaries, and canals were initiated by government in 197035 and have been conducted every
five years since to monitor and assess progress in pollution control. They deserve recognition as
a positive step in the evolution of government policy towards water pollution control. However,
what they have shown is disturbing. Examination of the surveys of 197036, 197537, 1985s8, and
199039 show the deterioration in pollution control linked to under-capitalization. Overall, the
surveys showed no net changes between 1970 and 1975. However there was significant
decline in water quality between 1975 and 1985. The 1990 survey confirmed the downward
trend.
The main import of the 1990 survey was that, while the proportion of inland waters of
either “good” or “fair" quality was high (89 percent for rivers), deterioration continued despite de
industrialization and the efforts of the RWAs. This trend was disturbing because it demonstrated
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that the RWAs did not have adequate controls over the water environment to prevent backsliding
which they should have been able to prevent via the discharge consent process. While 11
percent of river lengths were upgraded, 15 percent were downgraded for a negative 4 percent
result for the five-year period 1985-90. This was an increase in the negative trend of two percent
fortheperiod 1980-85. The 1990 survey shows that in eight out often regions, the net changes
were relatively small, though about equally divided between four regions improving, and four
regions declining.40

Table 5.1
Percentage of river length in each classification 1990

Region

Good
1a
1b

Anglian
Northumbria
Northwest
Sevem-Trent
Southern
Southwest
Thames
Welsh
Wessex
Yorkshire

8
60
45
15
23
17
16
54
28
39

Fair
2

49
26
14
40
47
35
45
32
32
33

35
11
20
32
22
30
32
8
34
14

1a, 1b, & 2

Poor
3

Bad
4

3 &4

92
97
79
87
92
82
93
94
94
86

8
3
16
11
7
17
7
5
5
11

0.3
0.2
5
2
1
1
0.3
1
1
3

8
3
21
13
8
18
7
6
6
14

Total
(km)
4328
2801
5323
5721
2185
3037
3530
4647
2622
5767

Table 5.2 Percentages of river length changing class, 1980-90
Region_________
Anglian
Northumbria
Northwest
Sevem-Trent
Southern
Southwest
Thames
Welsh
Wessex
Yorkshire
England &
Wales

Up
21
4
4
10
19
4
15
22
27

12

1980 to 1985
Down
13
1
12
7
20
45
18
21
10

14

Net
+8
+3
-8
+3
-1
-41
-3
+1
+17
+2

1985 to 1990
Up
Down
9
11
2
5
7
11
10
9
23
16
40
18
19
33
20
18
4
3
4
g

Net
-2
-3
■4
+1
+7
-22
-14
+2
+1
-5

-2

11

-4

15

Against the background of small changes were two cases of significant deterioration in
the Thames and South West regions (see Table 5.1). Of the river lengths in the Thames region,
fifteen percent rose in classification while eighteen percent moved downwards, for a net decline
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of three percent between 1980 and 1985.41 The Thames Water Authority argued that these
changes indicated a slight net decline in river quality after 1980, however, canal water quality
showed improvement, and there was no change in estuarial quality. Some forty-five percent (73
km) of canal length had improved while only five percent declined. The majority of class
changes were to, or from, adjoining classes 42
The power of capital investment can be seen in the survey. Four km of the Ingreboume
(a tributary located southeast of London) improved from Class 3 to Class 1B as a direct result of
improvements to the sewer system serving the Brentwood Sewage Treatment Works.43
The Thames River Authority argued that the majority of changes in classification were
caused by non-specific environmental influences. The rest of the changes could be attributed to
increased urbanization. The specific problem faced by the Thames River Authority was
maintaining effluent quality at sewage works that experienced ever-increasing flows.44 Various
river stretches in the Thames valley (all flowing into the Thames) showed deterioration due to
poor quality effluents. They included seven km. of Bull Brook, twenty-one km. of the Cut,
seventeen km. of the River Cherwell, one km. of the River Lee, eighteen km. of the River
Loddon, eight km. of the River Ray, and seven km. of the River Thames. Sixty-six km. of the
River Wey deteriorated from Class 1B to 2 due to the failure of several sewage works to meet
their ammonia standards.45 Two points are significant about these declines. The first is that all
of the declines (according to the Thames Water Authority) are related to the production of lower
quality effluents from sewage treatment plants, not from increased discharges from industrial
polluters. The second is that the declines could easily have been prevented, and possibly
improvements made, if government had made the capital investment in sewage treatment
promised in the 1970s.
The deterioration continued between 1985 and 1990 despite privatization by Mrs.
Thatcher’s government. The 1990 survey showed that only nineteen percent of river lengths
moved upwards in classification while thirty-three percent moved downwards, for a net decline of
fourteen percent.
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Comparison of the 1985 and 1990 surveys is misleading because they used separate
methodologies. In the Thames region over half of the changes in category in the 1990 survey
were due to more extensive monitoring, which may have simply revealed deterioration that had
not been noticed in 1985. Another influence may have been low river flows due to drought,
which would have affected the total amount of water flowing through the river and thereby
affected the pollution capacity of the river.46
The surveys also showed that the causes of river deterioration were varied and
localized. Examination of the Thames and Southwest show noticeable differences. The
Thames region is densely populated and highly developed around a river heavily used for
multiple purposes. The dominant influences in the region are urban. As shown above, the
decline in quality was directly attributable to urban sewage. In contrast, the Southwest is more
rural, has few large towns, much coastline, and considerable appeal as a vacation spot. Yet the
Southwest also showed river deterioration, which suggests pollution from diffuse sources
primarily associated with agriculture. The surveys clearly demonstrate a decline in water quality
between 1974 and 1990, but as shown not from the same causes.
One reason why RWAs failed to achieve net improvements in river water quality
between 1985 and 1990, during implementation of COPA, was due to a relaxation of standards
and concealment of the results. In 1974 Parliament voted to establish open registers under Part
II of the COPA, which would contain the details of discharge consents and sampling results. The
responsibility for the new water authorities then operating the sewage works lay with government
ministers—the very ministers who were restricting investment needed to improve the sewage
works and other infrastructure. Thus under Labour and Conservative ministers in turn, the
creation of public registers was postponed, for no less than eleven years after Parliament
legislated for it.
Two technical points on how limits on discharges are actually expressed should be
briefly noted here, as they influence perceptions of pollution control effectiveness. First, limits
may be expressed as uniform emission standards (UES) or environmental quality standards
(EQS). A UES would set uniform limits for the entire nation, a region or river basin that no
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effluent discharge to water may contain more than, for example, 20 parts per 1000 of this or that
substance. The EQS system would set limits in individual permits for each discharge in its
specific location, taking account of the level of dilution available in the river and the quality of
water already prevailing there. In economic terms, the EQS system has the advantage of
flexibility: if the river can dilute more pollution without ill-effects, it is offering a natural opportunity
that the nation may take advantage of. However, the EQS system may come under pressure
when later would-be dischargers want larger shares of capacity that is already reduced by
permits granted to others. Moreover, when permits are negotiated individually (and concealed
as they were until 1985), a discharger may feel there is little wrong, or little chance of exposure,
in frequently breaching the limits.47
The second technical difference is in the legal and practical effects of how the limits (in
UES and EQS formats) are actually expressed. If the limits are absolute, any violation of the
limit is readily recognizable as an offense, though no prosecution may follow. Most statutory
limits are expressed in absolute terms because certainty is important for social as well as legal
reasons. But limits may be expressed in percentile terms. This has the effect of allowing
violations of the stated limit for a proportion of a stated period, or, more precisely, in a proportion
of the sampling checks made in that period. Percentile limits may be useful in indicating the
standards that must be achieved “on average”, which can be significant for measuring
continuous discharges of effluent and their impact month after month. However, these limits
have the drawback of setting no limit on peak pollution loads during a period of time or samples
outside of the percentile limits. For example, peak pollution loads can deoxygenate a portion of
the river, causing “fish kills” which would not be revived by establishing lower levels of pollution
afterwards. Thus a percentile limit applying to ninety-five percent of samples may sound almost
as tough as an absolute one applying at all times. The key difference, however, is the absence
of any limit for some of the time.
A further drawback is the increased difficulty in identifying when an offense (as distinct
from an outright violation) is committed. If five percent of samples are allowed to exceed the
ninety-five percentile limits specified in any given period (say one year), no single sampling result
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can be said to show a breach of the permit until it is known whether other samples have failed
often enough to use up the defined quota. This depends on the number of samples taken as
well as the number failing. Thus uncertainty prevails most of the time. Enforcement proceedings
cannot begin until results are accumulated to show the full number of samples beyond the limits.
For some purposes it is helpful to set absolute and percentile standards together. But to be
easily understood by dischargers and the public, and for enforcement procedures such as
warning notices or prosecutions to be issued appropriately, percentile limits can be very
confusing and difficult to enforce.48
The use of different means of expressing limits helps to explain one of the worst
episodes of government administration of pollution control. In 1985, when Part II of the COPA
was implemented, the Department of Environment finally moved to end the concealment
surrounding the discharge consent system, prevailing since its inception in 1951. While late, this
move could have represented an important step: a public more concerned about the water
environment was for the first time to be offered access to the relevant data. As effective
environmental protection depends on the everyday awareness of individuals, this was an
obvious opportunity for a constructive exercise in public information at a suitable moment.
Instead, the Department of Environment was more worried about the public seeing just how
many sewage works were operating illegally beyond their pollution limits, which was
embarrassing to the government. Moreover, as stated previously, much of the poor
performance was attributable to restrictions on capital expenditure imposed on the RWAs by the
central government, or to reductions in the staffing of sewage works. The Thatcher government
chose this time to alter the discharge consents of the larger sewage works operating under
absolute numerical limits so the public would not see the illegalities. The key change made to
the consents for sewage works operated by the RWAs (but no others), was to substitute
percentile limits for the absolute ones then in use. Thus illegality was veiled in statistical
obscurity. Without a “look-up” table, showing the number of samples taken and the number of
violations allowed, it was impossible for the public to easily understand the information 49
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This was a betrayal of the worst sort. It sought to outsmart the public by obfuscating the
very facts presented for the first time. Moreover, it had no countervailing advantages. Its first
effect was to make the illegal operations of sewage work discharges less obvious and thereby
less embarrassing for the government and the Department of Environment. Its second effect
was to undermine respect for the pollution control system that had been established.
The relaxation of restrictions came to have a new significance as preparations for
privatization gathered speed from 1987 onwards. The prospectus required of each new private
water company had to show information would-be investors might regard as material to their
investment decisions. Data on compliance with discharge consents were thus critically important
to help potential investors judge the amount of new capital required to achieve compliance.
Thus, evidence of recurring illegality in sewage works discharges could not be left unclear. Yet,
despite the change to percentile limits, many of the water authorities failed to meet even these
lower standards, and this too could hardly be exposed. Thus, the first bad decision, shifting
reporting data to percentile limits, was compounded by a worse decision: the RWAs should
apply for further relaxation of numerical consents sufficient to bring even the poor performance of
their troubled sewage works within the bounds of legality. The scale of such breaches, even on
the basis of percentile limits, (Table 5.2) was reduced between 1986 and 1988 as consent limits
were generally eased.
Table 5.3 Sewage works in breach of consent50
Water Authority
Anglian
Northumbria
North West
Sevem-Trent
Southern
South West
Thames
Welsh
Wessex
Yorkshire
Total

1986
No.
309
37
62
179
54
55
67
112
39
88
1002

%
40
19
14
23
19
29
18
17
14
23
23

1988
No.
210
26
43
116
41
68
60
110
16
61
751

%
27
15
10
16
15
29
16
15
6
17
17
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An independent analysis of how ministers set about legitimizing this situation was
provided by the respected ENDS51 Report (no. 171):
In 1988, the number of non-complying works fell to 751, or 17 per cent of those with
numerical consents. But improvements are not being achieved at anything like the rate
necessary to bring all works into compliance by the November (1989) deadline. Last
November (1987), the DoE therefore encouraged the authorities to apply for relaxed
consents, on an interim basis for smaller sewage works.
[At mid-April 1989] a total of 1,033 applications have been submitted, but the number is
likely to rise well above 1,100.. .The number is significant because the DoE told the
authorities in January that the government wished “to restrict relaxations below 1,000”,
no doubt because it is keen to avoid embarrassment as the Water Bill continues its
passage through Parliament.
The large number of applications will also pose extreme difficulties for HMIPs water
branch [the part of DoE dealing with application], which is short of support staff but must
take decisions before August when its work passes to the NRA.

The proportion of sewage works for which relaxations were requested ranged from three
percent in the Southern region to twenty-two percent in Yorkshire and Thames, and twenty-four
percent in Anglia. The national average was sixteen percent. The ENDS Report quoted industry
sources as indicating that applications were made where works were not at risk of failing
consents—but where relaxations were still welcomed. These were refused by Her Majesty’s
Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP)52 as were relaxations in cases where excessive trade effluent
loads were being accepted, which were described as taking money fraudulently at the expense
of the environment. As a part of the DoE due to emerge with a wider pollution control role, HMIP
had an awkward task to perform. HMIP began imposing absolute limits again, and agreed with
the National Rivers Authority Advisory Committee (NRAAC, the precursor of the NRA central
office), rather than with the discharging authorities, in arguments about where these levels
should be set.
Putting the system of discharge consents back on a basis that could command respect

became the NRA’s most urgent task after it was launched in 1989. The DoE invited the NRA to
begin its work independently, but with agreed upon terms of reference. The Review of
Discharge Consents and Compliance was the first review of the discharge consent system since
concealment was ended and public registers established (1985), as well as the first open
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independent review since 1975. A group of politicians, government civil sen/ants, water industry
officials, and academic experts collectively known as The Compliance Group was established to
handle the review by the Department of the Environment. It was hoped that they could seriously
consider the system for the first time as a means of communication and accountability between
dischargers, the NRA, and other interested parties. The Group’s report, published in July 1990
as Discharge Consent and Compliance Policy: A Blueprint for the Future (also known as the
Compliance or Kinnersley Report), recommended that both the work of the NRA and the
dischargers should be subject to more scrutiny.
The Compliance Group’s recommendations concentrated on four main issues:
1.
2.

3.

4.

The wording of application forms, consents, and the way limits and conditions were
expressed, to make them easier to understand and less ambiguous.
The limits that consents specify for compliance; absolute limits would be retained as
the key controls, plus percentile limits where relevant. Limits on ammonia would be
included more widely and consistently.
Proposals for more effective sampling and monitoring, including scope for automatic
monitoring where practicable (and what changes in parameters might facilitate that
in the longer term). Self-monitoring by dischargers can hardly be relied upon as a
main method while the courts resist convicting defendant companies on their own
evidence, but self-monitoring can be welcome as a real sign of dischargers’ being
committed to supervise their effluents.
The motivation of dischargers to provide up-to-date information on effluents to the
NRA and to allocate clear responsibility for the supervision of discharges to named
managers. This could improve internal and external liaison and accountability
without making individuals liable to prosecution.

The Compliance Group’s recommendations could only pave the way for improvements
in the discharge statistics that the NRA inherited. At the time of the review, the best available
figure for the number of discharge consents in operation (nearly 140,000) was 50,00 higher than
the actual total (established by mid-1991 at 86.000).53 The fact that this became known was
attributable to the design of the NRA, which as a national body was able to collect and present
all of the data, and as another benefit of the end of concealment. But it also followed that
accuracy and openness required more effort and more resources for both staffing and

information technology if they were to be translated into effective action.
It was not until 1991 that the entire structure of water pollution control required by Part II
of the COPA was fully implemented, fifteen years after it was intended. By then, the structure of
the water industry it was designed to regulate had been transformed. However, the COPA did
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transfer regulatory power over water pollution to the national government, specifically through
the powers of the Secretary of State for the Environment. This transfer eventually allowed for
implementation of more stringent standards resulting in better water quality in the 1990s. Many
of these changes were driven by British membership in the European Union (EU), the subject of
the next chapter.
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HMIP would oversee. IPC includes several interlinked approaches. For substances prescribed
as dangerous for disposal to air, land and water, generation of wastes was to be brought to nil or
as dose to nil as possible. This was to be accomplished by using the Best Available Technology
Not Entailing Excessive Cost (BATNEEC).
53. National Rivers Authority, Discharge Consent and Compliance Policy: A Blueprint for
the Future. (London: HMSO, 1990).
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C H A P T E R V II

THE IMPACT OF THE EU ON BRITISH WATER POLLUTION CONTROL

The preceding chapters have reviewed the development and refinement of water
pollution controls to illustrate how deteriorating conditions and public agitation prompted
Parliament to redefine and transfer authority over the environment to increasingly higher
levels, from the local to regional and then national level. The transfers each promised
solutions to Britain’s pollution problems, but events failed to fulfill them.
Concurrent with Britain’s decision in the early 1970s to locate authority over pollution
control at the national level, its acceptance into the European Union (EU) indirectly
transferred authority over the environment to the supranational level, where EU institutions
began to formulate policies in 1973.1 This development produced conflicts between Britain
and other member states: Britain was disparaged within the EU for poor compliance with
environmental policies, most noticeably during the Conservative government of Margaret
Thatcher (1979-1990), when a new focus on implementation became primary within the
Union. This chapter will examine the impact of the transfer of authority from Britain to the EU
through examination of several pieces of European Union legislation that impacted the water
environment in the 1970s. Specifically, these were the surface water directive (75/440), the
1976 bathing water directive (76/160), the 1976 dangerous substance directive (76/464), and
the 1980 drinking water directive (80/778). All four remain among the most important pieces
of EU water law so far adopted and all had an impact on the British water environment
A vast body of literature on the European Community has been compiled over the
past thirty years. Most is general in nature, such as John McCormick's The European Union:

Politics and Policies.2 presenting an overview of the historical development of the EU. Other
surveys have a decided editorial slant, such as John Pinder's European Community: The
Building of a Union.3 which views EU historical development as leading inextricably towards a
federal system. Still others, such as Juliet Lodge's The European Community and the
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Challenge of the Future.4 are anthologies that present a number of specific case studies on
various policies and workings of the EU. Works on environment policy and water are far
fewer in number but are growing. Examples include Anthony Zito's Creating Environmental
Policy in the EU.5 and Stanley Johnson and Guy Corcelle's The Environmental Policy of the
European Communities.6 Tim S. Gray's UK Environmental Policy in the 1990s.7 Christopher
Miller's Environmental Rights.8 and Albert Weale's Environmental Governance in Europe.9
The EU regulates member states’ natural environments through a variety of means.
All major organs of the EU, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission and the
European Parliament have roles in formulating environmental policy. The Commission's
Environment Directorate General, created in 1981, is responsible for preparing and
implementing environmental laws and policies. The European Court of Justice interprets
Treaties and subsequent EU legislation, but it has limited enforcement powers, save the
recent ability to fine member states for non-compliance.
The relationship between the EU and member states is complex. In one sense it is a
dialectic whereby member state participation empowers the center and the center in turn
directs the mutually beneficial activities of the community. But like the spokes on a wheel, not
all are equal in strength or durability. Member states have a responsibility to give effect to EU
law, generally through legislation, through their own legal systems. However, this action
provides opportunities for others to participate in the process of policy formation and
implementation with consequences for those policies. In many instances, Britain did not
initially fulfill its obligations to the EU in regard to environmental measures, which had
consequences not only for the environment, but also for the integrity of Britain’s membership
within the EU.
EU power derives from the willingness of the member states to give up their
individual prerogatives for the “good” of the union. Each member state, represented in EU
institutions, has the ability to influence events and help shape policies prior to reaching
decisions. However, once decisions are reached, each member is required to fulfill its’
obligation to the EU by implementing the agreed-upon measures, whether they were in
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agreement or opposition during the debate phase of the policies construction. Only in this
manner, can multi-national organizations operate effectively for the benefit of all. In Britain’s
case, especially in regard to the implementation of environmental measures, this obligation
has not always been fulfilled in a consistent manner that caused it difficulties with its EU
partners and the organs of EU institutions charged with ensuring its implementation. The
problem has many sides but can be seen to derive partly from the evolving nature of EU
environmental policies, partly in British attitudes towards the EU and vise versa, partly due to
the nature of British environmental practices, and partly to the evolving nature of British
politics and its subsequent relationship with the EU.
The British relationship to the EU has been influenced by internal politics at home.10
Both the Labour and Conservative parties have been split by Britain’s turn towards the EU
and this has, more than anything else, influenced British attitudes towards its membership.
When the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was initially proposed Clement
Atlee’s Labour government (1945-51) declined to participate. Similarly, when the initial
European Economic Community (EEC) was proposed, Anthony Eden’s Conservative
Government (1955-57) also did not respond favorable, but instead attempted to convince the
other European states to form a looser free-trade area. By 1961, the situation had changed.
Eden’s Conservative successor, Harold Macmillan (1957-63) attempted to make application
for membership but was rejected by France’s Charles de Gualle, which was followed by
another application for membership in 1967 by the first Labour government of Harold Wilson
(1964-1970), which also failed.11
As the debates over membership continued, both parties became more divided over
time, the Labour Party more seriously than the Conservative Party. Edward Heath’s
Conservative Government (1970-74) was successful in negotiation British entry into the union
but he was criticized by the right wing of the party, mostly vigorously articulated by Enoch
Powell. In order to head off such criticism, and to convince the British public of the
advantages of membership, Heath made the creation of a EU regional policy a high priority in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

210

the hope that it would bring tangible benefits to the British economy. This is just one example
of British policy inside the EU being driven by domestic policy considerations.12
Another, more obvious example was provided by Wilson’s Labour Government
(1974-76). While in opposition, the Labour Party had been racked by dissention, and EU
membership had been at the heart of the problem. Several of Wilson’s Cabinet ministers from
1964-70 were committed to membership. They included Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams, Roy
Hattersley and George Thomas. But a majority of the party was still opposed, and the
pressure from this majority meant that Wilson could not give unqualified approval of the entry
negotiated by Heath. The result was a compromise whereby the Labour Party opposed entry
to the EU on the terms negotiated by the Conservative government. Labour went into the
1974 elections committed to renegotiating the terms of entry with the threat (or promise) of
withdrawal if satisfactory terms were not agreed.
Upon winning the 1974 elections, Labour then proceeded to fulfill its promise of
renegotiation, which seriously disrupted the other business of the EU where more important
issues, other than Britain’s terms of entry, were on the agenda. Labour’s activities involved a
great deal of posturing and nationalist rhetoric from the government. However, it should be
noted that this rhetoric, while strong, ultimately did not involve changing the essential terms of
the Treaty. Nevertheless, these terms were put to the British people in a referendum, with a
recommendation from the government that they be accepted, which they were.
The idea of the referendum originated from the left of the Labour Party, and was
pressed on Wilson on the assumption tf)p|t jf would lead to a rejection of membership. The
ultimate two to one vote in favor of pipfflfter^ijp d|d not last lon9- Britain had joined at a bad
time, when continuing economic difficulties at home could and were conveniently blamed on
the EU. While Wilson’s Labour opponents had to accept the verdict of the referendum, they
lost no opportunity to attack the EC. Wilson accepted these attacks as they diverted attention
away from his failure to solve economic difficulties at home. He himself continued to take a
strongly nationalistic line in EU negotiations, as did his Labour successor James Callahan
(1976-79). The balance of forces within the Labour Party meant that anti-EU forces could
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make the most noise, and a cooperative attitude was not to be expected of Britain, which in
turn naturally strained the relationship.13
This position did not change when the Conservative government of Margaret
Thatcher came to power in 1979. In order to confirm the support of the nationalistic right wing
of the Conservative Party, which had supported her bid for the leadership, Thatcher chose to
tackle the very real problem of the disproportionately high British contributions to the EU
budget in a confrontational and self-righteous manner. While the other members accepted
that there was some claim for a rebate, they were put off by Thatcher’s demand for “our
money back,” and her demand that they accept structural changes to the budget that
amounted to another renegotiation of the terms of entry.14
By 1984, the budgetary issues had been settled in Britain’s, but this did not translate
into meaningful cooperation. Thatcher always remained careful not to lose the support of her
back-benchers, and this, coupled with her own personal prejudice, meant that Britain
remained an awkward and reluctant participant in EU affairs. While Thatcher’s successor
John Major (1990-95) was committed to membership and wanted to change the relationship
from a negative to a positive position, he suffered from “Euro-skeptics “ amongst his own
backbenchers, those same individuals who Thatcher had to contend who had the support of
the majority of the Party’s rank and file members. The backbenchers surprisingly were
prepared to exploit their own Party’s parliamentary weakness to make their voices heard on
Europe, and their tone was highly negative.15
John Major’s Government was responsible for negotiating the Maastricht Treaty. This
Treaty was designed to bring the member states closer together and from a federated union.
Major was forced to keep a close eye on what his own Party would accept. Thus he had to
refuse the social chapter of the Treaty, which became a social protocol binding all of the other
members except Britain. He had to insist on the right of Britain to opt out of the eventual
monetary union. Regardless of Major’s own beliefs on these issues, he was unable to make
concessions, or to prevent Britain appearing isolated, because of the domestic constraints
that bound him. Despite arguing that the Treaty was a success for the British view of Europe,
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he had difficulty in getting the Treaty ratified and had to rely on Opposition votes to
succeed.16 Major’s problems continued in this vein through his entire tenure as Conservative
Party leader. It even resulted in a challenge to that leadership in 1995 by leading Euroskeptic John Redwood. While Major prevailed, Redwood’s respectable vote marked him as a
figure who would have to reckoned with on the Tory backbenches. Within the Cabinet, Major
had similar problems with Michael Portillo and had to transfer him from the EU sensitive post
of Secretary of State for Employment to Defense, but even here he managed to embarrass
Major with a Brussels bashing speech at the 1995 Conservative Party conference.17
Thus, both political parties suffered from the ambiguity of large sections of their own
parties. While the majority of the British electorate has remained in favor of membership
since the early 1970s, this has not translated into widespread support within the parties
themselves. The internal schisms meant that in numerous cases, both parties have had to
appeal to the opposition to pass important EU measures. This has complicated British
membership inside the EU because she was unable to speak with one voice like the majority
of the other member states. It should not be surprising then, that the other EU members have
questioned Britain’s commitment and become tired of her incessant complaining. While none
of these issues have had a direct impact on environmental issues, it has colored the entire
relationship and help set the background for the debates surrounding British implementation
of EU environmental measures.
The Evolution of EU Environmental Policy
When Britain joined the EU, it coincided with the historical emergence of concern
over the state of the worlds’ environment. As discussed previously, Britain had already felt
the upsurge of concern over the environment and had responded through domestic
legislation. As Britain entered the EU she felt secure in her position as a nation with a solid
history of addressing environmental problems. Whatever the differences between that record
of legislative accomplishment and the realities of pollution control, Britain perceived no threat
from the EU in this area. The environment was not part of the discussions regarding Britain’s
entrance into the EU, and at the time, no formal environmental policy existed. The EU would
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not take its first steps into this area until 1972. The one outside event that triggered policy
formation was member state participation at the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment held at Stockholm, Sweden, June 5-16 1972.18 Participants drafted and signed
an official Report that pledged their nations to taking actions to safeguard the environment.

19

Participants included all EU nations and Britain.
John McCormick has argued that the Stockholm Conference had a number of
important results. It confirmed trends that viewed the human environment holistically.
Intellectual discourse had evolved from simple conservation and preservation to a holistic
view of human management of ecosystems. In addition, there was a compromise between
the Zeitgeists of the developed and less developed nations. The compromise forced the
developed world to recognize the needs of developing nations to manage the environment in
terms of economic development. The creation of the United Nations Environment Program,
even with its limitations and deficiencies, was able to move the world environmental agenda
forward in a fashion that was acceptable to the majority of member states. Lastly, the
Conference Report presented a blueprint for national action. Soon thereafter the EU decided
to adopt its own environmental policy, which largely followed the model outlined in
Stockholm.20
The original Treaty of Rome did not mention the environment. Nevertheless, the
Heads of State and their governments decided in October of 1972, after the Stockholm
Conference, to implement the major provisions of the Report. Since 1973, this has been
articulated in five Environmental Action Programs (1973-76,1977-81,1982-86,198792,1993-2000).
The Programs detail the environmental policy intentions of the Commission and
Council of Ministers. By varying degrees, and typically after a considerable period of time,
policy intentions are translated into a series of council decisions in the form of regulations,
directives, recommendations and non-binding opinions. These are translated into memberstate law to achieve formal compliance, later followed by practical compliance (i.e.
implementation on the ground). The interval of time from the first statement of intention to
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practical compliance can be substantial (in excess of ten years in some cases) and the
content of the original decision with its associated costs and benefits can be transformed in
the process.
The first and second programs were largely focused on preventive actions to
safeguard the environment and working to stop disparate national policies from becoming
barriers to trade. The first action program was a long and comprehensive document
beginning with a general statement delineating the objectives and principles that would form
EC environmental policy.21 The Commission would take immediate action to: reduce
pollution and nuisances; improve the natural and urban environments; deal with
environmental problems caused by the depletion of certain natural resources; and promote
awareness of environmental problems and education22
The third program (1982-86) marked a significant shift from the previous two as it
called on members to develop an overall environmental strategy for their future development.
This shift was influenced by and mimicked the adoption of the U.N. World Conservation
Strategy.23 Environmental issues were raised from a secondary to a primary level in
community decision-making through the introduction of integrated environmental
management practices. Members were asked to consider the environmental implications of
their development decisions. The environment was given equal weight in the EU decision
making process regarding transport, energy, industry, and agriculture. This new emphasis
removed the environment as a potential block from the goal of completing the common
market.24
The fourth program (1987-92) was adopted in 1987, the same year the Single
European Act (SEA)25 was passed. It was based on the principles written into the new
environmental chapter of the SEA and introduced a number of specific actions for various
sectors (air, water, noise, etc.). In addition to reconfirming regulatory legislation using the
command and control approach, economic instruments, such as taxes and licensing fees
were included for the first time. The emergence of global problems such as ozone-layer
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depletion and climate change attracted greater attention to the international dimension of EU
environmental policy.
The gradual extension of EU competence into the environmental policy area was not
explicitly denied by the treaties and was made possible through a broad and dynamic
interpretation of the Treaty of Rome. The Preamble charged member states with ensuring
"the constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples.”26 Article II
expressed the objective of a "harmonious development of economic activities [and]...an
accelerated raising of the standard of living''27- neither of which are achievable in worsening
environmental conditions. Prior to the SEA EU environmental policy was based on Article
10028 or Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome.29 Article 100 provided a legal base for the
harmonization of national laws that directly affect the establishment of the common market.
In most cases, the economic link necessary to invoke Article 100 was easy to prove since
environmental regulations usually have a direct impact on industrial production and
commercial activities. Where this link could not be established, for example with the
Protection of Wild Birds,30 Article 235 remained a last-resort clause. It allowed the EU to take
action to attain objectives for which no powers were clearly granted. While this caused much
debate, the European Court of Justice repeatedly supported the incremental expansion of EU
powers over the environment. However, policymaking within this framework was limited by
two factors; all environmental measures had to have economic links and unanimity was
required for the adoption of measures.
The Single European Act (SEA) amended the Treaty of Rome and specifically set out
the EU’s role in environmental policy formation. While Articles 100 and 235 remained valid,
their importance diminished rapidly as a result of the incorporation of articles (130r-t)31 under
a new “environment” chapter that removed remaining doubts about the Union's competence
to formulate environmental policy.
Article 130r defined the objectives, principles and guidelines of the common
environmental policy and the EU's role in international cooperation. While “environment” was
not defined, a number of policy objectives were. They are; 1) To preserve, protect and
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improve the quality of the environment; 2) To contribute towards protecting human health;
and 3) To ensure a prudent and rational utilization of natural resources.
The EU's environmental policy was based on the prevention principle, the polluterpays principle and the principle that "environmental protection requirements shall be a
component of the Union's other policies". In preparing environmental legislation the EU "shall
take account of' four parameters. These were; 1) available scientific and technical data, 2)
environmental conditions in the various regions of the EU, 3) the potential benefits and costs
of action or of lack of action, and 4) the economic and social development in the EU as a
whole and the balanced development of its regions.
The first two parameters were included at the request of the British government.32
This is important to note, given that the British government had for many years refused to
accept the claim that scientific evidence existed which proved that emissions originating from
British territory were causing acid rain in Scandinavian countries. The second parameter
suggested that emissions of pollutants that dispersed rapidly might not need to meet the
same strict standards as others. This interpretation, suggesting flexibility in approach, was
strongly opposed by environmental interest groups and conflicted with the generally agreed
principle contained in the action programs that environmental conditions should not worsen in
any region of the EU. The fourth parameter was added to the original Commission proposal
on behalf of the Irish and Greek governments, who as poorer members were worried that
strict environmental standards would hamper their economic growth. Areas of industrial
decline, a major focus of the EU's regional policy, face severe pollution problems. The
temptation to use them as “pollution zones” by the member states had to be resisted by
regional restructuring plans.33
The principle of subsidiarity, contained in Article 130r, created the most controversy
due to its vagueness. Under the principle the EU should take action only if the desired result
could more efficiently be attained at the EU rather than the local level. Since the Danish
referendum in 1992 this principle has achieved great prominence without having any
functional definition. Which level is most efficient, the EU or local level, is only known after
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one or the other has been tried, which of course is too late. In practice the subsidiarity
principle hampered the speed of debate and made it more difficult for consensus to be
achieved.
Members were allowed to adopt stricter measures within their own national
legislation34 so long as they did not violate treaty provisions. States such as Denmark,
Germany and the Netherlands, which have relatively strict national environmental standards,
did not want their standards watered down by EU compromises. The possibility of adopting
stricter national standards or measures by individual member states35 was criticized as
creating a Europe of different speeds. But in reality, the SEA only legitimized what was
already a reality in secondary environmental legislation. One example of this is the large
combustion plant directive that set different reduction targets for sulphur dioxide and nitrogen
oxide emissions from fossil-burning power stations and other large combustion plants across
the E U .36
The scope of Article 100a of the Treaty of Rome was widened for several reasons.
The European Parliament favored its use because it guaranteed it a stronger role via the
“cooperation procedure.” It gave the Commission a more active role in initiating legislation as
qualified majority voting increased the likelihood of quicker action. The European Court of
Justice significantly extended the scope of Article 100a in a controversial benchmark decision
in 1989 regarding the titanium dioxide industry.37 The court upheld the right of the
Commission to seek a reduction in pollution from the industry under Article 100a because
environmental protection is sometimes an indivisible component of other policies. The
principle that environmental protection requirements be a part of the other EU policies was
strengthened.
The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty, 1992)38 further extended the EU’s
environmental powers.

39

But it did not herald radical change or resolve all the ambiguities

contained within the Single European Act. Under Maastricht "sustainable and noninflationary growth respecting the environment" (a rather complex and watered down version
of the term "sustainable development") became an explicit aim.40 The “non-inflationary
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growth” language was significant in that it reflected the importance of economic stability, a
central element needed for the success of the proposed monetary union, as inflationary
policies on behalf of one member would have direct negative consequences for others.
Environmental policy was listed as a common task.41 Subsidiarity was removed from the
environmental chapter and given its own separate chapter providing it with more political
weight.42 Qualified majority voting became, with few exceptions, the rule in environmental
matters.43 The Treaty also added the precautionary principle44 as a direct aim of policy.45
This, the Maastricht Treaty reaffirmed the integration of environmental protection
requirements into all policy. Qualified majority voting in the Council coupled with the
cooperation procedure became standard decision-making procedures. However, unanimity
will still required for measures primarily of a fiscal nature (environmental taxes), those relating
to town and country planning, and those affecting the management of water resources or the
choice of energy supply. The new co-decision procedure, which extended the power of the
Parliament and the Commission, was required for the adoption of all internal market
measures. In this manner the Parliament and Commission were granted equality with the
Council in terms of setting the environmental agenda. No longer would the Council be able to
act without reference to the input of the other bodies of the Union. The Parliament acted in
this manner with regard to vehicle emissions, which resulted in the widespread use of
catalytic converters.
The fifth program (1993-2000) was entitled "towards sustainability" and constituted in
the words of the Commission: "a turning point for the Community.... It provides a framework
for a new approach to the environment and to economic and social activity and development,
and requires positive will at all levels to the political and corporate spectrums, and the
involvement of all members of the public active as citizens and consumers in order to make it
work."46 The fifth action program stressed that actors at all levels should be involved in the
process but lacked specific proposals despite providing a number of examples of areas of
shared responsibility.47
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The fifth program was a departure from its predecessors via its focus on specific
activities and sectors rather than on traditional environmental elements or receptors of
pollution such as land, air, and water. In shifting to the source of pollution it designated five
targeted areas (industry, energy, transport, agriculture, and tourism) it expected to regulate
through the application of the most efficient and unified approach.48 In outlining long-term
objectives and setting certain performance targets, the fifth program was a step towards
integrated pollution control. However, it remained largely ill defined: the discussion of
priorities was only a meager half-page of a ninety-eight page document, which was hard to
justify when considering the implication of the new sustainable development strategy 49
Concurrent with the extension and solidification of the EU’s control over environmental policy
was a new adherence to monitoring implementation by each member state.
Implementation of EU Environmental Policy
Discussion regarding EU policy implementation during its early years has been
limited. The first book published on EU policy did not even discuss implementation,50 and the
first sustained discussion of implementation of EU legislation in any one country did not
appear until 1984.51 The lack of focus regarding implementation was indicative of the
Commission’s preoccupation with drafting new legislation. The Commission assumed that
directives were being implemented by member states. This assumption was challenged by a
sensational incident in 1983 that brought worldwide media attention to bear. Drums of
hazardous wastes (dioxin) originating from Seveso near Milan were “lost" then later “found” in
Northern France. The incident initiated calls for action by the media and the European
Parliament appointed a Committee of Inquiry to investigate implementation of the EU’s 1978
directive on toxic waste. The investigation led Parliament to censure the Commission for
failure to protect the Treaties and ensure member states compliance.52
As one might imagine, implementation immediately became a more important
concern for the Commission. The staff of the Environment Directorate General XI was
expanded to handle the ever-increasing tasks of preparing new legislation, and the follow-up
task of monitoring implementation. Dr. Ludwig Kramer was appointed to lead the Directorate.
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His vigor in recommending that member states be brought before the European Court of
Justice over non-compliance brought greater attention to the cause of implementation. His
victories before the Court ensured the supranational status of environmental policy. As the
size and stature of the directorate rose within the Commission it gained the respect and
experience necessary to make decisions affecting the interests of other Directorates and
member state governments.
In 1989, the EU appointed Italian socialist Carlo Ripa di Meana as Environment
Commissioner. Ripa di Meana was a flamboyant and outspoken personality. He pushed for
further action and publicly criticized those states that failed to meet implementation
requirements. This was a fundamental shift in operational style; previously, such discussions
were held privately and internally within the Commission. Ripa di Meana strongly supported
Kramer’s view that the law should become the active instrument in environmental battles.
Questions of environmental regulations should be resolved before a court, not as in the past
through more negotiation. He agreed with Kramer that current law was insufficient and he
was unwilling to allow political considerations to reduce the scope of environmental action.
He believed that directives should be broadly interpreted and enforced to maximize benefits
to the environment. The Environmental Directorate General (DG XI) role was to act on behalf
of current and future generations who lacked the resources, information, and representation
to check the machinations of governments and other vested interests.53
Ripa di Meana also wanted to raise his own stature within the Commission. Having
lived in London, he was aware of Britain’s sensitivity to environmental issues and the
perception of other member states that she was not complying with EU directives. Attacking
British “failures” garnered the media attention he sought even if it was bound to create
conflict. Ironically, one of the reasons Ripa di Meana was able to attack Britain so well was
because she was one of the few nations who regularly sent pollution data to the Commission.
The validity of the perception is arguable. Britain was no worse, and in many cases was
much better at implementation than other member states. The misperception resulted from
Britain's reluctance to agree to new environmental policy in its formulation stage. Britain took
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the pragmatic attitude during this time not to agree to anything that could not be readily
implemented, thereby avoiding the possibility of sanctions and preserving her own scope for
national action. Unfortunately this stance was viewed as obstructionist by the other member
states, who wanted to be seen taking action in this crucial policy sector. In contrast, Italy
readily agreed to new policies, garnering support for doing so amongst the other member
states, even when she had no hope of achieving implementation.
In many ways Britain became caught in the evolving nature and legal expansion of
EU environmental policy. When Britain joined in 1973, EU environmental policy formation
was in its infancy and was not of particular concern, as she felt reassured by her own
legislative record. But as the numbers and pervasiveness of EU environmental policies grew,
she found that she no longer controlled the intricacies of her own pollution standards. The
growth of the Environment Directorate General’s power within the Commission, coupled with
aggressive leadership, fundamentally presented Britain with a political challenge that would
both influence her stature within the community and force changes in her pollution control
practices at home.
EU Environmental Water Directives and Britain
Member states' institutions are bound to act in conformity with the binding rules laid
down in EU law. This obligation is derived from Article 189 EC that stipulates that a
regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all member states.
Similarly directives are also binding as to the results to be achieved, upon each member state
to which they are addressed. Implementation of regulations and directives refers to the
process of integrating EU principles into member states’ national law. This process transfers
rights and duties contained in EU law to the individual member states’ legal systems, where it
becomes reliable for individuals to use in court. This fulfills the legal obligation upon member
states to give effect to EU law. Full and accurate transposition would create uniform law
throughout the EU, one of the overall goals of integration.
W ater pollution was one of the first concerns of initial EU environmental policy, with
several important legislative developments occurring between 1975 and 1980. Directive
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75/440/EEC initiated requirements to ensure that surface freshwater used for drinking water
met certain standards and received adequate treatment before being transferred into public
supply networks. Directive 80/778/EEC initiated standards for the quality of water intended
for human consumption, both directly and after processing. It had the dual purpose of
promoting free circulation of goods in the EU, for example bottled water, and protecting
human health and improving the environment. Directive 80/68/EEC provided protection of
groundwater from pollution by dangerous substances, including agricultural pesticides.
Member states were charged with monitoring compliance with the conditions of authorization
and the effects of discharges on groundwater. Additionally, they were to maintain inventories
of authorizations and supply the EU with information regarding them at its request.
The primary legislation regarding the quality of bathing waters was set in directive
76/160/EEC, which now applies to over 10,000 bathing areas across the EU. The directive
specifies nineteen physical, chemical, and microbiological parameters for the quality of
bathing waters (fresh or seawater) and established a system of monitoring bathing water
quality by the member states. In addition to the bathing water and drinking water directives,
the directive on the discharge of dangerous substances into water (76/565/EEC) was passed
as part of this early phase of legislation.
Nigel Haigh has pointed out that these early directives adopted different systems of
standards for the control of pollution.54 The bathing water directive is a water quality standard,
setting maximum concentrations for nineteen physical, chemical, and microbiological
standards. In contrast, the drinking water directive was based on an exposure standard,
setting parameter values (maximum allowable concentration and minimum required
concentrations) for specified substances. The directive on the discharge of dangerous
substances into water allowed member states to choose between two different types of
standards; one that is set in reference to emission values or one set in reference to water
quality. The choice in regard to this directive arose from the desire by Britain, at the time of
drafting, to utilize its own traditional approach to the consenting of water pollution.
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The majority of difficulties that the Commission would later cause member states,
including Britain, in the late 1980s and early 1990s stemmed from implementation of these
early directives. Directive 80/68/EEC was the subject of numerous violations by Belgium, the
Netherlands, Italy, and Germany55 Implementation of the bathing water directive took
between two and eight years, and Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, and Britain were all
condemned by the Court of Justice for compliance failures. In light of this, it is striking that
there is little evidence on how the bathing water standards were formulated. It is also notable
that the committee established by the directive had not met by the time of a House of
Commons inquiry into bathing water policy in 1989/90, so the outstanding technical questions
about the standard were not addressed.56
The approach employed in the dangerous substance directive gave rise to a number
of problems. Even today this early legislation proves highly controversial, and EU water
policy is still dominated by complex debates over the essence of the regulatory approaches
taken in these original directives. For example, under the original directive a number of
“daughter” directives were ultimately enacted which focused on substance reduction, setting
strict limit values. Lists of dangerous chemicals were created based on priority and impact on
human health. "Black list" chemicals were the most dangerous (generally, heavy metals
[mercury and lead] and organochlorides), while a "grey list" covered those substances whose
health effect was thought dangerous but not yet scientifically proven. In practice it is difficult
to draw such distinctions and several member states, most loudly Britain, protested that the
directive was not based on a serious scientific calculation of risk. They objected to incurring
the costs associated with such limits when the scientific evidence proving the public health
threat was lacking.
Few member states have successfully implemented all of the demands made by the
dangerous substance directive, in particular the demand under article 7, which required
member states to go beyond simple discharge control and stabilization via emission limits,
relying on best available technology notices: instead, they should ameliorate any waters
damaged by dangerous substances. Even Germany, which had originally supported the
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directive, had to face court sanctions from the Commission by 1996, on the grounds that its
authorization system did not cover diffuse sources of dangerous substances in water, such
as those deriving from agriculture.
The drinking water standard was set in reference to standards promulgated by the
World Health Organization (WHO). Yet these standards produced controversy, as they did
not simply replicate those set by the WHO, but instead went much further. For example,
Britain argued for a more lenient standard for lead than that proposed as a maximum
allowable concentration, since the proposed value (50 ug/l) was half the WHO recommended
value.57 Britain has special difficulty with this standard due to the antiquated nature of the
majority of her water infrastructure and the wide-scale use of lead pipes in its existing
housing, which resulted in higher levels of lead than normal. A second example of how
politically charged and complex implementation of EU directives has proven relates to
pesticides in water. The British and Italian governments believed that the stringent maximum
allowable concentrations were far too strict and were, in effect, a surrogate zero.
Consequently, both nations’ policy was to disregard the limits.
The pesticide standard set in the drinking water directive can be interpreted as a
strict application of the precautionary principle. The directive was not based on a
toxicological scientific basis, but rather on whether one could measure and detect pesticides
in water. The position of EU law at the time was to place a general prohibition on levels of
pesticides wherever they could be detected. This did not coincide with WHO guidelines,
which set various levels above 0.1 ug/l, for example 1.7 ug/l for atrizine, a pesticide causing
severe pollution incidents in Italy by the mid 1980s. As a result, the Italian government
attempted to pass decrees based on the WHO standards rather than those of the EU,
arguing that they were more realistic. Equally, in 1986 the British Department of Environment
ordered water authorities to ignore the EU standards set out in 1980, suggesting that they
were unworkable, and instead issued guidelines based on WHO and domestic toxicological
data.58
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From its entrance to the EU, British governmental officials and policy-makers have
questioned the EU's approach to pollution control. For example, when the Commission first
published proposals for a directive on bathing waters in 1975, the debate in the European
Parliament revolved entirely around amendments deriving from British MEPs. The relevant
House of Lords select committee thought the standard so undefined as to be virtually
unenforceable. Expert opinion in Britain tended to support this view.59
It is perhaps as a result of these beliefs that the British track record on full
implementation of EU water directives, whether on bathing or drinking water, was less than
perfect. However, a number of other reasons can be cited to account for this implementation
deficit.
First, transposition was attempted initially via purely administrative means, employing
departmental circulars that failed to create specific legal rights or have the transparency of
legal instruments. A classic example of this was directive 80/778/EEC, which had to wait
nine years until the adoption of the 1989 Water Act to find a legal parent.60
Second, Britain lacked modern domestic law that would act as an adequate platform
for legally transposing the directives. It was not until 1996 that proper legal regulations were
introduced that formally transposed directive 75/440/EEC, which was slated to come into
force in 1977.61 Britain eventually achieved in 1989 the type of modern water pollution
legislation that most other countries had in the mid-1980s. Prior to this, there actually were
no “recognized legal means” for setting statutory water quality standards.62 While the
Secretary of State for the Environment was charged with setting such standards, differences
of opinion between Britain and her EU partners over uniform emission standards prevented
their promulgation. The 1989 Water Act included such standards which ended the
controversy. Even after this legislation was enacted, implementation delays continued to
hamper British performance.
An obvious reason for this attitude affecting the British-EU water policy relationship
was the privatization of the water industry by the Conservative government. In their original
version these plans even attempted to create private regulatory agencies. The dynamics of
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privatization meant that politically the Thatcher ministry of the late 1980s did not want to
agree to any legislation that would increase environmental standards and demand costly
investment for the new private companies they were hoping to form. Such long-term
investment needs would have made them particularly unattractive as investment
opportunities for the European marketplace. On the other hand, industrial and financial
interests dislike uncertainty and preferred that the outstanding disputes between Britain and
the Commission be resolved to provide for predictability and stability.

63

Third, even when directives did demand more concrete action, as with the bathing
water directive's demand that bathing beaches be designated and monitored, British footdragging and regulatory minimalism were evident. As a result, famous beaches like
Blackpool and Brighton were left conspicuously undesignated, while Scotland was deemed to
have no bathing beaches worthy of designation.64
In examining the bathing water directive, several features of the difficulties between
Britain and the EU are evident, including disagreements over technical questions, the
definition of what constituted a bathing beach and the discretion left to national governments
by the directive.65
The directive listed nineteen parameters for physical, chemical and microbiological
quality, some of which required mandatory compliance while others were intended as
guidelines. The two key parameters were for total and fecal coliform bacteria. It resides in
the human organism and its presence in water indicates contamination by sewage. Bathing
beaches that were to fall under the scope of the directive were to be designated by national
governments. They were to designate those areas where bathing was traditionally practiced
by large numbers of people. Member states were charged with organizing the necessary
monitoring of water quality to obtain a suitable number of measurements to assess
compliance throughout the bathing season. The number of beaches identified by this
directive could be increased annually.
The designation of bathing beaches was to cause difficulties for the British
government. When the directive first came into force in 1977 the British government only
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identified 27 beaches not including such obvious resort communities as Blackpool and
Brighton. Britain, which at the time had the longest coastline of any member state, was
obviously not fully disclosing the true number of beaches that required monitoring. The
British government defended this position by arguing that while many beaches existed, little
bathing actually occurred. Therefore, they had acted in accordance with the directive in
regards to how it had been written (ie, areas where bathing was traditionally practiced by
large numbers of people).
The Commission expressed disquiet over this result that ultimately led to a
"Reasoned Opinion” being issued in 1980. Britain was condemned for not taking the
necessary steps to implement the directive. The Commission announced that it was not
satisfied with the British interpretation of bathing waters and would enter into discussions with
the government to alter the situation. The Commission also threatened to initiate
infringement proceedings over the issue, a threat that ultimately helped change the British
attitude towards designation.
However, no change would occur until 1987 when continuous EU pressure forced the
Thatcher government to designate several hundred additional beaches. By 1992, some 416
beaches were so designated. The timing of the British decision was obviously linked to
domestic changes in Britain. By 1987, plans for the privatization of the British water industry
were well underway. Conforming to the directive (and several others) was important if the
future costs associated with meeting EU directives were to be adequately accounted for by
the new private water companies. In this sense, it was part of a larger clearing of the decks
of unresolved issues pertaining to the water environment between Britain and the EU that
helped resolve the designation issue.
Britain acted in this manner for several reasons. First, it believed it had the right to
interpret the directive as it saw fit, regardless of the view of the Commission, a view that
would ultimately be overturned by the decisions of the European Court of Justice. It also took
the position during its early years of membership in the EU that its existing water authorities’
investment priorities should not be distorted by its international commitments nor the desires
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of local resort communities who were acting out of their promotional interests. Considering
the range of investments needed, protecting the relatively few bathers as opposed to
protecting the drinking water supply of the entire community could not be justified. Haigh has
argued that in the case of Blackpool, which should have been designated under any definition
of a beach, the costs associated with compliance would have ranged from 10 to 50 million
pounds.66 Haigh also points out that Britain was unwilling to go before the Court of Justice,
which would have had to interpret a vague definition. However, it was clear to all in Britain,
based on the level of criticism, that the spirit of the directive was not being fulfilled. When it
did expand the number of beaches, the government found itself with the problem of how to
meet the standards contained in the directive. It was estimated that several years would be
required to meet the quality standards specified in the directive for all beaches. While
continual progress has been forthcoming it illustrates the extent of improvements necessary
for British infrastructure to meet EU requirements.
The Power of the Court of Justice
The unique power of the European Court of Justice in the integration process is
central to understanding events in Britain regarding water during this later period. The threat
of adverse court verdicts helped both the British government and the private companies they
would potentially affect focus on improving the relationship between the EU and Britain.
Given the general level of difficulties between the government and the EU over compliance
with water directives between 1973 and the late 1980s a new approach was required.
Towards the end of the 1980s, therefore, British approaches to EU water directives became
distinctly conciliatory, and the early period of deliberate slowness and open conflict was
replaced by a period of direct negotiation with the Commission.67 For example, in 1987 the
British dramatically reversed course and conceded they had under-designated bathing waters
and promptly identified several hundred additional areas.68 As an example of a political
strategy to prevent official sanction, the change was not effective. The Commission pushed
ahead with legal action against Britain and scored its first victory in 1993 over non
implementation of an environmental directive related to directive 80/778/EEC, relating to
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water for human consumption.69 As an example of recognition of the EU's primacy in the
environmental field, the effort has proved successful. Despite the power of the nation states
in the policy formulation and implementation process, the rule of EU law and its working style
are political realities that impinge on national autonomy and should not be considered mere
legal fictions. This reality has impacted both the nature of Britain's relationship to the Union
as well as her domestic policy agenda in regards to the transposition of EU legislation, both in
terms of her national legal system and through successful practical implication on the ground.
In the context of environmental law, implementing environmental directives includes
two obligations, a basic obligation to transpose directives into national legislation and a duty
to bring about beneficial changes in the physical environment as defined by individual
directives. Between 1973 and the late 1980s, Britain did not comply with the first obligation,
believing it sufficient to transpose directives through administrative regulations. Given the
British difficulties in implementing EU environmental directives, such an attitude was
insufficient. The Commission defined or reasserted the extent of that obligation when it
placed Britain before the Court of Justice in Case C-337/89: Commission v United Kingdom.70
Here the court held that both obligations applied, in this case to transpose into national law,
through legislation, the drinking water directive's requirements and to bring about physical
changes to the environment.
The Court of Justice had previously developed general criteria for determining
whether a directive had been fully implemented by a member state. For example,
administrative measures such as circulars were deemed inadequate as a means of
transposing directives.71 A strong stance on this obligation was taken in a German case when
the Court of Justice upheld a complaint that Germany had failed to secure legislative
implementation of EU directives on air quality. Rejecting the defense that German legislation
already conformed to the directives, the Court pointed out that implementation required
member states to set in place specific legal frameworks relevant to the directive's subject
matter to enable individuals to recognize clearly their rights and obligations under EU law.
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In the environmental sector EU directives are rarely transposed into national law
within the timeframe prescribed, leaving member states open to sanction. When directives
are implemented the national laws are frequently defective in either form or content in
regards to the specifics established in the directives. The rate for practical implementation on
the ground is even lower, as is evident in EU and member state reports and the proportion of
cases for practical infringement brought before the Court of Justice. For example, at the end
of 1990, 218 out of the 371 proceedings brought by the Commission before the Court were
for lack of effective application of EU law. In Britain, these issues were elaborated by the
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities which attributed the
implementation problems associated with environmental directives to several factors:
difficulties in drafting Union legislation in this area, the process of negotiation and adoption in
the Council, and the differing styles and techniques of national legislation.72
The relatively high rate of non-implementation or incorrect implementation can be
attributed to the specific problems posed by environmental protection. First, since natural
processes are not yet completely understood scientifically, the obligation to physically
improve the environment is difficult to fulfill. Second, there is a lack of reliable information on
the state of the environment and considerable variation in sampling techniques among
member states, making comparative analysis difficult if not impossible. Additionally, many
directives confer discretionary powers on member states that raise the question of whether
the exercise of such powers constitutes a failure to implement a directive in practice. This is
best illustrated by directive 85/337/EEC, which called for environmental assessments to be
completed on new construction projects. The directive gave discretion to member states to
determine appropriate criteria and thresholds to determine which projects should be
subjected to environmental assessments. This created a great furor in the EU when Britain,
employing that discretion, did not employ environmental assessments for several new
highway projects, which in other member states would have been mandatory.
The poor implementation record for directives with this type of discretion built into
them can explain why member states have resorted to "selective application" of Union law to
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avoid the costs of closer integration. Environmental legislation has proven discreet enough
for some member states to discount it in this manner. This practice was also encouraged by
the extension of qualified majority voting within the Council under the SEA for most
environmental protection measures, whereby member states found themselves obliged to
implement policies which they opposed. This problem was foreseen and a Declaration was
annexed to the Treaty on European Union that indicated that each member state had to fully
and accurately transpose into national law the directives of the Union within the prescribed
timeframes. But in a very practical sense, the Declaration only illustrates the larger problem
of the EU taking action without achieving the type of consensus that marked its earlier
history. Implementation problems may also be symptomatic of continuing doubts over the
Union's competence to legislate in the environmental area even though member states
formally transferred legislative powers on environmental matters to the Union under the
Single European Act. EU legal capacity has become compromised in practice by member
state resistance and the increasing use of the subsidiarity principle in environmental matters.
The procedure for charging non-implementation requires filing a complaint with the
Commission under Articles 169 and 170 of the EC Treaty. Any member state or citizen of a
member state to may complain to the Commission on the grounds that the Union provisions
have not been applied or have been incorrectly applied. Following investigation the
Commission may refer maters to the Court of Justice if in its opinion the complaint is
warranted. Successful enforcement actions brought before the Court include one against
Britain for failure to fully implement directive 778/80/EEC on the quality of drinking water.73
This directive, adopted in 1980, was set for implementation in member states’ laws by 1982,
and was to have produced the desired effects to the physical environment by 1985.
However, even by 1989 the maximum allowable concentration of nitrate specified in the
directive was exceeded in 28 supply zones in Britain, each supplying approximately 10,000
people.
The enforcement procedure itself is inherently reactive as it relies on complaints
being brought before the Commission by pressure groups and members of the public. In the
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case above the charge was brought by Mr. Andrew Lees and Friends of the Earth. These
cannot reasonably be filed until the timeframes specified in the directive are exceeded. As
such, it is a very slow process, which creates significant problems in cases of irreversible
environmental damage. The procedure is also weak in that it is premised upon member
states' cooperation. Until relatively recently, under an amendment to the Treaty on European
Union, the only sanction available to the Court was political pressure in the form of an order
to the state to fulfill its Treaty obligations. Currently, in the event of continued infringement,
the Commission may refer the matter back to the Court with a penalty recommendation,
usually a fine.74 However as these fines are much less than the costs of compliance, they do
not amount to an economic rationale for the member state to act.
The legal response to a particular problem, for example nitrate in water from farming,
helps to illustrate the difficulties of implementing EU environmental directives in Britain. In
contrast to the broad and integrated approach laid out in the environmental assessment
directive, the directive on nitrate in water from farming was formulated to address a single
substance in a single medium deriving from one sector of the economy. The response to the
nitrate problem also illustrates the dynamic relationship between EU and British
environmental law. This is a special concern in the Thames Valley where pesticide runoff
has become a persistent problem in maintaining water quality.
Nitrate is naturally present in soil and is essential for plant growth. When crops are
harvested the nitrate used during their growth is removed from the soil; to maintain a soil's
fertility it must be replaced, either through application of inorganic fertilizer, fertilizer in the
form of farmyard manure, or through the rotation of nitrogen-fixing crops such as legumes. At
simple replacement levels, application from either form of nitrate is essential to maintain soil
fertility and crop yields. Less fertile marginal soils may be enhanced if high concentrations
are applied. Employing marginal soils in agriculture has dramatically altered rural Britain
since the 1940s and has enabled farmers to grow grain on an unprecedented scale both for
her own needs and for export.
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When more nitrate exists in soils than is used for plant growth, rainwater may wash
excess nitrate away, either through the soil via percolation to the groundwater or as runoff to
the nearest stream or river. Nitrate from farming may thus end up almost anywhere within a
particular water catchment area. Soils themselves have a variety of characteristics that either
hinder or further the percolation process. In some soils, such as chalk (widespread in Britain),
soil particles are very small and water percolates slowly downward to the underground
aquifer. Depending on the mix of soils this process may take decades. Conversely, sandy
soils have larger particles and percolation to an underground aquifer is consequently much
faster. Natural manure, the waste of plants from animals, has high concentrations of nitrate.
Subsequently, rain failing on farmyards may cause pollution by carrying nitrate to streams or
into plowed fields where it then percolates into aquifers or runs off. Cultivation of soil also
releases nitrate that was formerly fixed, so if grasslands are plowed there is often excess
nitrate in the soil than is needed for crop growth.
Therefore, for agricultural purposes, the application of some nitrate is essential, but
too much may produce a potential for water pollution and threats to human health. Excessive
loads of nitrate on drinking water may be associated with risks to human health in the form of
"blue baby" syndrome and stomach cancer. The World Health Organization (W HO) set
guidelines for nitrates to safeguard human health on the assumption of life-long consumption.
They are intended for use as a basis for the development of standards, which, if properly
implemented, ensure the safety of drinking water supplies. When guidelines are exceeded, it
is a signal to countries to investigate the causes with a view toward remedial action to
safeguard human health. There are two standards employed by WHO, a stricter one that
should only be exceeded under exceptional circumstances; and a lower one used as a target
for nations to set their own standards.75
Nitrate also impacts its receiving waters. Too much nitrate can cause waters to
become eutrophic or over-enriched, producing excessive plant growth. When this occurs the
oxygen available in water is depleted at higher rates making it difficult for other forms of life,
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particularly fish, to survive, It may also produce a blanket of weeds that may cover mud flats
to such an extent birds cannot feed on the worms and shrimps that live in the mud.
The problem of nitrate in water from farming has proved more complex than originally
thought when the EU directive was first formulated. The directive itself was an early example
of the use of the precautionary principle. In formulating the directive the Commission did not
wait for conclusive scientific evidence on the health effects of nitrates and instead assumed
that the risk was real and should be limited. The EU justified this position by the fact that
humans have to drink water to survive and normal consumption of green vegetables already
exposed Europeans to considerable levels of nitrate consumption. The complexity of the
problem stemmed from the uncertainties associated with nitrates’ human health impact, their
behavior in soil and water, and the social organization of farming.
Compared with manufacturing, where concentrations of pollution are generally limited
to cities, and to a specific industry such as chemical manufacturing, which in turn limits
concentrations to a few specific locations, farming is widely dispersed on land which is held in
private ownership. However, the dispersal of farms is only part of the problem of pollution
control. The social relationships between farmers and the state, has made the problem even
more complex.
Despite Britain's century-long history of water legislation, the legal standard remained
that of "wholesome" until relatively recently. The W ater Supply (Water Quality) Regulations
1989, passed under section 52 of the Water Act 1989 (reformulated in the Water Resources
Act 1991 to comply with directive 80/778/EEC), defined water quality scientifically for the first
time. The Act set quantifiable limits not to be exceeded for an entire list of substances,
including nitrate.
The general criminal offence of causing or knowingly permitting water pollution is
contained in section 85(1) of the Water Resources Act 1991. Such law is by its nature
reactive in that it is only applied after pollution has occurred. Another limitation is that the law
is narrowly focused on causation: a discreet incident must be found to have caused the
pollution and an identifiable person must be found responsible for the incident. Nitrate
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pollution of water simply does not fit into this scheme of law since the harm may have
accumulated over several years from a variety of sources and many of the responsible
persons may be untraceable by the time the harm becomes measurable.
In 1980 the EU issued directive 80/778/EEC on the quality of water intended for
human consumption that set standards for drinking water at permitted levels of specified
substances. Acting on the WHO guidelines for nitrate levels in drinking water, the EU set a
limit of 50 mg/l (the WHO target level rather than the safe level of 100 mg/l), with a guide
level of 25 mg/l. It has been argued, particularly by the National Farmers Union, that the EU
level is arbitrary and there is no justification for halving the WHO limits. However, this did not
hold because the WHO revised its levels in 1984 to 45 mg/l and 15 mg/l to take account of
the importance of green vegetables in the European diet.76
When the directive first came into force in 1985 Britain sought a derogation under
Article 9(1) which allows for exemptions in order to take account of "situations arising from
the nature and structure of the ground in the area from which the supply in question
emanates." “Friends of the Earth” complained to the Commission that Britain had failed to
implement the directive that formed the basis for EU action.
In 1987 the Commission began formal proceedings under Article 169 of the EC
Treaty against Britain for failure to implement the drinking water directive in its domestic
legislation and for failure to apply the directive correctly. The British government argued that
there was nothing else it could possibly do to secure the required water quality and it should
not be held liable for the actions of third parties, in this case the privatized water companies.
In 1988, on advice from the Department of Environmental legal staff that it would lose
the case in the Court of Justice, the government announced that existing dispensations
allowing water undertakers to continue supplying water above the 50 mg/l limit were being
withdrawn. This effectively conceded the argument to the EU and required the
implementation of the EU standard.
As anticipated, in January 1992, the Court of Justice, following the Advocate
General's Opinion, issued an opinion that Britain had failed to fulfill its obligations under the
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EC Treaty by not complying with the nitrate limit in the drinking water directive. The Court
ruled that Britain had failed to ensure the quality of water supplies in 28 areas in England
(Thames and East Anglia regions). In finding against Britain, the Court gave a clear signal
that the quality standards of the directive must be satisfied. This decision reiterated the
supremacy of EU law in regards to the environment.
Prior to the official Court decision, the British government under John Major reversed
course and began to take a more proactive stance in regards to EU water quality directives.
This was part of a systematic effort by Major, a supporter of the EU, to take a different
direction from the past twenty years and begin to address relevant issues between Britain
and the EU to help strengthen British membership. This was important if Britain was to
continue to play a large role in EU affairs in other sectors than the environment. Directive
76/464/EEC on dangerous substances in water had a fundamental impact in Britain because
the government had to formalize its systems of quality objectives for receiving waters. As
previously mentioned, this was first done via governmental circulars, but the Commission was
not satisfied with this action as an implementation measure as it did not spell them out in law.
Britain was not the only member state employing circulars, and the issue was finally settled in
1988 when the Court of Justice ruled in Case C-361/88: Commission v. Germany, that a
change in domestic law was required for formal implementation of EU law, since
administrative measures were felt to be too flexible. As a result of this case, statutory water
objectives were therefore introduced in sections 104 and 105 of the Water Act 1989, and are
now contained in sections 82 and 83 of the W ater Resources Act 1991, the current British
legislation. Section 84 of the Act required that when the Environment Agency (EA) (the
successor regulatory body of the National River Authority) issues discharge consents it must
ensure compliance with these statutory objectives.
Several proactive measures to prevent pollution occurring at source were enacted in
the Water Act 1989 and were now re-enacted in the Water Resources Act 1991. These
included the provision of information, measures to encourage good storage practices, the
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designation of nitrate vulnerable zones and nitrate sensitive areas, and the formulation of a
code of good agricultural practice.
It was first thought that the nitrate problem in Britain was caused by over-enthusiastic
application of inorganic fertilizers onto arable land. While this is part of the problem, it
became clear that manure spreading was the source of the majority of the pollution. This has
added greatly to the complexity of the problem of controlling nitrate applications because it is
difficult to establish the concentration of nitrate in a given load of manure. Consequently if
spreading manure must be limited, then it must also be stored and disposed of adequately.
Most dairy and hog operations do not have adequate manure storage facilities nor do they
have the means for disposal. The realization that natural manure was the real problem
challenged the popular view held by those not involved in agriculture that the artificiality of
inorganic fertilizers was the main source of the problem; nothing can be more "natural" than
manure. What is unnatural is the size of modem hog and cattle operations, which produced
unprecedented concentrations of natural manure.
Under the 1974 COPA, farmers were provided with a defense against prosecution if
they polluted a stream or river where the pollution was attributed to an act of omission that
was in accordance with good agricultural practice. However, no farmer ever applied for
protection under the act up to the time it was modified by the Water Resources Act 1991.
Section 202 of the Water Resources Act empowered the EA to request information
that could assist in the prevention of water pollution. The section allowed the EA to operate
in an advisory capacity, with the hope of establishing cooperative relationships with farmers,
so that potential problems could be discussed early and measures taken to prevent water
pollution. Such measures were diverse, ranging from avoidance of spreading manure near a
watercourse to the installation of large and expensive storage facilities.77 Section 86 of the
Water Resources Act also gave the EA power to prohibit discharges from a building or any
other fixed plant. While potentially useful in some cases, this provision would not apply to
farm waste disposal systems such as mobile slurry spreaders.
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Prior to the 1989 Act, agriculture accounted for approximately twelve percent of
reported pollution incidents, but these were considered only a fraction of those actually
occurring.78 Eighty-seven percent of all reported farm pollution incidents were due to organic
wastes.79

Oil accounted for another 3 percent. Section 92 of the W ater Resources Act

provided for the setting of minimum standards for keeping and handling silage, slurry, and
agricultural fuel on new or altered facilities. Most existing facilities were exempt but the EA
was given the power to serve notice, requiring improvements if the agency believed a
pollution threat existed. Failure to abide by the notice was a criminal offense. The central
offense in this case is not for causing pollution but rather for failing to take precautions to
prevent it. If an offender did not comply with the notice the EA was also given the power to
take independent action and bill the offender. This is a very powerful measure that could be
used if a farmer did not comply with the regulations. However, it is only useful for point
sources such as slurry tanks, and crucially, it assumed a financially solvent farmer. The law’s
concentration on the adequacy of storage facilities has resulted in great expense, arguably
without solving the problem.
Section 93 of the act gave the Secretary of State for the Environment powers to
designate water protection zones after consulting with the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food. In effect a local water pollution law operated within each zone, with the EA
prohibiting or restricting activities that were likely to pollute water, with criminal sanctions for
breaches. This first appeared as a power under the 1974 COPA but was never employed. It
was carried over into the 1989 W ater Act and the subsequent 1991 Act. This measure is
particularly useful in protecting groundwater from diffuse pollution such as pesticides and
fertilizers. A limitation was that the powers were restrictive or prohibitive only and did not
include the power to require positive works to be carried out which may be necessary to meet
EU standards.
While still in the EU legislative pipeline, directive 91/676/EEC on nitrate from
agricultural sources prompted an inclusion in the Water Act 1989 of a provision to prevent
nitrate pollution via the designation of Nitrate Sensitive Areas (NSAs) in which farming could
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be modified to prevent the leaching of nitrate. An area was generally designated as a nitrate
sensitive area if it formed the catchment area for a water supply. Section 112 of the Water
Act 1989 and currently, sections 94 and 95 of the Water Resources Act 1991, provided
powers to the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Secretary of State for the
Environment to designate these areas. Following an application by the EA these bodies may
jointly designate areas to prevent or control entry of nitrate into controlled waters as a result
of anything done in connection with, or use of, any land for agricultural purposes.
Different legal tools were employed as deemed appropriate to the problem. In the
NSAs, this has involved a voluntary contract in the form of a management agreement
between the Minister of Agriculture and the farmer. If this fails to meet the objective, powers
exist to make the arrangement compulsory and to resort to additional criminal sanctions,
generally in the form of fines.
A farmer may apply to the Minister to join such a contract and a voluntary
management agreement is then entered into whereby the farmer receives payment for the
agreement of the curtailment of practices (such as the spreading of manure) that may cause
pollution (Conservative Party Compensation Rule). Terms are set out in Nitrate Sensitive
Areas Designation Orders.80 The agreement allows the Minister to monitor compliance with
the terms or to assess its effectiveness by going onto the land, installing equipment, taking
samples and examining records. If a farmer fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with
any of the provisions of an agreement the Minister may terminate it and recover the whole or
any part of any payment already made. The payments vary both from area to area and
between options, according to how onerous the agreement obligations.
The proactive element of the NSAs is the protection of designated land and the
powers of the appropriate Ministers to act to protect water. Pollution is taken to be at, or
above the 50 mg/l level set for nitrate in the 80/778/EEC directive. The EA has a duty to
identify both the controlled waters that may be threatened by nitrate and the land area in
which agricultural practices require modification to prevent pollution. Specification of land
use is an innovation in legal terms. The power to require positive acts by farmers, such as

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

240

the planting of cover crops in autumn, is clearly invasive. Farmers can also apply for other
programs that entail permanent change to their land, with correspondingly higher payments,
under a premium program that essentially alters land usage. Under this program a farmer
converts arable land to unfertilized grassland or trees are planted under the Farm Woodland
Scheme. This option is designed to fundamentally change the character of the land and
prevent nitrate pollution.
The significance of the NSA program is that it addressed the root of the problem by
coupling land use with water protection and restricting intensive farming for the sake of
drinking water and the amenity quality of surface waters. It also interacted with other
preventive legal measures, such as the code of good agricultural practice and the regulations
for the storage of slurry, silage and fuel oil. All are designed to mitigate pollution of water
from farming and prevent a repetition of Britain's failure to comply with EU directives
regarding water pollution. In this manner the government has altered its social relationship
with farmers. However, it has not addressed the fundamental problem, the overproduction of
manure. This can only be addressed in an advanced nation with intensive agricultural
practices such as Britain through direct action limiting the amount of manure produced. This
would entail limiting the number of farmers, their type, their activities, and their size of
operations. Given the inequities that already exist regarding the distribution of agriculture
throughout the EU, specifically Britain's already small agricultural sector and its intensive
practices, such action is highly unlikely. In any case, such a move would contravene the
spirit of the Treaties. They call for improving the environment for all citizens of Europe and
the world. Transference of agricultural out of Europe would simply shift the problem to a
different region of the world, where the process of pollution control would have to be re
learned and applied. Thus, the problem of nitrate pollution in Britain, while being addressed,
has not been solved and it is unlikely to be solved anytime in the near future.
In addition to a more proactive stance in regards to EU directives, Britain also took
steps to conform to the EU's point source control of pollution in 1990. The Environmental
Protection Act (EPA) of 1990 formally introduced the concept of Integrated (Cross-Media)
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Pollution Control (IPC) to Britain. This was not a new idea. In 1976, the Royal Commission
on Environmental Pollution’s Fifth Report called for a version of IPC but did not suggest an
administrative structure. Instead it devoted much of its attention to methods of waste
reduction and defining media in which dangerous substances would cause the least damage
(the best practical environmental option). In 1986, a Cabinet Office review confirmed the
need for better administrative controls as they were then spread among a variety of
directorates within the Department of Environment. In itself, the recommendation was a
modest administrative reform motivated primarily by a desire to improve the technical
effectiveness of pollution control within the established traditions of British legislation.81 Her
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution was set up as an executive unit in mid 1987. Soon
afterwards, the Department of the Environment issued a consultation paper making clear its
new commitment to IPC.82 This signaled a shift away from established practices, and
followed the international movement away from “end of the pipe” approaches. In light of the
government’s acceptance of IPC and with HMIP lacking any coherent mandate, the
government introduced the Environmental Protection Act, which created the statutory
framework within which HMIP would operate.
IPC concerns the unified control of discharges to air, land and water from prescribed
installations and processes, including waste management, genetically modified organisms,
litter, etc. This approach to pollution control attempts to avoid the common situation where
control over one medium simply displaces the problem to another, without any overall
strategy for the most appropriate treatment of disposal routes. IPC was conceived with the
notion of preventing pollution at source using a cross-medium approach. HMIP was to
provide a “one-stop shop” for applications for scheduled industrial installations and
processes. Authorizations were issued based on the operator determining the “best practical
environmental option” (BPEO) using the “best available techniques not entailing excessive
cost” (BATNEEC). IPC in this sense is the application in law of Tarr*s conclusion that
polluters will seek the least expensive sink for the their wastes, although to be fair, IPC does
consider cross-medium transfers.
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In determining BPEO, operators consider the environmental consequences of
different options. For example, capturing emissions to water requires the removal of
suspended solids via natural or mechanical means, which then have to be disposed of either
at sea, in a landfill, or through incineration. Are any of the disposal routes less polluting than
an unfiltered emission? What process options were considered to reduce emissions, for
example, turning the suspended solids into organic fertilizer for sale on the open market?
BPEO was intended as a framework within which cost, benefit, ecological and community
impact were considered in a rationalized system.
Under IPC the instrument of control is the license to operate, issued as an
authorization by HMIP. Applications for process authorizations specify the type, quantity and
fate of substances discharged to water, land, and air. Without authorization, operating a
prescribed process is a criminal offense; in an industrial complex, several specific and
individual authorizations are generally required. The IPC timetable for process authorizations
was staggered over the period 1991-1996, according to process and sector. The staggering
was necessary given the numbers of processes (about 5000) and companies (20,000)
involved.

83

Like the W ater Act of 1989, the Environmental Protection Act of 1990 derived from
both domestic administrative considerations and pressure from the EU. Which was more
significant is difficult to determine. While the idea was under consideration by the British
government since 1979, they did not act until EU priorities were clear. In one sense, Britain
beat the EU to the punch by taking action prior to the promulgation of new EU law. No similar
program would appear as EU policy until adoption of the SEA in 1987. Specific controls over
processes and sectors were not introduced by the EU until 1993 under the fifth action
program. However, the direction of EU policy clearly suggested what was to come. British
participation in the discussions leading up to the SEA and the fourth action program alerted
them to the impending source-based controls. In addition their foreknowledge of the adoption
of qualified majority voting made it likely that Britain would no longer be able to employ
blocking tactics in the Council to delay environmental directives.84 Thus, it was inevitable that
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Britain would eventually face implementing directives (or methods) of which she did not
approve.
Prior to the Act, successive British governments approached negotiations with a
determination to take no actions that were economically costly, ran counter to their
environmental regulation philosophy, or were based on “spurious science.” This stance was
apparent in the discussions surrounding the discharge of dangerous substances to water.
The debate concerned the most efficient, equitable and effective means of controlling the
most dangerous substances released to water (the EU’s Black List). The Commission
advocated uniform, source-based emission standards built around what the “best available
(abatement) technology” could achieve. Conversely, Britain was adamant that standards
should be set in relation to what the local aquatic environment could bear, which was more
flexible and gave Britain a competitive advantage. The other member states favored Uniform
Emission Standards (UES) over Environmental Quality Standards (EQS) largely out of fear
that EQSs would produce unfair advantages and would result in transnational transfers of
pollution. Unfair competition would result if different countries could meet the EQS for
industrial effluents with different emission standards as the differing costs of pollution control
would mean differences in the prices of finished products. Britain, with a large coastline and
fast rivers, would be able to achieve the EQS with easier controls, entailing less cost. Other
members, who share river systems such as the Rhine, would find it difficult to negotiate an
EQS as upriver members would not feel compelled to impose stricter standards on their own
citizens to help those downstream, meaning that those downriver would have to entail higher
costs.
Britain rejected the notion of unfair competition employed by the EU, arguing that she
should benefit from the natural disposition of her rivers in the same manner that Italy
benefited from the natural occurrence of more sunshine as compared to Holland. She
argued that it would be absurd to insist that the Italians grow tomatoes only in greenhouses to
prevent “unfair competition” with the Dutch.85
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Ultimately a compromise was reached that allowed members to choose either to
have “limit values” or EQS. Subsequent daughter directives followed the same compromise,
with only Britain choosing to use EQS. While both sides held opposite positions in the debate
it is important to note that neither side consistently followed one approach only. Britain
regularly applied both types of standards. For example, a UES is used to monitor air quality
as well as nitrates in water, while an EQS is used to determine overall river quality.
The conflict continued to simmer until Britain finally agreed under EU pressure to
apply source-based BATNEEC control to a number of substances on the Commission’s list.
Thatcher’s decision, announced in November 1989, coincided with its decision to move
forward with IPC and signaled a change in philosophy and practice that was contained in the
1990 legislation.
Why Britain changed its position is unclear from a policy standpoint. None of its
previous policy’s foundations were intellectually undermined, and her recalcitrant stance had
in fact forced a compromise of sorts from the Commission. One explanation for the change
may be that Britain recognized the futility of further conflict. Her constant bickering over
environmental directives impacted her ability to conduct other business within the community.
John Major’s replacement of Margaret Thatcher as Conservative Party leader and Prime
Minister in 1990 provides a political explanation. The EU's movement towards the integration
of environmental policy throughout the entire policy framework made British acceptance
essential if she was to play a significant role within the EU. Major understood this position
wholeheartedly and wanted to alter the nature of the British relationship with the EU. Thus,
Britain may have decided to conform to EU practices to enhance her position. By moving
before the EU she showed her willingness to embrace the union's new direction. Whatever
the rationale for the change, it brought Britain into closer alignment with the rest of the
community.
Britain continued to lead from the front during John Major’s tenure as Prime Minister.
On July 8, 1991 he announced the government’s intention of forming a combined
environmental agency. Neil Carter and Philip Lowe have argued that the proposal for a fully

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

245

integrated Environmental Agency (EA) was informed by a desire to integrate, centralize,
formalize, enhance professionalism and open up the process of environmental regulation in
Britain.86 Even more importantly, it reflected a need to remove environmental regulation from
the cabinet, and thereby protect it from domestic political pressures. A parallel debate
occurred over whether to separate operational roles from regulation, in order to prevent
conflicts of interest. There was also controversy over whether the EA should adopt the
cooperative culture of HMIP or the interventionist culture of the NRA. All of the debates
demonstrated the difficulties between choosing an administrative or a scientific approach to
pollution control, which continue to the present.
Finally passed in 1995, the EA represented a merger of the former National Rivers
Authority, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution, the Waste Regulation Authorities, and
several smaller units from the Department of the Environment.87 The Agency took over the
responsibilities of its precursor organizations in addition to a variety of other tasks associated
with the environment. Two of its most significant new functions were its structural
independence, and its liaison role with foreign governments. Structural independence was
guaranteed through the appointment of a governing board that takes direction from but is not
responsible to the Department of Environment. This has allowed the EA to provide an
independent and authoritative view on a wide range of environmental issues that may involve
analysis and comment beyond the agency’s specific regulatory remit, similar to that of the
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. Independence is significant for a couple of
reasons. On the one hand, it grants the agency freedom from direct political control, which
during the 1970s and 1980s hampered the application and enforcement of environmental
legislation. Its independence will allow it to identify and study environmental problems and
solutions outside of the domestic political context, which is required if Britain is to be a good
partner within the EU.
The EA’s liaison role may be its most important. It gives the EA the opportunity to
participate in the global development of consistent environmental policies. What this has
meant in practice is that the EA addresses environmental issues directly to the EU
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Commission or the Environment Directorate General on behalf of the British government. The
EA was intended to centralize pollution control into a “one-stop” shop as a matter of
convenience for those regulated. Within the EA an increasing tendency towards the
employment of uniform emission standards has developed, which signals the further
integration of the British environment into that of the rest of Europe. The EA’s development
was significant for British relations with the EU because it reinforced the signal sent via the
introduction of IPC in 1990. While the decision to create the EA again derives from both
domestic and European considerations, it seems the latter made the difference in
determining the essential shape and operational culture of the new agency.
To conclude, Britain joined the EU for a variety of reasons, mostly for economic and
political gain. Whether she had a real choice or not is still open to question. What is certain
was that as Britain entered, the community embarked on a wide-ranging program of
environmental policymaking. Initially, Britain was not concerned, as she believed that her
environmental record was solid in comparison to Continental members. She was surprised to
learn that she did not meet the standards of environmental cleanliness prescribed in EU
directives. Worse, those standards were going to cost billions of pounds to implement, which
would place additional costs on industry and government during a time of economic restraint.
In addition, EU environmental directives challenged the British system of monitoring and
pollution control, which relied upon voluntary adherence and environmental quality standards
over uniform emission standards. The decade-long fight over standards was only resolved
when Britain, under pressure, decided to change practices and fall in line with the remainder
of the community. By that time, Britain had few options left. The political consequences of a
continued fight would have meant relegation to the sidelines of EU discussions. Joining with
the rest of the community offered a better approach politically for Britain’s future within the
EU. With regard to pollution control administration, centralization of British institutions was
well under way and in all likelihood would have occurred in its own time regardless of
changes within the EU. What is clear is that the timing of those changes was significantly
influenced by EU developments. More importantly, the changed approach, from “end of the
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pipe” to sources and processes, can be directly linked to developments in EU environmental
policy. By making these changes Britain accepted the authority of the EU to set and manage
environmental policy. That acceptance signified the formal transference of pollution control
from the national to the supranational level and acknowledged the factual reality of this policy
area as opposed to British wishful thinking.
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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

This review of British and European Union environmental legislation demonstrates
the complexities of protecting the river commons in modem Britain. It shows that the largest
obstacle to effective river management is that river water is regarded simultaneously as an
economic resource, a public utility, and a public amenity. Legislators, subject to pressures
from industrial polluters, political parties, and advocates for environmental quality, sought at
different times to locate authority at local, regional, national, and extra-national levels.
However, each effort failed to resolve the issue of authority over the environment because
the single-issue technical solutions implemented merely shifted pollution elsewhere.
Furthermore, the authorities created suffered from the structural difficulty of being both the
guardian of rivers and the largest polluter in their individual watersheds. In hindsight, Britain’s
decision to join the European Community (EU) in 1973 was fortuitous, as the nation became
subject to EU environmental directives and policies. While this created conflict between
Britain and her European partners during her initial period of membership, it ultimately led to
a supranational direction of policy for the British water environment, which resulted in
improvements in water quality and more effective management of rivers.
The Thames Valley, historically managed by a complex group of national, regional,
and local governmental agencies, served as the locus to this study. The Thames pollution
problem has three main sources: human sewage, industrial effluent, and agricultural run-off.
Of these, human sewage was, and is, the most enduring problem. This is most common in
other rivers around the world as well. Three themes were evident in study of the Thames.

The first was the struggle to define the level at which authority over the environment was
vested. British society continually sought solutions to its water pollution problems by creating
ever-larger organizational structures that were thought better equipped to resolve the
problem. While the proper sized authority was eventually found, one that conformed to
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ecological as opposed to political boundaries, it was not given the financial powers necessary
to make capital improvements on the scale necessary to resolve the pollution problem.
A second theme evident in the story of building authority over the environment was
the internal contradiction of the authority as both regulator and polluter. This structural
contradiction undermined their ability to effectively manage the environment (common), as
they were unable to demand more stringent controls on other polluters and precluded public
scrutiny. This problem was not resolved until multi-purpose authorities, created in the 1970s,
were dissolved under privatization efforts and regulatory functions were separated from water
management and sewage disposal functions.
Third was the dilemma of how to use scientific and technical knowledge effectively.
Exploration of how science is created within a socio-political framework and is utilized by
interested parties for their own purposes shed some light on this. Definitions of water
cleanliness are still open to debate as societies continually advance their understanding of
the ecological processes of river management. Most, including Britain, have determined what
is “sufficiently clean” for their own purposes within a context of cost-benefit analysis. In
Britain, this outlook finally allowed rivers to return to a condition capable of supporting aquatic
life and be utilized for industrial and amenity purposes without undue threats to public health.
This is clearly evident in the case of the Thames, which over this period was transformed
from a “dead” river to one of the healthiest tidal rivers in Europe. Decisions as to what is
“sufficiently clean” inevitably meant the acceptance of pollution to varying degrees and
precluded returning rivers to a pristine state. While some environmentalists called for such a
return, arguing that technology can produce effluents of sufficient quality to have no
detrimental impact, in effect eliminating human impact, this was fiscally irrational for most
societies to pursue.
The British experience established three principles of environmental regulation
through historical trial and error. First, regulators work best when they focus only on
remediating pollution. The British experience with multi-purpose water authorities, which
ultimately combined river management with regulatory functions, proved untenable and
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unable to protect rivers. Internal conflicts of interest distorted authorities’ activities and
relegated pollution control to secondary status. Secondly, science and technology, relied
upon as neutral authorities, were not neutral, but instead were tentative, dependent upon
social and economic conditions, and evolutionary. This is still the case today. As societies
better understand the ecological principles of rivers they continue to adopt new technologies
in an evolutionary process aimed at achieving a technical solution to water pollution.
However, these attempts only expand or reshape the terms of debate, they do not really
provide for any definitive solutions. Previous chapters discuss the evolution of the scientific
understanding of disease, a move from a miasmatic to a bacteriological foundation. Water
analysis was reshaped from one based on simple observation, to one employing chemical
analysis, to one based on both chemical and bacteriological analysis to today’s methods,
which employ all the above coupled with analysis of flora and fauna specimens drawn directly
from rivers. Lastly, natural ecosystems, such as river basins or watersheds, ultimately
provided a rational geographical and ecological framework for regulatory control and
integrated resource management on the national level. The final shift in policy authority to
the supranational level of the EU extended those controls to the bodies of water into which
rivers emptied.
The British experience with water pollution demonstrates the validity of Hardin’s
argument regarding the interconnectedness of economic activity and environmental quality.
Societies that fail to develop institutions or coercive mechanisms for managing human
ecology ultimately destroy their common resources through overuse. In Britain, rivers served
a variety of purposes, chief among them the major source of drinking water and the most
expedient place for the dumping of wastes. The “tragedy of the river” was overuse by local
authorities under pressure from industrial and population growth, particularly as a waste
depository, which resulted in destruction of its natural carrying capacities, leading to the
death of most of the lower Thames. The historical separation of authority between those
charged with water supply and those charged with river protection precluded a harmonization
of efforts during the majority of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Water suppliers
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sought distant sources to meet ever-increasing demands, avoiding local action to limit
pollution of rivers. Only in the last fifty years, when distant supplies became economically or
politically problematic, did a shift to reexamine rivers as a necessary source of supply occur.
Where supplies were drawn from rivers, the focus was consistently on the treatment of
abstracted water, not on the source of supply. Not until the mid-twentieth century, when
external supplies were no longer readily available, did suppliers begin to reexamine rivers
and make common cause with river pollution regulators to take effective action. Today, water
of the Thames is utilized three times as it travels to the sea. The importance of its suitability
(i.e., cleanliness) for diverse usages cannot be overstated. Over the past century Britain
learned that water must be conserved and reused if all divergent needs of its society are to
be met. This is a lesson many regions of the developing world only recently began to
appreciate to its fullest extent. Britain is a land considered by many to be “wet,” an
oversimplification to be sure, but mean rainfall levels are much higher than in other regions. If
British society, had to grapple with ensuring adequate supplies for its population through
reuse, the issue in other countries, which are relatively drier and have higher population
densities, will only become ever more important to their future success. In the future, water
will most certainly be a source of conflict between nations that share common rivers. The
British experience with conservation and reuse can provide practical lessons for others in
mitigating these problems.
Attempts to regulate river pollution demonstrated the effectiveness of Parliament’s
ability to legislate, but the institutions created often lacked the administrative and financial
powers necessary to effectively act on behalf of the common good. This engendered a
search to build and locate water pollution controls at the most effective level of authority,
resulting in a regional management structure based on natural river basins and controlled by
the national government. This structure is now subject to the supranational authority of the
EU.
Beginning exploration of pollution control by examining 19th century pollution in the
Thames Valley and the first national response through legislation in 1876, this study
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examined the development of local control over the environment, and looked at the role of
science and technology in defining water quality. It reviewed how early centralization efforts
were defeated and how this hampered pollution management efforts until late in the twentieth
century. River authorities such as the Thames Conservancy, the Port of London Authority
(PLA), the London County Council (LCC), and the Greater London Council (GLC) failed for a
variety of reasons, but mainly due to lack of geographical size and central government
support. Limited size meant they were unable to control enough of the sources of pollution to
have positive effects. While they sought in some cases to control pollution in their own
vicinities, they were unable to address pollution that traveled into their areas from upstream.
In this sense, their experience with transboundary pollution mimicked that of national states
on the continent who share common river resources. It was not in the interest of the local
community to expend what was believed as unreasonable sums on a problem they could not
effectively control. As a result, pollution control efforts focused on solution of immediate
problems, such as spills, instead of systematic problems such as dumping of sewage or
industrial wastes into rivers. Localism constantly undermined pollution control priorities.
Local authorities did not consider the river as a whole ecosystem and their actions simply
resulted in the transference of pollution downstream.
Movement toward centralization is clearly evident from legislative history, which
shows a progression of pollution control from the local to the regional level. Clear problems of
localism and jack of coordination began to be addressed during this period. Creation of everlarger units continually reduced the number of authorities responsible for river pollution
control. Coupled with these changes, new powers given to the authorities improved their
ability to limit the amounts of pollutants placed into rivers. In this incremental manner Britain
groped toward ecologically based structures as a solution. The rational decision to increase
the size and complexity of water authorities, to take advantage of economies of scale, was
also experienced in other resource industries such as energy. Set within the highly
competitive political environment of the era, these changes helped set the stage for local and
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national governmental reorganization that in turn enabled creation of a centralized system of
water pollution control.
Governmental re-organizations of the 1960s and early 1970s enabled further
centralization of water pollution control functions. Governmental re-organization at the local
and national level made it rational to shift pollution control management from local to central
government, while retaining practical administration at the regional level. Large
comprehensive agencies were created to manage the entire hydrological cycle of ecological
river basins. The new governmental system made Regional Water Authorities (RWAs)
appear a promising model for pollution control.
The Water Act of 1973 illustrates the synergy between government reorganization
and the application of larger pollution control units that centralized river management and
regulatory functions. While Parliamentary debates did shift from questions of administrative
machinery to political issues, this was largely due to the domestic political needs of each
party as both parties used the water environment to score political points against each other.
However, ecologists and water specialists (engineers) urged recognition that water pollution
control required conformity to ecological/hydrological principles. The new Regional Water
Authorities (RWAs) created in 1973 were based on these principles, representing a
significant change for Britain. For the first time the “environment” (river systems), not a
political unit, was recognized as the proper unit of “authority.” This recognition granted
autonomous authority to rivers themselves, changing the fundamental relationship between
society and nature. Humans would now attempt to conform to nature (in regard to river
pollution control); nature would no longer be required to conform to human social
organization. This fundamental shift in British attitudes deserves fuller analysis in the future.
Of special note is the role of politics regarding environmental issues. It is clear that at
this time as both parties were attempting to formulate their own thinking on this policy sector
neither party was willing to stand against the environment. The debates surrounding the 1973
Water Act show that Labour’s attacks were directed more for the consumption of their base
than against efforts to secure a healthier water environment. The election of 1974 saw a
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return of the Labour Party and the second Ministry of Harold Wilson. However, this political
change did not result in any revision of the 1973 Water Act. If, the Labour charges against the
Act were real, and its structure was truly an assault on “local democracy” one would have
expected wholesale revisions once Labour was in control. The fact this did not occur
suggests that the earlier charges were baseless. Labour, like the Conservatives Party before
them, could ill afford an anti-environmental perception from the public given their broad
support for a cleaner environment. Instead, Labour would focus its efforts on other legislation
that died as a result of the change in governments and would continue to address
environmental issues.
The second major change occurring in the mid 1970s was passage of the Control of
Pollution Act in 1974. Part II of the Act, specifically related to water, was a comprehensive
attempt to base pollution control on regional watershed authorities under the aegis of the
Department of the Environment, with flexible implementation of pollution control via regionally
based authorities. Critical in Part II of the COPA was transference of pollution control powers
for policy, planning, and oversight to the central government. The system failed for a number
of reasons, but largely because the economic crisis in Britain in the mid-1970s left it under
funded. Regional Water Authorities, operating as public utilities through their supply and
waste treatment functions, were prevented from borrowing in the private money markets due
to restraints imposed by Whitehall. Central government did not want Regional Water
Authorities borrowing money, pushing up interest rates for the remainder of society,
hampering economic recovery. As a result of these decisions by central government,
Regional W ater Authorities were unable to make the necessary capital investments in
sewage treatment required to produce higher quality effluents needed to improve river
quality. Because Regional Water Authorities were both regulators of river pollution in their
regions and disposal authorities for sewage, they remained the chief polluters in their
watersheds. It became increasingly difficult for Regional Water Authorities to implement
stricter controls on industry when they were unable to meet existing standards themselves.
This contradiction ultimately undermined public confidence in the new system. The large
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costs associated with infrastructure improvements necessary for improved river quality
ultimately led the Thatcher ministry to conveniently divest itself of the sewage disposal
functions via privatization.
Britain’s decision to join the European Union (EU) was ultimately significant for the
protection of the water environment as it impacted British institutions, procedures, and
standards. No sooner had the British government established central control over pollution
control policy than it was subjected to supranational influence from the EU. This was no easy
process as pollution control became entangled in a host of other controversial issues
separating Britain and her EU partners. Britain attempted to retain her traditional methods
and practices; however, these were repeatedly deemed insufficient by the European Court of
Justice. The Court’s decisions ultimately indicated that authority over the environment rested
with the Union and not with the national government. British membership in the EU shifted
but did not resolve such questions, particularly the tension between central and local
authorities, between regulators and users, or the authority of scientific or technical
knowledge. However, British membership in the EU resulted in a cleaner British
environment. EU standards, in most cases relating to the water environment, were more
stringent or rigid in comparison to the flexible practices of the Britain. British compliance with
these standards (resulting from EU pressure during the late 1980s) led to quicker
improvements in water quality than might otherwise have occurred within the traditional
system, where cost was given a dominant position in any analysis.
Improvements in the water environment are always related to issues of cost either for
new sewage works or new industrial processes that reduce the amount and concentrations of
wastes. In the modem world this is always a political question, as national governments
control the means of either imposing those costs directly on their citizens via taxation or fees,
or indirectly by passing those costs to the consumer via higher prices for products. Given the
political/economic climate in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s, it is clear the national
government was unwilling to expend resources in the amount necessary to make
improvements. This was a choice that balanced the interests of the water environment
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against those of the community at large. In this case the government chose to support the
desire for economic wealth over a healthy environment. Why Britain acted in this manner is
easily understood considering economic development is a concept easily grasped by the
public, is immediately obvious and individually desirable. In contrast, creating a healthy
environment is complex, indirectly influential, and desirable for the whole community yet
laden with individual costs. At its essence, this is the unchanging dilemma of the common.
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